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Abstract 
This thesis explores the process of economic and political reform in Egypt, by taking ,Iý I- 
into consideration the role of the Muslim Brotherhood and the politics of succession 
in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is arguably the most important political actor in 
Egypt, and by looking at how the Muslim Brotherhood developed strength over the 
decades through a process of change in its shape and character, it will allow an 
understanding of how it was able to pose a challenge to the Egyptian government at a 
time of economic reform in 1991 and the consequences, ývhich followed for the 
process of political change in Egypt. Also, a look at the process of political succession 
in Egypt, which has risen to the surface over the last 6 years, will allow an 
understanding into the actors and forces involved in the politics of succession and the 
consequences, which emerge for the future process of reform, in particular political 
refon-n in Egypt. 
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Chapter I- Framing Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East 
1.1 Introduction 
A causal relationship has been hypothesised between economic and political 
liberalization, with economic liberalisation viewed as a key driver in the process of 
political change (Fnedman, 1962; Hayek, 1960). Economic liberalisation is belleved 
to roll back the state creating political space to exist, in which civil society can 
develop. As civil society groups proliferate, the argument runs, individuals become 
more assertive in demanding their political rights. Once these demands reach a certain 
pitch, authoritarian leaders are forced to make meaningful changes or risk being swept 
away (Cook, 2005). The policy implications of this casual relationship between 
economic and political liberalisation are simple; to encourage economic liberalisation 
to promote the growth of civil society. Thus this casual relationship has underpinned 
the work of IFI's and aid agencies, in the Middle East. However, it has been 
problematic to examine the link between economic and political liberalisation in the 
region, for 2 main factors. First, the level and extent of economic liberalisation has 
not been consistent , in most cases 
it has been restrictive and minimal. Second, 
regional cnsis's, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and border clashes between 
countries (i. e. Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Iran and Iraq), have been continuously used 
by power elites to keep in place autocratic mechanisms and institutions. As a result, 
these 2 factors have, no doubt problematised an examination of the link between 
economic and political liberalisation in the region. 
Thus, this research does not aim to address the relationship, if any betwccii economic 
and political libcralization but does seek to examine the process of economic and 
political change in Egypt. with particular reference to the period, 1991-2006. In order 
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to do this, I focus especially on the role of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) In Egypt 
and its role in the process of political change by examining changes it has undergone 
in its shape and character, which has allowed it to become a key political actor in 
Egypt. In addition to this I look at the way in which the Egyptian state has sought to 
manage the politics of succession, by taking into consideration the actors and forces 
dnving the politics of succession in Egypt. The Egyptian case is located ý, vithin the 
broader context of the Middle East. In doing this, four important questions emerge. 
These are the following: to what extent has there been a process of economic and 
political reform in Egypt? To what extent has this process of economic and political 
change allowed for the emergence of a functioning civil society? To what extent has 
this allowed political actors such as the MB to challenge state power? Finally, to what 
extent is the role of the MB symptomatic of challenge to the legitimacy of the existing 
state dispensation? To address these questions, this thesis will first examine the 
process of economic and political reforrn in the context of the Middle East. This will 
be done in Chapter 2, which in addition locates the questions in the context of 
regional and global developments such as US foreign policy post September II th I 
200 1, and the subsequent (war on terror'. 
The case of Egypt and the MB is detailed in chapters 3-8. These chapters set out the 
economic and political changes in Egypt. In particular they provide an understanding 
into the process of political change by exploring the MB. This is done by examining 
the details of transformation of the MB from a religious movement into a central 
political actor in Egyptian politics. I xvill. examine how the MB emerged as a strong 
political force and how internal reforrns to the way in which the MB organises itself 
have contributed to its increasim; strength in Egy ian political life. I also situate the ltý - pti I 
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intemal political and organisational transformations inside the MB alongside shifts in IIIIIII 
the spintual and ideological discourse that the MB promotes. This is important. as by 
understanding these shifts, the process of change in the MB's shape and character and 
how it has come to relate to the Egyptian state can be more readily understood. This 
will allow an understanding of how the MB has become a key agent in Egyptian 
politics and how it has been able to challenge the authority and possibly the 
hegemony of the Egyptian government. A significant reason for the importance of the 
MB in Egyptian politics and the increased interest in their role relates to the post 9/11 
debate concerning democratization in the Middle East and the role of US foreign 
policy identified as promoting democracy in the region. In this process of 
democratization, Egypt has come to be viewed as a key actor in spearheading the 
process of political change due to its close relationship with the United States and its 
key regional role in the Middle East. The MB is arguably the single largest political 
force in Egypt. Since 1991 it has become the main competitor against state power 
that has dramatically raised the profile of the MB. As a result the MB has become 
central to the process of economic and political change in Egypt. 
A detailed examination of the MB will be followed by exploring the politics of 
succession in Egypt, which has risen to the surface of Egyptian politics over the last 6 
years. This has been due to the increasing role and power of Gamal Mubarak in 
Egyptian politics. The rise of Gamal and his associates in the echelons of Egyptian 
politics has raised many questions pertaining to the future of economic and political 
change in Egypt. Therefore, as the talk of political succession is developing speed and 
strength, it is important to explore the discourse surrounding political succession, 
taking into consideration the actors involved, the grooming process and the forces 
driving the political succession in Egy II pt. In addition to this, it is important to examine 
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the role of key political actors. such as the MB, a key political weight, in order to 
determine their influence and impact on the political succession process. This 
discussion, will allow a basis from which to explore the future process of economic 
and political change in Egypt, in particular the level of continuity and discontinuity in 
the process of economic and political change arising ftom a succession process in 
Egypt. 
1.2 Methodology 
The methodology, which will be used for this study, is based on an intensive generic 
research design, which allows for an investigation of a single, interesting, critical 
incident or event to gain a deep understanding of the processes involved. This may be 
a case study of a person, organization or nation. The strengths of the intensive design 
are that it allows for investigation of one case. Therefore for this study this method is 
appropriate as it allows a focus to be made upon Egypt, in particular the process of 
economic and political reform in Egypt post 1991 and the wider debates concerning 
the MB and the politics of succession in Egypt. 
The research will incorporate both primary and secondary data. The pnmary data is 
data that a researcher collects through observations and interviews. The secondary 
data is data that already exists (somebody else has created), such as archival and 
questionnaires-, which are already in the public domain. The main advantage of using 
secondary data is the enon-nous savings in resources, particularly time and money. 
However, secondary data should be used carefully, as the data will have been 
collected for a specific purpose that differs ftom the set research questions. 
Consequently, the data that is being considered may be inappropnate to the research 
questions at hand. 
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For this study. primary data will be collected through the use of interviews. with 
leading academics. politicians and thinkers in Egypt. The methodology can 
be classed as being structured and unstructured. In a structured intem'ew. such as 
survey interviews one uses a standardized set of interview procedures, questions are 
asked in the same order and often in the same interview setting. In contrast 
unstructured interviews are described as reflexive interviewing, where questions are 
not asked in an orderly manner but in response to the answers that are being provided 
by the interviewer. The interview methodology that was applied in this research is the 
structured method as it provides an opportunity to ask a fixed set of questions to the 
interviewees, thus allowing a comparison of answers to be made. The secondary data 
will be collected through the use books, journals and media sources. In particular 
there will be the use of a range of newspaper sources (i. e. Egyptian, US and British 
newspapers); this use of newspapers will contribute with the interviews to a new 
contribution to the research through original interpretation of the newspaper sources 
allowing answers to be sought in relation to the research questions. 
1.3 Field Work 
The carrying out of fieldwork was an important aspect of my research. It entailed me 
visiting Egypt for approximately 5 months in 2004, between the months of April and 
August. I was located in the capital city of Cairo and had access to the resources 
a\, ailable iti the American University of Cairo and the University of Cairo. The 
objective behind the fieldwork was three fold. The first objective was to develop a 
comprehension into Egyptian society and politics by living in Egypt, which could not 
be attained through secondary sources of literature. The fieldwork in Egypt added a 
vital dimension of personal expenence to my research, which would have been absent 
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without its conduct. The second objective ývas to collect information concerning 
Egyptian reform (i. e. economics and politics), state-society relations and political 
actors, such as the MB by accessing the resources available at the American 
University of Cairo and the University of Cairo. The information accessed ý, vas in the 
form of masters and doctorate theses, which provided an important understanding into 
the key themes of this research, such as Egyptian reform, the MB and the politics of 
succession. Finally, an important objective was to add a new contribution to the 
research by conducting personal interviews with leading academics, thinkers, 
commentators and politicians in Egypt. This exercise was of paramount importance as 
it provided me with the thoughts and opinions of those familiar with the economic and 
political dynamics in Egypt. In addition I was able to ask specific questions to the 
interviewees to obtain detailed answers, in relation to my research themes O. e. 
Egyptian refonn, the MB and the politics of succession). The interviews were 
conducted mainly in Cairo and lasted approximately for 1 1/2 hours. In some cases 
the interviews were shorter dependent upon the working schedule of the individuals 
interviewed. Notes were taken in the interview, which respondents found acceptable. 
1.4 Limitations and Difficulties Experienced in the Field Work 
The fieldwork in Egypt was made easier by the contacts I had received through my 
supervisor Professor Ray Bush, which immediately gave me, leads which I could 
pursue and devclop into a more extensive contact list. Therefore I was relatively 
pleased in relation to the contact details I received and the Individuals I Interviewed. 
The individuals interviewed were more than happy to assist in providing the details of 
their friends and contacts, which could assist me in my research. As a result. the 
Possible limitation and difficulty in accessing- and meeting individuals that is usually I- 
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encountered by research students in their respective field xxorks , vas not encountered 
by my self in Egypt. 
Most of the interviewees spoke a good level of English, which was of great help in the 
interview process. In some instances I required an interpreter to comprehend what 
was being said but this was not a major difficulty or burden as Diglish is ,, videly 
spoken within Egyptian academic and political circles. A major difficulty encountered 
during the fieldwork-concerned entrance into a number of academic and research 
institutions in Egypt. The level of security throughout Cairo is extremely stringent and 
high, which was also the case at the academic and research institutions, which I 
visited. This level of security made it difficult to enter. For example, this problem was 
encountered at the University of Cairo and the Center for Criminological and 
Sociological Research. In some instances I was allowed to enter after consultation 
with the security personnel in the institutes and in other situations there was no 
leniency by the security personnel in relation to entrance. This did impact adversely 
on my research schedule. 
Another major limitation and difficulty in the conduct of fieldwork was accessibility 
to Islamist figures. It would have been of great benefit if I could have met with 
leading figures from Islamist organizations such as the MB but unfortunately this did 
not materialize. This was due to personnel security, which took precedence over the 
arrangement of interviews ý, vith controversial figures. On entering Egypt I faced 
difficulty due to my Pakistani ethnic origin. After a grueling episode at Cairo Airport 
I took the option not to meet Islai-nist activists. In order to make up for this limitation 
in research, I accessed the email addresses of some Islamist activists and conducted 
8 
brief inter-views over the intemet. The questions were short and bnef but I was able to 
extract the information that was needed for my research. 
1.5 Contribution and Significance of the Studý, 
An evaluation of economic and political refonn in the Middle East has received much 
consideration post September II th , 2001 in particular from the US to enact its policy 
of democracy promotion (Dalacoura, 2005; Nufrio, 2004). Given, that Egypt is a key 
actor in the region, there has been scrutiny on its process of economic and political 
reform. This study adds to this scrutiny by providing detailed examination of the 
process of economic and political change in Egypt, particularly relating it to the role 
of the MB through changes to its shape and character and the process of political 
succession. The importance of this study is twofold. First, this study contextualizes 
the subject of economic and political reform, by relating it to the role of the MB, 
through examining its changing shape and character and the politics of succession. 
Second, this study also takes into consideration the contemporary context and the 
wider war on terror, which resulted in US foreign policy directing itself towards 
promoting economic and political reform in the region. Therefore this study adds the 
importance of a new domestic, regional and international dimension to the subject of 
economic and political reform in Egypt and the Middle East, which has been a source 
of study over the decades. 
1.6 Chapterisation 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 2 examines authoritarianism and 
democratisation within the Middle East. It also examines the extent to which westem 
constructs of civil society can be applied to understanding the role played by 
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organizations such as Islamist parties as actors able and willing to challenge the 
hegemony exercised by state elites. This chapter provides the backdrop to move onto 
the case study at hand, which is Egypt. Chapter 3 examines internal economic and 
political changes in Egypt since the beginning of economic reform in 1991. This is 
done in order to determine whether the process of change allowed political actors to 
challenge the Egyptian state's power and its structures. Chapter 4 examines the MB 
(1928-1975), by taking into consideration the evolution of the MB, through a study of 
its growth and development. Chapter 5 examines the changing shape and character of 
the MB, through documenting the rise of the new guard and its participation in 
parliamentary elections that set into process the MB's transition into a key political 
actor in Egypt. Chapter 6 examines further changes in the shape and character of the 
MB, through its participation in professional syndicates in the 1980s, which allowed 
the MB to construct a challenge to state power and its structures in the 1990s. Chapter 
7 examines the discourse concerning political succession in Egypt and in particular, it 
explores the rise of Gamal Mubarak and the forces, which are driving the process of 
succession in Egypt. Also it looks at the role of key political actors, such as the MB in 
terins of their influence and impact on the politics of succession in Egypt. Chapter 8 
examines the future process of economic and political change in Egypt, by taking into 
consideration the implications of a succession process for the level of continuity and 
discontinuity in the process of economic and political change in Egypt. Chapter 9 
provides a conclusion to the research. 
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Chapter 2- Shifting Sands- The Middle East in between Authoritarian'sm and 
Democratisation 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will explore the process of economic and political change in the Middle 
East, taking into consideration the impact of any process of political change on state 
powers and structures. In doing this it is important to explore the following questions: 
to what extent has there been a process of economic and political reform in the 
Middle East? To what extent has this process of economic and political change 
allowed for the emergence of a functioning civil society? To what extent has this 
allowed political actors such as Islamists parties to challenge state power? Finally, to 
what extent is the role of the Islamist parties symptomatic of challenges to the 
legitimacy of the existing state dispensation? Also it is important to examine US 
foreign policy post 9/11, to deten-nine the extent to which it has been inclusive of 
democracy promotion in the Middle East. This will allow a conclusion to be made on 
the prospect of political change in the region in the context of the on going war on 
terror. 
2.2 Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East 
2.2.1 Economic Reform 
The Middle East undertook economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, with the 
'Washington Consensus' laýqng down the economic reform programme (Williams, 
1990,1996,1997). The key targets of the 'Washimgton Consensus' included the 
introduction of government budgetary balances, low inflation, market determined 
prices and the fiberalisation of economic sectors (Dhumale, 2000; Hank and Sullivan, 
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1992-, Erian et al, 1996). To achieve. these targets economIc refonn was shaped by 
two key processes. The first process was the macroeconomic stabilisation of the 
economy through the use of tight fiscal and monetary policies. The second process 
was the structural adjustment of the economy through privatisation, the removal of 
price controls, liberalisation of trade, banking, agriculture and other economic sectors 
(Easterly, 2001; Killick, 1995; Bird, 1995). However, the Arab States were somewhat 
inconsistent in carrying out economic reforms. The Arab States showed commitment 
to the process of macroeconomic stabilisation but did not show as much dedication in 
the context of structural adjustment. They preferred a piecemeal approach to structural 
adjustment in contrast to the 'shock approach' advocated by the IFFs. Two main 
reasons can be presented for this: 
1) A number of strikes and protests in the 1980s and 1990s, in response to economic 
policies, such as the removal of price controls and privatisation concerned the power 
elites. This led them to pursue a more cautious method to structural adjustment 
(Sadiki, 2000; Burke, 1987). For example, in August 1983, the Moroccan 
government reduced consumer subsidies by 20 percent, triggering urban unrest in the 
north and elsewhere. The abrupt way, in which the Jordanian government attempted 
to raise fuel prices in 1989, ignited riots in the southern city of Ma'an and resulted in 
the death of II people (Ryan, 1998). Similar protests and strikes took place in Tunis 
in 1984 and in Khartoum in 1982 and 1985 (Bayet, 2003). 
2) In society powerful vested interests blocked economic refonn. They blocked 
economic refon-n or ensured that specific reform is passed through that will ensure 
capital accumulation. Therefore the results were inconsistent, in which regimes 
embraced somc, cconomic reforms relating to macro economic stabilisation yet 
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postponed or evaded more complex reforms related to structural adjustment such as 
privatisation, reform of regulatory rules and the development of the rule of law 
(Richards, 2001). For example, the Egyptian economic reform experience in the 
1990s is indicative of powerful vested interests that blocked parts of economic reform 
that threatened their economic status. The top layers of the army-bureaucracy, the 
power elite created by Nasser in a similar manner to their fonner Russian allies 
responded negatively to the process of privatisation and the liberalisation of a number 
of key economic sectors such as, insurance, trade and banking. A symbiosis between 
governmental regulators and businessmen developed; in particular insider trading in 
the construction sector, where public land was sold cheaply to a fiiend, who would 
then re-sell the land at the market value (Hirst, 1999). 
Therefore, as a result of these 2 reasons (i. e. political risk and the role of vested 
interests) power elites embraced economic reforms relating to macroeconomic 
stabilisation but often abandoned or evaded structural adjustment such as 
marketisation, pnvatisation, reform of institutions and regulatory practices (Richards, 
'1001). Thus, Arab States balanced a fine line between meeting economic refon-n 
demanded from the IFI's and internal demands (i. e. the public and vested interests). In 
particular, Arab States worked hard to minimise the socio-economic fallout by 
pursuing an inconsistent approach to economic reform. Despite this endeavour by 
Arab States, the social and economic changes in the region in the 1990s were 
worrying. 
2.2.2 Social and Economic Changes 
The neo liberal economic reforms provoked a number of socio-economic changes. 
The market centric reforms made consumer commodities vastly more accessible and 
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enriched the upper socio-economic strata while also increasing income disparities and 
causing critIcal changes in labour markets. The size of informal and marginalized 
groups, such as the unemployed, casual workers, and street subsistence labourers, 
expanded rapidly (LTNHDP, 2002; Economist, July 6'h, 2002). The level of 
unemployment was worrying, which continued to increase in the 1990s (Richards, 
2001). The average unemployment rate for the 6 largest non-oil or diversified 
economies in the region (Syria, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Morocco and Tunisia) rose from 
12.7 per cent in 1990 to 15 per cent in 2000 (Gardner, 2003). In the 1990s, more than 
one-third of Morocco's youth were unemployed, while in Syria youth unemployment 
was at 73 percent (Heydeman, 2004). The women in the Middle East were 
unemployed at twice the rate of men. Vast segments of the workforce were in the 
informal sector, with no access to the benefits of fon-nal employment (Heydeman, 
2003). A WB study in 2002 of 16 Middle Eastern and North African countries, 
representing about 60 percent of the population in the entire region, showed that up to 
47 million new jobs would need to be created between 2002 and 2012 merely to keep 
pace with new entrants into the labour market (Keller and Nabli, 2002). An additional 
6.5 million jobs would be needed to reduce the unemPloyment rate to just below 10 
percent. This study indicates the challenge of unemployment in the Middle East. The 
levels of unemployment within the Middle East can be seen from table I below; 
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Table 1: Unemployment Rates in the Middle East 
Country Unemployment Rates Remarks 
Algeria 30 Data from 1999. 
Egypt 12 2000. some estimates 
show 20 % 
Iran 20-25 Data from 2001 
Jordan 15 Official rate 
Lebanon 18 Data from 1998 
Libya 29 Data from 2000 
Morocco 15-22 Data from '1000 
Saudi Arabia 14-18 Higher among graduates 
Syria 12-15 Data from 1999 
Tunisia 16 Data from 1999 
Yemen 35 Data from 1999 
Sources: Saudi Arabia. ) US Embassy, Riyadh and New 
York Times 26/08/01; Iran, Le 
Monde Diplomatique 05/06/2001. All other MEDEA Institute and CIA World fact 
book, 2001. 
In the 1990s, the socio-economic problems in the region were not helped, by the 
economic withdrawal of the state. Many social provisions were withdrawn, and the 
low-income groups largely had to rely on themselves to survive. For instance, in 
Egypt, state subsidies on certain basic foodstuffs such as rice, sugar, and cooking oil 
werc removed, and subsidies on items such as fuel, power, and transportation were 
reduced. Rent control was reconsidered, a new land Law in 1992 ended tenant 
farniers' control over land. and public-sector refon-n and privatization continued, all 
with sig-nificant social costs. From as early as 1993, a United States Agency for 
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IU social conditions International Development report was warning of the -deteriorating 
in Egypt" (USAID, 1993). ThIs was because the levels of unemployment, poverty, 
and income gaps reportedly increased in Egypt (Westley, 1998, Amin, 1998). Similar 
socio-economic changes took place in Jordan, which were escalated by events such as 
the Gulf War in 1991 , which 
deepened the crisis there (Majdalani, 1999). In Iran, the 
government moved in between statism and free-market policies in the 1990s. The 
direction of economic liberalization in Iran was slow, due to the struggle among rival 
political factions for economic self-interest and the losers were the Iranian public., 
with Iran experiencing heightened social and economic crisis in the 1990s. 
Therefore overall social and economic changes in the Middle East were negative- 
notably the increasing levels of unemployment and poverty. These socio-economic 
changes posed a danger to the survival and security of the Arab States in the 1990s. In 
response to growing internal socio-economic pressure, Arab States began to 
experiment with the process of political liberalisation- the strategic opening up of 
political space in society to allow limited political participation. This was a 
significant change in behaviour of the Arab State. Given this drastic change in 
behaviour, it is important to explore the process of political liberalisation in the 
Middle East during the 1990s, in particular to detennine the extent to which this 
process allowed political space to political actors to contest state power and its 
structures. 
2.2.3 The Shift from Authoritarianism to Political Liberalisation 
During the late 1980s and 1990s, the mixture of elite politics, patronage, selective 
repression, and patrImonialism came under pressure due to the growing socio- 
economic cnsis in the Middle East (Brumberg, 2002; Bromley, 1994; Niblock and 
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Murphy, 1993). These changes resulted in the Arab States changing their beha,,, -iour 
resulting in reworking of the rules of the political game in the Middle East. This 
created the foundations for the process of political liberalisation in the region. which 
allowed political actors, secular and Islamic to enter the system. In Egypt 
parliamentary elections were held in 1990, Syria extended the number of seats in the 
legislature to include 60 independents, the Gulf monarchs created consultative 
chambers, Jordan held its first elections for a substantial period in 1989 and Yemen 
held elections in 1993 (Kechichian, 2004; Rumaihi, 1996, Nonneman, 2001, Bensahel 
and Byman, 2004; Ehteshami, 2003). Thus, a tide of political change was witnessed 
which brought enthusiasm for change in the Middle East (lbrahim, 1995; Sadiki, 
1997). However, this enthusiasm did not last long, as the reworking of the rules, did 
not weaken the state. 
In countries ruled by single parties, such as in Syria, this process of political 
liberalisation did not lead to a weakening of state power and structures (Albrecht and 
Schlumberger, 2004). This dynamic of political liberalisation led to parties created 
from one faction or another of the ruling establishment, therefore the liberalization of 
party life did not create parties with strong gTass root support and constituencies 
(Brumberg, 2002-, Salame, 1994). Instead, this process by the Syrian regime largely 
prolonged the personal or familial networks that had long sustained the traditional 
Syrian elite institutions and structures, in the context of state-managed liberalization. 
As for the inonarchies of Morocco, Jordan, and to some extent Kuwait, xhile they 
NN, cre iiot characterised by dominant ruling parties as in the case of Egypt and Syria, 
the close links between opposition party leaders and the king nevertheless ensured 
what was often a remarkable level of consensus (Brumberg, 2002). In addition, the 
power of the state continued, through the executive's dominance, which is enshrined 
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in the constitutions of the Arab world, which either explicitly give the monarch or 
president ultimate authority (as is the case in Morocco, Egypt, and Yemen). or 
implicitly do the same by not providing a decisive separation of powers that makes it 
possible for elected assemblies to represent the will of elected majorities. During the 
early and mid- I 990s, this arrangement invited periodic conflicts between legislatures 
and executives on a range of issues such as party and press laws. However 
mainstream secular opposition parties were not strong enough to question and contest 
the basic rules of the game, which characterised liberalising Arab States. In fact, 
legislative-executive conflicts and crisis's worked in the favour of the executive. On 
various occasions leaders dissolved parliaments, as was the case in Jordan in 2001, or 
forced the resignation of an existing cabinet, as was the case in Kuwait in 2002 (Herb, 
2002,2005). Executives, who had mastered the art of political survival, in fact 
introduced a new set of political reforms, which effectively strengthened the powers 
of the executive at a time of liberalisation. This was often accomplished by creating 
an upper house whose appointed or indirectly elected members, had the authority to 
block the legislation of the lower house and thus can effectively defend the supremacy 
of the executive. Such was the case with Morocco's constitutional refonns in 1996, 
with those of Algeria in 1996, and those of Bahrain in 2002. 
As a result, the process of political liberalisation witnessed in the 1990s did not 
weaken the state's powers and its structures. However, the secular opposition forces 
and even Islamists continued to accept and play by the rules of the game being 
introduced by the Arab States. A key reason for this acceptance to play by the rules of 
the game was pragmatism. For Islamists entrance into the political system was vital, 
in giving thern an insider status, thus allowing them to contest state power at the 
national level. In Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen, reforrns at different times have made it 
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possible for opposition parties (i. e. secular and Islamic) to participate in multi-party 
cabinets, and in Morocco, to form a govemment that during the mid-1990swas led by 
the opposition. Therefore the opposition has entered state managed power sharing 
arrangements, whether in parliament or government, which has meant coordinating 
themselves not only with the state but alternative political, forces as well (Brumberg, 
2002). For example, beginning in 1997, the Algerian regime and opposition parties 
adopted a system by which Islamists, liberal secularists, ethnic Berbers, and state 
apparatchiks shared seats in a parliament. While the latter had no real power, under its 
roof an aura of peaceful coexistence between different parties and identities emerged. 
This in fact assisted in survival of the Algerian state after 8 years of bitter civil war. 
In far away Kuwait, secularists and Islamists since 1992 have sat in a parliament that 
is probably the most vocal and obstructionist institution of its kind in the Arab world. 
Secular and Islamist parliamentarians occasionally have joined forces on issues such 
as foreign investment, and have attempted to challenge and contest the complex set of 
formal and informal mechanisms that allow the royal family to prevent any one 
faction from actually controlling the parliament or using an election victory to impose 
its cultural or social agenda on the rest of society (Brumberg, 2002; Crystal, 1990). 
Kuwait's relatively open society gives Islamists and secularists opportunities to 
express themselves in parliament and in a variety of newspapers and civil society 
institutions. 
Like the case of Kuwait, seculansts and Islamists found a niche for themselves inside 
the political system across the Middle East in the 1990s. However, the secular 
opposition lacked a strong social base, therefore existence outside the system, which 
would havc allowed them to exert bottom up and top down pressure on the state. In 
contrast, Islamists would use their existence outside the system (i. e. social base) to 
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assist their agenda inside the political system. Also, the Islamists outside power 
would be facilitated by the proliferation of civil society organizations in the 1990s, 
which would allow Islamists to exert a greater degree of outside pressure on state 
power and its structures. Unable to cope with the manifold social , economic, and 
humanitarian challenges facing the state, governments let nongovernmental or quasi- 
nongovernmental groups initiate programmes in health, the enviromment, and 
education. Longstanding professional associations representing lawyers, journalists, 
businessmen, academics, doctors, and engineers also became more active and 
politicized as they attempted to become substitutes for weak political parties. In 
particular this opening up of space in civil society provided further room for Islamist 
parties and organisations to mobilise outside the system in order to contest and 
challenge state power, thus testing the liberalising credentials of Arab States by 
launching a challenge to state power from inside the system and also outside through 
civil society. 
2.3 Islamists Politics, Civil Society and its Challenge to the Arab State. 
The western construct of civil society has for some time been at the centre of attention 
for both academics and policy-makers, in the light of its very close association with 
the democratic process (Cavatorta, 2006). In western societies, the existence of an 
autonomous space between the state, the market and the family is believed to sustain 
the democratic political system, due to its ability to bring citizens together without 
coercion. The voluntary nature of movements, which mobilise around very different 
and, at times, conflicting issues and interests allows society to develop ties and 
iietworks (Gellner. 1994). The existence of such an active civil society is presented as 
a positive development for democracy, because it promotes the interaction of people 
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in a voluntary setting, allowing differences of opinion to be taken into account 
because of the diverse interests of mobilising groups. The state does not interfere with 
this autonomous space where demands can develop, issues can be discussed and 
activities organised. 
The positive implications that an active civil society has in western democratic 
countries have been transferred to authoritarian states. In this different political 
context, the ability of independent social actors to prise away an autonomous sphere 
of action from the state is perceived to be vital in undennining the authoritarianism 
that characterises political, economic, cultural and social relationships. This is 
because a sphere with no official state intervention is allowed to develop, and become 
an organic space within which political demands and pressures can be made on an 
authoritarian political system (Norton, 1994-1995). Following from this, the literature 
on transitions to democracy investigates the role of civil society in the demise of 
authoritarianism. The literature points out the fact that countries with a growing civil 
society were either democratic or getting there, while countries with a weak and 
passive civil society were deeply authoritarian and likely to remain so. In relation to 
the Middle East, early studies indicated that the absence of democracy in the region 
was partly explained through the absence of truly active and independent civil 
societies. This absence was blamed on Islam, which was believed to require passive 
citizens. The Muslim world is viewed as waiting for the 'just prince' to initiate 
political refon-ris and take control of societal development, rather than mobi i. ing *1 s 
itself independent] y (Margin, 1995). However, Norton's (1995-96) extensive study on 
CiNil society in the rc_gion contradicted much of this previous scholarship. His study 
demonstrated that civil society activism in the Middle East had been largely ignored 
in the acacicnlic, "'orld, but was an important political reality. According to Nonneman, 
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'Norton's study demolished the myth that the region ý, vas uniquely lacking in such a 
category, while examining the varieties and variations within it' (2001, p143). While 
. it still 
left open this study by Norton, quickly became the conventional understanding i 
the problem of Middle Eastern authoritarianism. If one wanted to explain the absence 
of democracy in the region through the western construct of 'civil society '. it could 
no longer be argued that Middle Eastern societies were passive and inactive, because 
there was now evidence to the contrary. 
In response to the findings of Norton, some were led to explain the absence of 
democracy in the region by emphasising that the few associations and movements that 
were truly autonomous from the regime were far too vibrant and too politicised to 
foster the democratic process in the Middle East. The popularity of this explanation is 
due largely to the fact that the most active and popular civil society actors have been 
Islamists. Their activism is perceived to be uncivil rather than civil, and therefore 
more conducive to authoritarian political and social relationships than to democratic 
ones. Sami Zubaida gives an account of this: 'many secularist writers have tried to 
exclude Islam and Islamism from definitions of civil society. This is partly on the 
grounds that Islam and Islamism are part of traditional and primordial formations, and 
partly on the perceived incompatibility of a religious-based society, sought by 
Islamism, with pluralist democracy' (2001, p 239). Islamic movements such as the 
Egyptian MB have been presented as undennining the positive connotations which 
civil society holds (see Bennan 2003). At a policymaking level, the US has been 
warned not to be so enthusiastic about civil society in the Middle East precisely 
because the most activc actors are Islamists and the 'Islamist sector does not 
'1004, p 12). To quote Berman, 'a final constitute a pro-dernocracy force' (Hawthorne, ý 
important lesson that the EgNptian case teaches that at least in certain contexts, the 
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civil society sceptics may have a clearer vision than its proponents. The (growth of 
civil society should not be considered an undisputed good. but a politically neutral 
multiplier' (2003, p 266). 
This explanation that authoritarianism in the Middle East remains robust because civil 
society is dominated by Islamists, thereby not allowing civil society to trigger a real 
process of democratic political change faces a number of shortcomings (Cavatorta, 
2006; Brumberg, 2002). First of all, the labelling of all Islamists as being un- 
democratic does not reflect the reality. There are certain Islamists who indeed make a 
point of strongly emphasising their democratic beliefs and political behaviour, such as 
the Tunisian Nahda Party or the Algerian Movement for Society and Peace. In 
addition, Islamists also vary both in ideology and methods from one another, due to 
confessional differences, leadership style and external constraints. To assume that 
they are all the same because of a shared Islamic belief is misleading and incorrect 
(Norton, 1995; Schwedler, 1998-1999,1998). The second shortcoming is the 
empirical focus on violent groups and their use of political violence. This fails to take 
into consideration, Islamists which represent large sectors of society that would 
otherwise lack any representation, such as the marginalised youth of the shantytowns, 
women from poor backgrounds and sectors of the disaffected middle classes. Their 
welfare work and their constant criticism of the incumbents are the pillars of their 
strategy. Thirdly, to argue that democracy is absent in the region because of the 
existence of Islamists in civil society underestimates the nature of the Arab states 
undcr cxamination, which are highly repressive and rely heavily on the 'coerciý,, e 
apparatus' (see Posusney 2004). Therefore, based on the above shortcomings it seems 
misguided to labcl civil society in the Arab world authontarian simply because of the 
role of Islamist,,,. Thcv operatc in a political context where competing views and ideas 
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are present and they have to come to terms with that. Therefore, it then becomes 
imperative to examine Islamists opposition and their contribution to the process of 
polltical reform, without utilising sweeping statements about the intrinsic illiberal 
nature of Islamists and their presumed 'totalitarian' social activism. This can be 
explored by examining 3 Islamist parties, which exist inside and outside the system in 
Jordan, Morocco and Bahrain. 
A) The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood- The Islamic Action Front 
The Jordanian MB has long been integrated into the political mainstream due to its 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy. It has been tacitly 
recognized first as a charitable organization and later as a quasi-political organization, 
which has openly fielded candidates in parliamentary elections albeit under a different 
name (Islamic Action Front - IAF). The relationship between the MB and the Palace 
has been beneficial over the years for the MB, which has allowed it to expand its 
influence in Jordan. Successive Jordanian monarchs have found that the MB has been 
more useful politically as an ally than as an opponent as it secured Islamist support in 
countering Arab nationalist interference during the 1960s and secular Palestinian 
nationalism in the 1970s (Tamimi, 1999). Jordanian Islamists have been most 
effective at gaining control of Jordan's educational system. After the Brotherhood 
sided with King Hussein during the Black September crisis of 1970, in which the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization openly clashed with the Jordanian anned forces, 
King Hussein granted the MB control over the Education Ministry. Through its 
extensive charitable networks, the MB also established a number of Sunni Muslim 
schools (Ifadhaheb), in addition to institutions of higher education. The MB's 
educational, social, and health services lia\, e grown so extensive over the years that 
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some experts believe that the MB budget for services rivals that of the Jordanian 
government. In 1992, the MB's political wing, IAF was legally recognized as a 
political party in Jordan under a new political party's law, which allowed the MB to 
be represented at the national level. Three years before that, Jordanian Islamists 
running as independents gained almost 40% of the seats in parliament. The 
government responded by altering the electoral law, changing the system from a 
multiple/transferable vote system in which voters could cast as many ballots as there 
were seats in their constituency, to a one-person, one vote system, which led most 
voters to choose candidates from their extended families or tribes over ideological 
parties, such as the IAF (Clark, 2004). Those Jordanians who did vote for the IAF 
hailed predominately from urban areas dominated by middle class Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin. Government-IAF relations deteriorated after the 1994 peace 
agreement with Israel, which resulted in the government constraining IAF political 
activity in mosques and professional syndicates. In response the IAF boycotted the 
1997 elections. The most recent parliamentary elections, held on June 17,2003 gave 
62 seats in the II 0-member lower house to conservative, independent, and tribal allies 
of King Abdullah. However, the IAF won 22% of the vote, thereby gaining 18 seats in 
the lower house, plus 6 sympathizers. When asked about the IAF's prospects in ftiture 
elections, one member reportedly remarked that "I am not optimistic that we can win 
a majority now, because the laws have still not been changed.... But we are not trying 
to take everything away. We just want to take part in a fair process", (New York 
Times, May, 2006). Therefore despite political engineenng to undermine the 
represciitation of the IAF, it continues to work within the political system in order to 
have a voicc at the national level, which has allowed it to address economic issues 
such as corruption. pri\, atization, and poverty but also political issues such as political 
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freedom, transparency and even sensitive issues such as the peace agreement with 
Israel. The IAF is firmly embedded in Jordan through the MB and it is likely to pose 
more pressure on the state in the future, but the state has not remained idle and has 
fought back which can be seen from the breakdown in relations between the IAF and 
King Abdullah. Recently the state banned independent religious edicts to be given 
without the states approval, constraining the activity of the MB but at the same t' ime 
has weakened the IAF by stripping the political immunity of 4 IAF MP's and 
imprisoning them. Therefore it is likely that this cyclical relationship is to continue 
but there is no doubt that the Jordanian Islamists have challenged the boundaries of 
economic and political reform in Jordan and are likely to continue to do so as their 
strength grows. 
B) The Moroccan Muslim Brotherhood- The Party of Justice and Development 
(JDP) 
The JDP is one of a number of Islamic organisations in Morocco but is the only one, 
which is involved in the political system and has adopted a path of involvement rather 
than disengagement (Christian Monitor, November, 2005). The leadership of the 
JDP's wished to strike a balance between continuing its opposition to government 
corruption and nepotism while preparing the ground for participation in future 
government coalitions, perhaps after the 2007 parliamentary election. Reportedly, the 
JDP covets the influential Social Affairs and Education ministerial portfolios, where it 
could pursue its agenda of promoting Islamic morals and ethics in society. The JDP's 
aggressivc campaigning among lower- and middle-class Moroccans has made the 
group more popular than many of Morocco's older and more established parties C4 
(HamzaNN-N, et al, 22006). However, despite a growing support base the JDP has decided 
to rem. un limited in its demands to consolidate its position, with the hope of 
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launching a stronger challenge in the future against the government. For example. the 
JDP remains allied with the monarchy. even on issues that would appear to 
contravene Islamic law, such as their acceptance of King Muhammad's '1004 ground 
breaking revision of the family code (Mudawana), which, among other things, raised 
the legal age of marriage for women from 15 toI8 and allowed women to divorce 
with a judge's approval. The JDP argued that because the family code revision was 
democratically enacted, its members should accept it, since the party is committed to 
both democratic and Islamic principles (Hamzawy et al, 2006). Despite this warming 
to the monarchy for reasons of political opportunism and pragmatism, the JDP has 
done more than existing oppositional actors by campaigns to bring more transparency 
to Moroccan politics and the JDP publishes the attendance record of all members at 
parliamentary sessions in order to highlight chronic absenteeism found in other parties. 
The JDP's party leaders require JDP parliamentarians to attend all legislative sessions 
and to be more productive than members from other parties. It is clear that the JDP 
has brought something different to the Moroccan political system. The JDP's time in 
the system has been short and it requires more time to develop as a political force and 
to really contest the state. Its behaviour resembles the 1AF in Jordan, which bided its 
time before posing a challenge to the state on economic and political issues. It is 
likely this is the route that the JDP will follow in the near future and the coming 
elections in 2007 will indicate the progress, which the JDP has made over the years 
and its future ability to influence Moroccan politics. 
The Bahraini Shiite- Al NN'efaq National Islamic Society 
Al Wefaq, is the largest Shlite Bloc, led by Sheikh Ali Salman and it has 1500 active 
members. It has based its appeal in Bahrain on the provision of social services and 
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mosque outreach programmes in both urban and rural areas. King Hamad's political 
refonn process in 1999 provided a window of opportunity for Al Wefaq to enter the 
political system. King Hamad's unprovoked reform process, arguably, stemmed from 
a generational change fuelled by his realisation that a new post traditional Persian 
Gulf is emerging, in which tribal affiliations may no longer suffice to legitimize a 
ruling tribe (Wright, 2006). Therefore, since the start of his reign, King Hamad has 
promoted reforms characterised as liberalising by which he has maintained control of 
the pace and direction of political reform, thus avoiding the elite's loss of political and 
economic privileges. On the other hand, Bahrain's Shiite population led by Al Wefaq, 
has sought a more fundamental political re-orientation that, if allowed, would 
undermine the current centralised power base of King Hamad. The 2002 
parliamentary elections provided the chance for Al Wefaq to enter the political system 
but it boycotted the elections. In 2002, there was widespread protest and political 
opposition by Al Wefaq to the legislative rights granted to the 40 royally appointed 
members fon-ning the upper house that constituted a distinctly un-representative 
majority loyal to the King (Middle East International, February, 2004) 
However, despite its boycott, Al Wefaq's challenged legislation passed by the 2002 
parliament, and specifically mentioned the need to revoke the Law of Associations, 
Counter- Terrorism Law and the Law of Assembly. According to Bahraini and 
hiternational Human Rights Groups, these laws have been misappropriated to rein in 
civil liberties and dissent in Bahrain (The Gulf Daily News, October, 2006). In 
addition, to this it called for constitutional refonns, which would weaken the 
monopolization of po\N, cr by the Bahraini state. These demands and challenges by Al 
Wefaq excr-ted a lot of pressure on the Bahraini state, in particular due to Al Wefaq's 
strong social support base in Bahrain. t, 
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A] Wefaq in its challenge to the Bahraini state NA'as willing to cross-ideolo. Mcal 
barriers and hold meetings with the secular opposition in Bahrain in order to achieve 
common goals. This led it to become a key political movement in Bahrain and put it 
in a prime position to make major inroads in the 2006 parliamentary elections. During 
the elections, Al Wefaq put forward 19 candidates for 40 seats in the parliament and it 
won 18 seats. Immediately after its victory, Al Wefaq outlined its political aims, such 
as redrawing the boundaries of constituencies, providing more independence of local 
councils and campaigning for constitutional reforms (The Gulf Daily News, 
November, 2006). In addition, it vowed to strengthen its relations with opposition 
actors to give the opposition the ability to challenge the Bahraini state in to the future. 
The examined case studies have highlighted the key role Islamist parties have come to 
play in inside and outside the system in Jordanian, Moroccan and Bahraini politics. 
This is the trend in other Arab States as well, such as Lebanon, the Palestinian 
Territories, Algeria, Kuwait, Yemen and Egypt. Therefore, excluding non-violent 
Islamists from the political sphere only serves to weaken the chances of political 
transformation in the region. In fact Arab liberals have come to realize this reality and, 
in the past few years, have been gradually reaching out to Islamists parties and 
engaging them in reform campaigns. Secular-religious national alliances for 
democracy are instrumental in contesting authoritarian state power and articulating 
popular consensus over the need for political transformation (Hamzawy, 2005). 
Islamists, on their side, have seized the integration opportunity and positioned 
thei-nselN, es at the heart of growing opposition movements across the region. In 
Morocco, Lebanon, and E(,, -,,, pt, differences between liberals and Islamists remain C'- 
relc\, aiit, but the degree of conN, ercyence of liberals and Islamists over national 
priontics is, systematically (groxving. These are steps the right direction. Political I CN 
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opposition platforms are far more effective with Islamist participation than without it. 
Therefore, it is likely that Islamist parties continue to play a key role in the 
process of economic and political reform, which is assisted by the pressure, which 
they are able to pose due to their exIstence Inside and outside the system. However. 
despite the positive contribution of Islamists to the process of change in the region, 
they face a number of obstacles. These obstacles are working to constrain the 
Islamists from driving the process of economic and political refon-n in the Middle 
East. 
2.4 Islamists and Obstacles to Change in the Middle East 
The Islamists, have evolved into key political actors but face a number of obstacles in 
their drive to change the rules of the game in the Middle East. The first obstacle is the 
growing convergence and interaction between the state and business sector (i. e. state 
and business relations). This is a process, by which individuals from the state and 
royal families (i. e. the Gulf) are active in economic and business ventures, therefore 
overlapping into the private sector. This involvement in the private sector has allowed 
the state to co-opt the business class through the provision of economic incentives and 
contracts. This co-optation has strengthened the political arm of the state, as the 
private sector has integrated itself into the state in return for opportunities to 
accumulate capital (Richards, 2001-, Nonneman, 2001; Hinnebusch, 2001). This has 
resulted in the creation of a powerful bloc (i. e. state-business nexus), which has 
resisted economic and political change pushed by political actors, such as Islamists, 
which could potentially cndanger its economic and political interests. 
A state-business nexus and a relationship of such a nature Nvas evident under Hafez Al 
Assad in Syria ('--', eale, 1990, Hinnebusch, 2001, Gambill, 2001, Washington Post, 
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October 281h 
, 
2005). Breaking from Baath socialist traditions, Assad gave greater 
latitude to the private sector, dominated by the Sunni urban economic and commercial 
elite, particularly in Damascus. As a result, of this limited economic opening (infitah) 
and with the growth of collusive state-business relations, large Sunni entrepreneurs 
allied themselves with the regime in the 1980s, when Islamists challenged the states 
powers and its structures (Al Ahram, April 6-12 th , 2006). This state and Sunni 
commercial class nexus continues to exist in Syria, as Bashar Al Assad persists in 
pursuing pragmatic economic polices, benefiting the Sunni commercial class. A 
comparable state-business nexus can be seen in Jordan and Egypt, which has like its 
Syrian counterpart constrained economic and political changes. Jordan is a case in 
point where politics since the inheritance of power by King Abdullah in 1999, has 
seen the overt introduction of the business class into Jordanian politics. The Jordanian 
state and the business class is more inter-twined than ever before, resulting in the 
creation of a powerful bloc, which has impeded economic and political changes 
demanded by the opposition, such as the Islamists. In Egypt the governmental party 
the NDP, is packed with individuals with business and commercial interests, which 
have blocked the reforms demands of the Islamists. This business class has been 
further buttressed with the rise of Gamal Mubarak. Real estate tycoon Ahmed Bahgat, 
steel and iron industry chief Ahmed Ezz (who also heads the People's Assembly's 
planning and budget committee), housing committee chief Mohammed Abul Enein, 
former head of the American Chamber of Commerce, Mohammed Sahfiq Gabr, the 
SaxN, Iris family and Rami Lakah all have come to be known for their privileged 
relations with the powers that be and their ability to influence decisions related to 
privatisation and the process of economic fiberallsation (Al Ahram, June 7-13 th , 2001; 
pti Ghobashy, 200-33). The recent E,, y ian parliamentary elections 2005 saw more 
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candidates with business links standing than ever before; indicating the nse of big 
business in Egyptian politics and the role of big business becoming more open than 
ever before (A] Jazeera, December 14 th 2005). 
The second obstacle, facing Islamists is the military, which has played its part in 
blocking economic and political refon-n. The military leadership benefits and seeks to 
mainta n the authoritarian political systems, in countries such Egypt. The institutional 
power of Egypt's military establishment is reflected in the pattern of relations 
between the presidency, its military-affiliated personnel, and the parliament (Abdalla, 
2003). For example, the staff of the presidency has been composed almost exclusively 
of currently serving or retired military officers, who have a significant role in the 
administration of the Egyptian state (Cook, 2004). Accordingly, these officers are 
routinely deployed throughout the ministries and agencies to impress upon the vast 
Egyptian bureaucracy the priorities of the leadership. Furthen-nore, while the 
executive's power in areas related to armament allocation and procurement, 
particularly from foreign suppliers- is legally subject to parliamentary review, this has 
never occurred. Indeed, despite the wider ranging powers of oversight with which the 
People's Assembly is formally vested, there is no actual oversight. Egypt's minister of 
defence is formally required to make an annual presentation to the Assembly's 
standing committee on defense, national security, and mobilization and is obliged to 
answer parliamentarians' questions, but these queries are, in general, not forthcoming 
(Cook, 2004). Thus, the influence of the military over the executive and parliament, 
has preservcd its poxvcr, and has allowed it to extend this power into the economic 
sector. For example, the government facilitated military expansion in the economic 
sector through the Administration of National Service Pro' tý jects, created in January 
1979 (Zohn\,, 1987). In the 1990s. the economic power of the military increased, 
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through its involvement in a number of development projects. such as canal and 
housing construction. It is because, of this political and economic power, which the 
Egyptian military has accumulated, that has led to it blocking reform that could 
weaken its power by changing the existing power and institutional relationships in 
Egypt. 
The third obstacle, which Islamist parties face, is the political elite and its lack of 
desire to give up power. For example, the President of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh the 
second longest serving president in the Middle East after Colonel Gaddafi of Libya 
announced in 2005 that he would not stand in the 2006 presidential elections clearing 
the way for new blood to enter the Yemeni political office (Phillips, 2006,2005). 
However, this decision was reversed in 2006 with President Saleh announcing that he 
aimed to stand in the 2006 presidential elections for another term. There was little 
doubt that President Saleh would win the Presidential elections given his monopoly 
over politics in Yemen (Philips, 2006). Importantly what this indicated was the lack 
of desire of the Yemeni political elite to relinquish power and its resistance to change 
being pushed by Islamists, such as the Islah party (the reform party) in Yemen. 
Therefore, it is apparent that Islamists face a number of key obstacles, in their 
endeavours to rework the rules of the game in the region. However, the position of 
Islamists inside and outside the system, gives them the best opportunity and the 
levera, ge to weaken these obstacles, in order to challenge the state's power and its 
structures. However, to facilitate the process of change in the region, there is a need 
for external actors to contribute to the process of economic and political change. 
Given, the cciltral role of the US in the region, it is important to examine US foreign 
policy towards the rc(-, Ion post 9/11. 
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2.5 The 'War on Terror' and US Foreign Policy towards theNliddle East 
In the 1990s, President Clinton supported the strategic liberalisation of political 
systems in the Middle East. Clinton administration officials spoke of "improved 
governance, " "political participation, " "pluralism, " and "greater openness" in the 
Middle East (Gause, 2005; Windsor, 2003; Regan, 2005). The US administration tried 
"to improve the climate for political liberalization in the region, " according to a 1995 
statement by then-Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Robert H. 
Pelletreau. However, pro-democracy initiatives remained at the level of "low policy, " 
meaning that they were neglected or undermined at the more influential diplomatic 
level when they conflicted with core "high policy" interests such as the supply of oil 
and regional security. This was disclosed by then- Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright, 'We did nudge at times, supporting Kuwaiti leaders in their initiative to give 
women the vote and encouraging the creation of representative bodies in Bahrain and 
Jordan. But we did not make it a priority. Arab public opinion after all can be rather 
scary' (Albright, 2003, p5). Therefore, despite numerous democracy aid programmes 
and lofty pro-reform rhetoric, nowhere in the Arab world was democracy promotion, 
a decisive force in U. S. policy. At no time did an Arab regime's restriction of civil 
liberties or the arbitrary detention of leading human rights figures prompt the Clinton 
administration to undertake any punitive measures. In contrast, President Clinton 
punished rulers in Latin America, Asia and Africa with sanctions in response to 
similar violations of liberty. At no time in the 1990s was democracy elevated to the 
level of other key US interests, or more crucially integrated with them (Koh, 2001). 
Howevcr, post 911 democracy promotion in the Middle East, has received more 
intcrcst than cvcr before from the US administration. A key reason for this has been 
the sequence linking authontarianism to terrorism (Gause, 2005). The sequence 
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follows the line that authoritananism leads to political exclusion, which leads to angry 
young men joining terronst organisations. As a result, by promoting democracy, it is 
argued that this sequence will be broken by allowing young men a greater say in how 
state and society functions (Gause, 2005). Thus, to combat terrorism and to heighten 
national security the US shifted democracy promotion from a low policy to a high 
policy priority. President Bush made this policy of democracy promotion clear, in a 
series of keynote speeches. In developing a case for removing Saddam. Hussein from 
power, Bush stated: 'The world has an interest in the spread of democratic values. A 
new regime in Iraq would, serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for 
other nations in the region' (New York Times, February 27 th , 2003). In a speech given 
by President Bush (09/05/2003), at the University of South Carolina, he outlined US 
commitment to democracy promotion in the Middle East, 
'We support the advance of freedom in the Middle East, because it is our founding 
principle .... the hateful ideology of terrorism is shaped by oppressive regimes ... free 
nations, in contrast, encourage creativity, tolerance, and enterprise .... over time, the 
expansion of liberty throughout the world is the best guarantee of security throughout 
the world' (www. whitehouse. gov/news/release/2003/05/20030509-1 I. html). 
President Bush once again presented this US commitment to democracy promotion, in 
his speech at the National Endowment for Democracy (06/11/2003). Bush in his 
speech stated, 
'Peoples of the Middle East, share a high civilisation, a religion of personal 
responsibility and a need for freedom as deep as our own. It is not realism to 
suppose that one-fifth of humanity is unsuited to liberty, it is pessimism and 
condescension and we should have none of it' (National Endowment for 
Democnicy, Novcniber 6 th 2003). 
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This US commitment to democracy promotion was given more drive when President 
Bush in his speech at the Royal Banquet House (19/11/2003), chticised previous US 
governments for not promoting democracy in the region; 
'Willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. long 
standiing ties often led us to overlook local elites. Yet this bargain did not bring 
stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered and 
ideologies of violence took hold' (Royal Banquet House, London, November 
I 9th 2003) 
President Bush's agenda to promote democracy was backed by senior US officials. 
Dick Cheney stated, 'Our for-ward strategy for freedom commits us to support those 
who work and sacrifice for reforrn across the greater Middle East. We call upon our 
democratic friends and allies everywhere and in Europe in particular, to join us in this 
effort' (World Economic Forum, January 24 th , 2004). Also, Colin Powell stated 
'Dictators and despots can build walls high enough to keep out arrnies, but not high 
enough to keep those winds from blowing in' (Dawn, November 12 th , 2003). Michael 
Ledeen, a neoconservative scholar close to President Bush, wrote in the Wall Street 
Journal 'We should ... be talking about using all our political, moral and military 
genius to support a vast democratic revolution to liberate all the people of the Middle 
East from tyranny, ' (Wall Street Journal, September 4 th 2004). 
In his Second Inaugural Address on January 20,2005, President Bush confirmed the 
notion that the "forward strategy of freedom" - democracy promotion - and American 
security are closely interrelated: "The survival of liberty in our land increasingly 
depends on the success of liberty in other lands. " (The Guardian, January 21", 2005). 
N Also the National Security Strategy of 2006 puts the spread of democracy abroad at 
the center of American sccurity policy: "In the world today, the fundamental character 
ot'i-cginies niatters as niuch as the d'stnbution of powcr among them. The goal of our 
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statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet 
the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international 
system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people. " 
(National Security Strategy, 2006, pl). 
Therefore, a revision in US foreign policy is clear, directed towards dernocracv 
promotion in the Middle East. This revision in foreign policy, kick started a debate in 
the US foreign policy community on the extent to which democracy promotion should 
play a role in US foreign policy towards the Middle East (Neep, 2004). The classical 
realists in the US foreign policy community, who dismiss the internal situation of 
other countries as irrelevant to foreign policy, were critical of President Bush's 
democratic agenda (Speck, 2006). They argued that President Bush's democratic 
agenda resembled the idealism of the Clinton administration. To promote democracy 
in the Middle East would mean to destabilize these countnes and therefore put 
American national interests at risk, such as energy security (Speck, 2006). 
The fact that recent elections in Iraq, Egypt, and the Palestinian Territories saw the 
rise of Islamist parties reinforced the argument of the classical realists that autocratic 
re(gimes, such as those in Egypt and Saudi Arabia might be bad, but the popular forces 
in these countries are much worse for Amencan interests (See, BBC News, January 
26 th, 1.006, The Guardian, January 20th , 2006; The Washington Post, June 
6 th , 2005-, 
The Guardian, December 9th 5 2005). Thus, a democratic transformation of the region 
bears such high risks that it is much more prudent to maintain the status quo - the 
lesser evil (Guazzone, 1995). This view of the classical realists was further 
sti-engthcried by a report released by the National Security Council on the 13 th of 
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January 2004, which predicted that by 2020 a 'global caliphate' would have been 
established in the Middle East (CIA, 2004). 
The leftist critics, who have long been very critical of American foreign policy in the 
Middle East, charged the policy of democracy promotion being a new cover for the 
old US policy that was still interest-driven. Thus, behind the liberal rhetoric, lurked 
the old hypocrisy of American imperialism. The Bush administration's reluctance to 
press Saudi Arabia, its close ally and third-largest oil supplier, towards democratic 
reform seemed to make it all too clear that the US government was far from giving up 
its double standard. Other critics challenged the diagnosis that was at the center of the 
policy of democracy promotion (Speck, 2006). It came up after Islamist attacks on the 
European soil. These attacks, especially the London bombings in July 2005, seemed 
to give clear evidence that the breeding ground for terrorism is not necessarily the 
Middle East, but Europe itself with its large Muslim minorities, which it was argued 
had failed to integrate. Therefore, it is apparent that US policy of democracy 
promotion came under much scrutiny and criticism in the US. However, the biggest 
wound for the Bush administrations democratic agenda has been the Iraq war. 
As no huge quantities of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were found in Iraq, 
making Iraq the beacon of democracy in the Middle East became a major argument 
for the war. This association with Iraq damaged the US democracy doctrine in two 
ways. First, it made Iraq the test case for American democracy promotion. The 
security failure in Iraq reinforced the view that outside forces cannot promote 
democracy, and that to put democracy on the top of U. S. foreign policy agenda is a 
dang, crous thing. Second, the association with Iraq made the democracy agenda 
vulnerable to the chargc that democracy promotion was only a code word for regnme 
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change by military force - for war. Thusý the association of the Iraq war with 
democracy promotion has become one of a key obstacle for the US democratic 
agenda in the Middle East (Speck, 2006). It has diminished the support for American 
democracy initiatives at home and abroad, and it has made it easy to dismiss 
American democracy promotion for those who are hostile to it. To argue that the US 
could play a positive role in the promotion of democracy in the Middle East and 
North Africa has become much harder, given the ongoing security crisis in Iraq. 
2.6 Arab Criticisms of US Foreign Policy Post 9/11 
The Bush administrations, democratic programme not only led to criticism in the US 
foreign policy circles, but led to criticism in the Arab world. All political quarters, 
from the right to the left, including the Islamists in the region were critical and 
showed defiance to the US democratic agenda in the region (Ottaway, 2003). A 
statement by Condoleezza Rice, provoked anger and a quick response from the Arab 
press which expressed discontent with the sudden concern of the US for the political 
situation in the Middle East. Condoleezza Rice declared that the United States was 
committed not only to the removal of Saddarn Hussein but also to 'the 
democratisation or the march of freedom in the Muslim world' (Financial Times, 
September 23 rd , 2002). The 
Jordanian daily Al-Dustour replied that there are, 'more 
than one and a half billion Muslims who suffer from American greed and oppression 
and from its cruel and visible war against Islam and Muslims'. The London based. 41- 
11a. vat lashed out against 'Ayatollah Condoleezza and the Export of Democracy' (The 
Middle East Media and Research Institute, October II th , 2002). This statement 
by 
Condoleezza Rice, led Arab analysts to conclude that the US planned to remove what 
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it classed as "rogue states" in the Mi ddle East, in order to enforce its vision of 
democracy on the region. 
As a result, the promotion of democracy in the region by the US has become 
synonymous with imperial designs and ambitions in the region by various 
commentators. Husayn Abd-al-Wahid from the Egyptian newspaper Akhbar al-YaK, m 
declared 'within this framework, the only logical explanation for the so-called US 
programme for bolstering democracy in the Middle East is that it is merely a means of 
pressuring Arab and Islamic governments and regimes to become more co-operative 
with US policies on Palestine, Iraq and Sudan, Afghanistan and other areas where 
Washington is committing gross mistakes that worry everybody' (Akhbar al-Yawm, 
August 31", 2002). Islamic leaders within the Middle East have continuously used the 
imperial card to resist the US democracy initiative in the region. The Islamists are 
adamant on the point that the US would never permit the holding of truly free and fair 
elections because of the possibility of political parties coming to power that are 
adverse to US interests in the region. Azzarn Huneidi, head of the MB political front, 
the IAF in Jordan stated, 
'America is calling for reform. But would America be happy with the results of 
free and clean elections? No. they would not be happy. They want the results 
they want. A recent public opinion survey in Jordan indicated that 99% of the 
people hate America. If there were truly free elections, the results would be a 
parliament that hated America. What the US wants is democracy according to 
American standards' (Wickham, 2004, p 3). 
Raheil Gharaybeh also a member of the IAF stated, 'This is what the Arab people 
think. Real democracy Nvill hurt American interests. Any real reforms will work 
against Israel and America' (Wickham, 2004, p4). Muhammad Mahdi Akhef the 
slipi-cnic guide of the MB in Egypt declared 'The Muslim Brotherhood rejects all 
40 
shapes of foreign hegemony, and denounces foreign interference Into the affairs of 
Egypt or any other Arab or Islamic country' (Islam Online, March 4 th, '1004). 
The Bush administrations lack of US credibility in the region has not helped in its 
democratic programme. The US is viewed to be championing the ideals of democracy 
and freedom but at the same time supporting the policies of the Israeli State, which 
occupies Palestinian Territories. 'This superpower, which protects and sponsors 
Sharon's mass killings and systematic destruction of Palestinian life, cannot emerge 
as an 4 angel' in Lebanon, calling for virtuous work and looking after the seeds of 
democracy', argues Talal Salam a writer from Lebanon (Al Safir, September 9th, 
2002). Fahd Fanek from the Jordan Times argued on the same lines when he stated 
'[A]nd what does Bush have to say about the so called Israeli democracy, which has 
produced the worst kind of far right extremist government... ' (Jordanian Times, 
September 3 Oth , 2002). A further dent in the Bush administrations credibility has been 
the small budget, which it has set aside for its policy of democracy promotion in the 
region. 'The US has set aside no more than $30 million to support freedom and 
support democracy in the Arab region' commented the Al Quds al- Arabi newspaper 
(Middle East Mirror, November 18 th , 2002). A writer in Qatar added 'Allocating 
$29 
million is not even enough to launch an advertising campaign in the United States for 
a local domestic product' (Middle East Mirror, November 18 th , 2002). This small 
allocation of funds was seen by the Arab press as a clear indicator that the Bush 
administration had no real interest in promoting democracy in the Middle East. 
Thus, it is clear that the US democratic programme has faced intense criticism in the 
Middle East. The US to win internal support for its programme needs to take a 
number of stcps. For cxample, the US needs to remove double standards in its foreign 
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policy, develop a more balanced position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and consult with 
internal political actors, both secular and Islamists in the context of democracy 
promotion. These basic steps are important for the US to win support i in the region 
for its programme. However, it appears that US policy (i. e. US silence on human right 
abuses, and the war on terror), so far is not helping in its aim to promote democracy in 
the region (Bayet, 2003). There needs to be a revision in US behaviour for it to be 
able to win support to promote its democratic programme. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the process of economic and political change in the Middle East, 
taking into consideration the impact of any process of political change on state powers 
and its structures. In particular I explored the role of Islamist parties and the 
challenge, which they directed towards state powers and its structures. This challenge 
was facilitated by the presence of Islamists inside the system and their presence 
outside the system, through their existence in and engagement with civil society via 
involvement in trade unions, professional syndicates, student unions and teaching 
clubs which allowed Islamists, to position themselves in a strong position in order to 
launch a challenge to contest state power in the Middle East. This challenge has 
continued post 9/11, with Islamists becoming more central to politics in the region. 
This examination of Islamists provided a basis from which to look at the role of 
external actors in the process of political change. I examined US foreign policy post 
9/11, to deduce the extent to which it has been inclusive of democracy promotion in 
the Middle East. This allowed a realisation into the prospect of political reforrn in the 
repon in the contcxt of the on going xvar on terror. This chapter has set the framework 
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I -hich in order to examine the process of economic and political change in Egypt, ýý 
proceeds in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 3- Economic and Political Reform in Egypt: Post 1991 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the process of economic and political reform in Egypt after 
1991.1 do this to examine the questions identified in chapter I to allow an 
understanding into the process of economic and political change in Egypt. In 
particular if the process of economic and political change had any substantial impact 
on the power and structure of the Egyptian state. I first provide an understanding into 
the economic situation in Egypt and the factors, which led to economic reform by the 
Egyptian government in 1991. This will provide a backdrop to exploring the process 
of economic and political change in Egypt. 
3.2 Background: Economic Crisis to Economic Reform 
Egyptian modem history shows a cyclical transition of growth patterns post 
independence-, in addition to several radical economic and political transformations 
(Al Sayid, 2003). Starting with the 1952 military coup d'etat, the new system 
overhauled the pre 1952 economy impacting the entire society. Adopting a planned 
economy approach, Egyptian officers established a public sector, extensive 
national isation, and a widespread process of income redistribution accompanied by a 
scfies of important social policies (Waterbury 1983, Woodward, 1992). The early 
sta(,, cs following the 1952 revolution ,, vere charactensed by challenges to Nasser's 
rule, which affected the levels of economic growth (Stephens, 1973: Ayubi, 1995). 
First, froin 1952-19-54, there was a challenge to Nasser fTom the political opposition, 
in particular from the MB (Al Ahram, June 27 th -3 rd July. 2002, Hopwood, 1993). 
Second, Nasser also faced challenges from inside the Free Officers. As a result, once 
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Nasser was able to deal with internal and external challenges, Egypt improved 
economically from the mid 1950s to the mid 1960s. From 1967 until approximately 
1973 Egypt fell into economic cnsis which was worsened by the heavy involvement 
of the Egyptian army in Northern Yemen between 1962-1967 and the heavy militarv 
loss in the 1967 six day war against Israel (O'Brien, 2002-, Aboul Enien, 
January/February 2004; Dresch, 2000). 
The 1973 conflict with Israel was a turning point for Egypt. The success in the war 
raised the legitimacy of Sadat, thus allowing him to step out of the shadow of Nasser. 
As a result Sadat introduced the 'Infitah', a process of economic liberalisation, which 
led Egypt to undergo a change in its economic model- transition from a state led to a 
market economy. This transition would have severe socio-economic implications for 
Egypt (Aoude, 1994; Beattie, 2000; Sullivan, 1990; Ayubi, 1991,1988). According to 
the WB, 'malnutrition increased between 1978 and 1986, particularly among school 
children', (World Bank 1991, p66). The poor of Egypt - often illiterate, with minimal 
job skills, and residing disproportionately in Upper Egypt - depended on education 
and health services. ) which the state 
had offered, but this changed with the 'Infitah', as 
the state began to reduce its economic role (El- Laithy 1997, p147-, see also Harik 
1997, p2l). The economic liberalisation of the 'Infitah' widened the gap between the 
rich and the poor. 'While the lowest 20 per cent of the population held 6.6 per cent of 
national income in 1960 and had improved their share to 7.0 per cent in 1965, they 
dropped to 5.1 per cent by the late 1970s. By comparison, the income of the highest 5 
per cent clipped slightly to 17.4 percent from 17.5 per cent between 1960 and 1965 
but increased markeffly to 22 per cent after several years of Sadat's policies' 
(McDen-nott 1988, p822). Thus, it appears that the etatist policies under Nasser 
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actually narrowed the gap between the rich and the poor, but the Intýfah destroved this 
advance. 
Furthermore, the Egyptian economy began to weaken at the macroeconomic level. 
Egypt's total external debt in 1977 was over USS 5.7 billion, 42 percent of its Gross 
National Product (World Bank, 2000). In addition Egypt suffered weak economic 
growth, and a severe budget deficit of over USS 2.0 billion. Suffering from this micro 
and macro economic crisis, the Egyptian government began its first discussion with 
the IMF in 1976. The 1976 discussion between the Egyptian government and the IMF 
led to a US$ 450 million loan, contingent upon Egypt's willingness to implement 
currency refon-ns and reduce government spending (Rivlin 1985, p 179). As a result of 
these negotiations, Egyptian policyrnakers decided to reduce expenditures by cutting 
subsidies. However, when the government cut bread subsidies, the results were 
disastrous: the 1977 bread riots (Ahmed et al, 2001). These riots ultimately posed a 
major danger to Egypt's social and political stability (IMF, 1996; IMF, 2001). 
However, as Egypt's domestic problems worsened, the Egyptian government tried to 
solve them with short- and long-teirm loans. The Egyptian govemment found itself in 
November 1977 in negotiation for a US$ 600 million loan from the IMF over a three- 
year period, instead of US$ 450 million. The IMF allowed Egypt to withdraw only 
US$ 105 million in 1977 because it was worried that excessive borrowing would lead 
Egypt to exceed its ability to repay. However, the United States was worried that a 
lack of available funds would lead Egypt into further domestic insecurity. 
Consequently, it pushed the IMF to allow Egypt to borrow more (RivIin 198-5. pp 179- 
180). 
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However, the IMF's conditions in return for Egyptian borrowing ignored the socio- 
economic fallout from tightening fiscal and monetary policy. For the Egyptian 
government this socio-economic fallout was impossible to ignore. Therefore the 
Egyptian goveniment's main objective was to compromise between external pressure 
and internal stability. As result, the Egyptian govern-ment continued to deal with the 
IMF and WB, seeking new loans and abiding by conditions but at the same time being 
aware of the socio-economic fallout and its impact on political stability (Harik 1997. 
p 105; Clark 2000, p 16 1). 
3.3 The Egyptian Economy from 1980s to 1991 
At the core of Egypt's macroeconomic crisis in the 1980s were three main macro 
economic imbalances. There was 1) a gap between domestic savings and investment 2) 
imports exceeded exports 3) government spending exceeded sources of revenue. A 
number of factors contributed to these macroeconomic imbalances. First, the collapse 
of oil revenues and mounting losses of public sector companies undermined public 
savings (Richards, 1991,2001; Richards and Waterbury, 1990,1996; Handoussa and 
Potter, 1991). Second, private savings were limited as a result of uncertainty by 
private wealth holders as to the future direction and credibility of economic policy, 
resulting in capital flight from Egypt. Third, investment flowed into infrastructure 
rather than into traded goods productions and investment was inefficient, not leading 
to the creation of jobs to absorb the vast number of unemployed within Egyptian 
society (Richards and Waterbury, 1990; Handoussa and Potter, 1991). 
Also at the macroeconomic level, because of excessive borrowing under Sadat and 
%lubarak Egypt's foreigg-n dcbt became a nagging problem. It climbed fTom 
2 billion in 1970 to some USS 21 billion in 1980. This huge rise approximately USS 
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was a direct result of state borrowing in order to plug the savin g-investment gap 
within the economy. In 1988 total external debt was expected to reach USS 46 billion 
or about double the amount in 1980. As a result civilian debt came close to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in 1987 and was forecast to surpass it in 1988 (Richards. 
19919 2001). Most of Egypt's debt was owed to other governments or guaranteed by 
them, especially when military debt was taken into account. For example, in 1987 
debt to private creditors was about 21 per cent of the civilian total and debt to 
multilateral organisations was about 17 per cent of the civilian total. Prior to the peace 
treaty with Israel in 1979, the largest creditors were Arab countries. Since 1979 
OECD members replaced Arabs. In 1987 Egypt owed US$ 10.1 billion to the US 
(Richards, 1991,2001). Of this about US$ 4.6 billion or about 23 per cent of Egypt's 
combined debt was military debt. In Egypt itself, the largest debtor was the 
government and the public sector. For example, public debt not accounting military 
component made up about 78 per cent of the total, the rest was bom by private 
enterprises. As new foreign lending dried up in the latter part of the 1980s, the deficit 
began to be financed by monetary expansion. Inflation as a result of an increase in the 
money supply rose, affecting living standards within Egypt. From 1976 to 1986, the 
consumer price index rose ftom 164.2 to 708.8 in urban areas and from 187.8 to 795.8 
in rural areas (Oweiss, 1990). Over the same period, the national inflation rate itself 
generally increased, growing from 10.30 per cent in 1976 to 23.9 per cent in 1986 
(World Guide, 2001/2002). 
Egypt's economy began the 1990s xvith chronic macro and micro problems, including 
a gi-owing fiscal deficit, escalating inflation rate, worsening balance of payment 
deficits and declining international reserves. For example, real GDP growth decreased 
from 1.9 per cent in fiscýil ý, car 1987/1988 to 2.3 per cent in 1990/1991, the Egyptian 
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pound was devalued from 1.761 to 3.009 per US dollar (Abdel Khalek 1992 and 1993-, 
Kienle, Spring, 1998). At the micro level the quality of governmental services, such 
as in health, transportation and education had dropped, which directly impacted upon 
the state as the provision of such services underpinned the legitimacy of the post 
colonial Egyptian state. 
The Gulf war in 1991 did not help Egypt's suffering economy. Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait in August 1990 and the subsequent war (February, 1991) vastly reduced 
Egypt's economic resources. The war also forced the return of 700,000 workers from 
the Gulf countries and a severe decline in tourism. Adding to these problems, the 
heavy service of Egypt's debt, which totalled US$ 46 billion, became an imminent 
threat to the economy (The Economist October 25 th , 1997; see also World Bank, 
2000). In response to the growing economic problems, the Egyptian government 
tumed to the IMF; like it had done in 1976,1978 and 1987. The Egyptian govemment 
adopted a conventional stabilisation and structural adjustment package, endorsed by 
the IMF in exchange for massive debt relief (Bush, 1999 and 2004; Licari, 1997). 
Sucli a bargain was attractive to the Egyptian regime economically and politically. 
Economically the reduction of up to US$ 20 billion of debt reduced annual interest 
payments by US$ 12 billion for the next 10 years. Politically the deal was easier to 
sell domestically since the Egyptian government could argue that debt relief would 
hclp the ailing Egyptian economy greatly and that international creditors 
acknowledged part responsibility for past mistakes. Another incentive was that the 
IMF was ready to accept a somewhat more gradual approach to implementation of 
economic reforrn due to Egypt's key role II in regional geo-politics (Shafiq, 1998). 
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The underpinning structure of the Egyptian economy in the 1980s and early 1990, 
ian government was fragile. The adoption of economic reform in 1991 by the Egypt' 
was a direct result of the ailing fortunes of the Egyptian economy. The adoption of 
economic reform was as a new dawn for the Egyptian state, making it important to 
acquire an understanding of the nature of the economic reform programme - in 
particular its rationale, objectives and impact. This will then allow a platform from 
which to explore the process of economic and political change in Egypt. 
3.4 Economic reform 1991 
3.4.1 The Economic Agreement - Objectives and Rationale 
Egypt has undertaken many agreements with the IMF to alleviate its economic 
problems (IMF, 2001). Egypt signed three stand-by agreements with the IMF, in 1976, 
1978 and 1987, which followed the same line of policy recommendations as would be 
outlined in the 1991 agreement. All three agreements were discontinued for social, 
political and economic reasons (The Economist, October 25 th , 1997). The 
development of inherent economic problems in Egypt, such as a huge debt, which 
reached US$ 50 billion in June 1990, resulted in the opening of a new set of 
iiegotiations with the IMF (Abdel-Khalek, 1992; Lofgren, 1993). A stand-by 
ageement was concluded with the IMF in May 1991 and the implementation of the 
stabilisation programme started even earlier on January I s'M the same year (Korayem, 
1997). Economic stabilisation to improve macroeconomic indicators was central to 
tile programme. The restoration of internal and external balances would be achieved 
by the application of demand management policies. which included expenditure 
reduction and expenditure switching, using mainly monetary and fiscal policies. From 
the view of tile INIF. macroeconomic stabilisation is urgently needed, particularly in 
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heavily indebted countries in order to achieve long-tenn growth. This process 
included the use of monetary and fiscal pollcles. Abdel Khalek explains this*, 
'The fiscal adjustment lies at the heart of the stabIllsation package and involves 
trimming off the fiscal deficit, both the overall and bank financed par. The 
target is to bring down the ratio of the overall budget deficit to GDP from an 
estimated high of 22 per cent for 1990/91 to a mere 1.5 per cent by 1995/96. It 
stipulates a slight reduction in the ratio of public expenditure to GDP and a 
substantial hike in the share of public revenue. But it is interesting to note that 
in relative terms, central government non tax revenue will provide most of the 
targeted adjustment; namely through price increases particularly in energy 
prices. The increase in tax revenue is mainly through greater reliance on indirect 
taxation' (Abdel-Khalek, 1992, pp44-45) 
The macroeconomic objectives were outlined by the economic reforrn programme, 
which the Egyptian state aimed to fulfil under the auspices of the IMF. The 
macroeconomic objectives of the programme were to reduce inflation gradually so as 
to reach 5 per cent by 1994/1995. The investment ratio was expected to rise from 19.5 
per cent of GDP in 1990/91 to 24.6 per cent in 1995/1996 with an emphasis on the 
private sector. Public investment outlays were to fall from about 15 per cent of GDP 
in 1990/91 to less than 8.5 per cent in 1996/97. The saving rate was targeted to rise 
from an average of 9.4 per cent of GDP in 1990/1991 to 16.9 per cent in 1995/1996 
(El Gafarawl, 1999). As a result of the economic refon-n programme real output 
growth was expected to gradually recover, reaching three per cent or more by 
1994/1995. The second component of the reform programme was the process of 
structural adjustment, which included a set of economic changes and regulations in 
order to promote a fundamental change in the ownership structure of the Egyptian 
cconomy. It contained three main policy areas: price liberalisatIon, trade 
libcralisation and investment reform (EI GafaraxA, i, 1999). Investment reform included 
public sector restructur-ingy. pnvatisation and improving the investment environment 
for private activitics. 
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The economic reform programme was planned to be Implemented through various 
phases under the auspice of the IMF and the WB (Seddon, 1990). By the mid 1990s 
two phases of the reform programme had been completed, whilst a third was in 
progress. The first signing with the IMF was that of May 1991 under the stand by 
agreement for 18 months but this had to be extended to March 1993 with a US$ 278 
million SDR. The second was the Extended Fund Facility arrangement, in September 
1993. The signing of the first stand by agreement with the IMF was shortly followed 
by a structural adjustment loan with the WB in June 1993. The WB also supported the 
second phase and the reform Programme was also backed by other foreign creditors, 
such as the Affican Development Bank (Korayern, 1997). In the case of Egypt the use 
of cross conditionality was clear and the IMF put stricter conditionality on Egypt so 
that implementation of the agreement would proceed according to the plan. Both the 
IMF and the WB divided the disbursement of their credit into two tranches and related 
the release of each with the fulfilment of reform measures. Before each disbursement 
IMF or WB officials would visit Egypt to review with the Egyptian government the 
previous phase and to set the performance criteria for the following phase. The IMF 
and the WB to ensure performance criteria were met by Egypt conducted extensive 
monitoring. 
The second tranche, which was due in November 1992, was not released until May 
1993. The delay in releasing the tranche was as a result of the IMF's perception that 
the pace of refon-n was too slow and that some of the objectives that had been set 
could not be achieved within the scheduled time. There was dissatisfaction with the 
progress of the privatisation programme and the Egyptian goverriment tried to correct 
this by announcing its first major privatisation programme in February 1993 
(Koraveni, 1997). The signing of the agreement, the nature of the agreement and the 
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actors involved can be deduced from the above but the impacts of economic refonn 
orm, which would have a are important to explore. It is the impacts of economic ref I 
key beanng on the process of political reform and the subsequent Egrýptian 
government's political strategy, which one would witness during the 1990s. 
3.4.2 Macroeconomic and Structural Impact of Economic Reform 
The Egyptian government took new steps toward achieving long-term 
macroeconomic stabilisation and strengthening the financial sector. The results were 
to unify exchange rates, raise interest rates, bring energy prices up to world levels 
over five years, raise taxes, eliminate most consumer subsidies over five years, pursue 
prIvatisation and to reduce the budget deficit (Clark, 2000). It is assumed in general 
that the Egyptian government managed to reduce the deficit in the state budget. 
Government investment as a percentage of GDP was reduced from 13.45 per cent in 
1990/91 to only 5.5 per cent in 1995/1996 and the subsidy outlay as a percentage of 
GDP was reduced from 5.9 per cent to 1.9 per cent during the same period. Measures 
to increase revenues focused mainly on the increase in the level of taxation, which 
resulted in the imposition of a new sales tax instead of the consumption tax and a 
stamp tax in addition to a unified income tax. The reforrn programme reduced the 
level of inflation. The official figures indicate reduction from 21.1 per cent in 
1991/1992 to 7.2 per cent in 1995/1996. 
In regard to the exchange rate, the forrner multiple exchange rate system was replaced 
by a single rate, market orientated system with a managed floating of the Egyptian 
pound for all public and private transactions (Kamar and Bakardzhlc\-a, 2003). 
Although the E(-, -Nptian pound depreciated during 1991, the exchange rate stabilised in C"% tN 
the ranoc betwccii L. E 3.35-3.4-5 to USS I from the third quarter of 1991 until the 
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from only USS 3.6 fourth quarter of 1998. The foreign reserves increased signi 
billion in 1990/1991 to US$ 21.1 billion in 1997,1998, which meant an increase of 
more than 500 per cent was achieved. The real GDP growth rate declined sharply in 
the first two years of the economic reform programme period to 1.9 per cent from 2.5 
per cent. However since 1993, the real GDP growth rate grew steadily reaching 5.7 
per cent in 1997/1998 (El Mahdi, 1997). 
The IMF itself praised the Egyptian goven-iment for its achievements in 
macroeconomic stabilisation (IMF, 1996). According to an IMF press release in 1996, 
Egypt improved public finances and made major advances in decentralizing its 
economy; 
'Real GDP growth accelerated to over 4 per cent in 1995/96 from virtual 
stagnation in 1991/92, while the rate of inflation declined to 7 per cent from 
over 21 per cent. The overall balance of payments remained in surplus, leading 
to a substantial accumulation of net international reserves. With limited external 
borrowing and further debt relief from the Paris Club, the ratio of external debt 
GDP fell to 47 per cent in mid 1996 from about 75 per cent in 1991/92, and the 
debt service ratio declined to about II per cent of current account receipts from 
14 per cent in 1991/92' (IMF, October II th, 1996, No 96/5 0). 
To facilitate the process of structural adjustment of the Egyptian economy some 
important legislative measures were introduced in view of establishing a capital 
niarket in the country and removing price distortions in many sectors. In the 
agricultural sector Law 96 in 1992 was introduced, which ended fixed rents of 
culti\'ated land (Bush, 200", 2004). Legislative measures aiming at providing the 
proper institutional framework for the new liberal economic policies were introduced. 
The most important of these legislative measures the Law of the publi I ic 
sector ( 103 of 1991 ). which alloNA-cd pnvatisation of public sector companies, the Law 
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of capital market (92 of 1993), the Law of exchange (38 of 1994) and the la", of lease 
financing (95 of 1995). 
However, the structural adjustment phase of economic reform was cnticised by the 
IMF. The IMF stated that Egypt failed to realise the level of economic refonn that the 
IMF had expected (IMF, 1996). The IMF was in particular critical of the pace of 
privatisation. The pace of privatisation of the public sector slowed in the late 1990s. 
Despite, important steps taken by the Egyptian government in order to prIvatise small 
units in the state owned sector, the large industrial complexes, particularly in textiles, 
steel and capital good industries in general remained in government hands. Public 
enterpnses continued to account for as much as 1/3 rd of Egypt's manufacturing sector, 
half of investment expenditure and about 15 per cent of total employment (IMF, 
1996). Therefore it was evident, that the Egyptian state was unwilling to dissolve of 
its control over economic sectors, due to an economic and political logic. First, to the 
Egyptian state, the transfer of capital into private hands was viewed to weaken its 
economic power. Second, the shift of capital into private hands was perceived to 
weaken the state's co-optation ability, thus its political power. As a result of the 
importance of prIvatisation in understanding the subject of economic and political 
change, it is important to explore in more detail the privatisation expenence in Egypt. 
3.4.3 Privatisation of State Owned Enterprises and Reduction in the Public 
Sector 
After 199 1, the Egyptian government started an extensive programme for privatising 
SOEs. Economic rcform since 1991 has aimed at starting an accelerated process for 
selling public sectoi- companies. There are many reasons why the Egyptian state was 
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refonning and selling SOEs, including public deficits caused by the SOE sector. the 
severe problems, such as inflation and the obstruction of export grow-th (Waterbury, 
1992, p183). Although the Egyptian government originally called this progamme 
4 refonn and privatisation' its man goal was to pnvatise, SOEs. The stated goal of this 
process was to reform many of these SOEs but the actual aim was to improve the 
financial situation of SOEs by decreasing and settling debts of SOEs to make them 
more attractive for private sector ownership. The Egyptian government adopted two 
main methods for privatising SOEs. The first focused on improving the management 
of SOEs by allowing the managers to act separately from their ministries. One of the 
main procedures in this regard is the 1991 SOE Law, which gave these enterprises 
more control over management, pricing, and the acquisition of funding. The only 
decisions still controlled by restnctive laws and regulations were those regarding 
employment and suspension (see, Waterbury 1992; Mohieldin and Nasr, 1996). 
The second method went hand in hand with the selling process itself It allowed the 
Egyptian goveniment to offer most of the SOEs for sale according to a medium term 
schedule. This approach meant that these SOEs would move from the state's hands to 
the private sector. Therefore, the SOEs, which faced financial problems, were dealt 
with according to the first method and the more attractive ones were dealt with 
according to the second method. Despite these two methods outlined by the Egyptian 
government, the process of privatisation has not proceeded as quickly as the Egyptian 
government had planned (Martin, 2001). According to the United States Department 
of Commerce-, 
'In January 1997, the government announced its plan ... to pnvatise 33 
companies through anchor invcstor sales and I) companies in Initial Public 
Offerings (IPO,, ). In the first fivc months of 1997, only six companies were 
privatised through Egypt's ... LE 60.3 billion (S17.8 billion) stock market. Onlv 
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one company was sold to an anchor investor in the same time period. At this 
rate, the government may not be able to meet Its 1997 objectiN-es for 
privatisation', (Galal and Tohamy 1994, p28; see also NTDB, 1997). 
The noticeable point here is that the decision makers have not had a specific plan or 
strategy for privatization and economic refon-n. This has been particularly clear during 
the second batch of sales, which used three methods of selling (Mohieldin and Nasr. 
1996, pp43-46). The first method was selling to an "anchor" investor who bought all 
of the company's shares. Under this method, the Egyptian govenu-nent sold three 
companies: the Pepsi Cola Bottling Company, the El Nasr Coca Cola Bottling 
Company, and the El Nasr Steam Boilers Manufacturing Company. Although it sold 
these companies using this method, the Egyptian government prefers not to sell public 
companies to such anchor investors, as it wants to avoid creating monopolies 
(Mohieldin and Nasr, 1996, pp43-45). 
To accelerate the process of privatisation, the cabinet privatisation committee headed 
by Prime Minister Atif Obeid, decided to privatise a number of profitable companies, 
including companies in tourism, maritime transport, cement, fertiliser and production 
in Tobacco. The general consensus is that stock in five star hotels and the Eastern 
Tobacco Company are the most attractive investments in the privatisation process (Al 
Ahram, December, 7-13 th , 2000). The Egyptian Maritime Transport Company was 
sold to Egyptian investors, and paved the way for the sale of the Alexandria Shipyard 
th Company and the Egyptian Ship Repair Company (Al Ahram, December 7-13 , 
2000). After several years of a driN, e to speed up the process of privatisation, during 
NN'lilch 180 fimis Nvith a value of tE 5.8 billion were sold, the pace of pnvatisation 
started to slow down once again. In 2001, only 13 transactions were made down from 
*n 2000 and `3 in 1999. This was mainly due to the fact that most of the Nvell 211 
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performing companies had already been sold and the remainder were either heavily 
indebted, over staffed, using out dated machinery or in a need of radical restructuring. 
However, three major factors acted as key obstacles to the Egyptian state undergoing 
comprehensive prIvatisation of SOE's in the 1990s (Aoude, 1994). These obstacles 
were; 
1) The capitalist bureaucratic sector wanted to maintain the public sector due to 
vested interests within this sector. 
2) Private capital was reluctant to invest as a result of undeveloped legal 
infrastructures 
3) Privatisation would heighten socio-economic problems that would inevitable spill 
over to the political arena. A large number of workers are employed in SOEs-, any 
cutting of employment would lead to worker discontent. The selling of SOEs in Egypt 
has led to numerous riots and demonstrations. Reported strikes rose from 8 in 1990 to 
26 in 1991, to 28 in 1992 and to 63 in 1993. In a major strike at Kafr al Dawivar in 
September 1994, three people were shot dead by the police and many others where 
subsequently injured. Developments of this kind were threatening to the political 
stability of the Egyptian govenu-nent (Kienle, Spring, 1998). 
These factors acted as obstacles to swift privatisation, thus structural adjustment in 
Egypt. The Egyptian state tried to find the right balance between macroeconomic 
stabilisation and structural adjustment to try to meet the pressures by the IFI's and 
internal economic demands. However, it was clear I ian state, in the 1990s that the Egypt' 
despite its balancing act failed to meet internal economic demands, resulting in a tý 
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heightened socio-economic crisis. This arlsis would have severe lmplicat, ons for the 
process of political change in Egypt. 
3.4.4 The Egyptian Socio-Economic Crisis in the 1990s 
The rate of unemployment rose throughout the 1980s. The unemployment rate was 
officially estimated in the 1986 population census to reach 10 per cent. The Labour 
Force Sample Survey (LFSS) estimated unemployment to be between 9 and 10 per 
cent. A correct estimation, which considered the phenomena of those who became 
discouraged from searching for work because of the high level of unemployment, 
raised the rate to 17 per cent. However, some studies put the level of unemployment 
to be higher at approximately 20 per cent (Fergany, 1998). According to the WB data, 
the unemployment rate of Egypt in 1994 was 17.4 per cent while more than 70 per 
cent of the unemployed belonged to the age group of less than 20 years old. It is rather 
a common experience from other countries that have applied economic refon-n that 
negative impacts on employment are frequent especially in the short term (Korayem, 
1997). This was made even more severe in the case of Egypt as the Egyptian 
government abandoned its policy of guaranteeing state employment to fresh 
university graduates in 1986. 
The contractive fiscal and monetary policies advocated by the economic reform, 
affected the socially weak by increasing their level of poverty. Through the abolition 
or reduction in the amount of subsidies on basic consumer commodities, the poor 
have had to pay substantial amount of more money on accessing vital basic food 
commodities. As the WB states, that as a percentage of the GDP. subsidy 
programnics dropped over II per cent, between 1982 and 1995 (World Bank, 1995). 
For example, 'the commoditv coverage of food subsidies has been restricted to 
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popular bread, a limited quantity of edible oil and sugar' (Kheir El Din, 1996. pl). Bv I- 
1995, goverriment investment levels were reduced to one third of the level that 
occurred in the mid eighties (World Bank, 1996). For example. 'five basic 
commodities (sugar, rice, edible oil, tea and soap) were subsidized by fEl, 390 
Mill. lion in 1986/87. Ten million Egyptians held family coupons fTom the Ministiýv of 
Supply that entitled them to a fixed quota of these goods at subsidized prices' (Hank. 
1997, p97). 
This distributional system guaranteed to some extent, that these subsidized foods and 
commodities found their way to the most vulnerable people in Egypt. The central 
control of the state, represented by the Ministry of Supply secured these minimum 
staples for the poor. After the introduction of structural adjustment policies, 'the 
Ministry of Supply abolished the quota distribution system, except for ordinary and 
patent flour, which is consumed in the production of subsidized bread and edible oil 
and sugar, which were distributed through ration cards' (Nassar and Fawzy, 
July/October, 1993, p56). The level of education and health are two services that 
impact on human development. During the period of economic reform, funding for 
education and health was reduced considerably. In education one study estimated that 
government expenditure on education as a percentage of total expenditure fell from 
16.7 per cent in 1970/1971 to 10 per cent in 1989/1990 (El Gafarawi, 1999). In 
relation to health, this sector also experienced the same bias in expenditure and 
deterioration in services and facilities. The percentage of expenditure on health to 
total expenditure declined from 4.8 per cent in 1970/1971 to 1.9 per cent, in 
1989/1990. 
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The extent of poverty in Egypt had increased rapidly durinu the 1980s. The level of 
poverty continued to increase in the 1990s but at a slower rate up to the mid 1990s. 
The year 1996 showed that around 13.7 million Egyptians lived below the poverty 
line. The percentage of people living below the international poverty line of one US 
dollar remained very high, as more than 1/2 of the total population (52.7 per cent) fell 
in this category (Al Sayid, 2003). Egypt's poverty profile reveals that the poor are 
usually either occupied in marginal activities and low wage work or unemployed in 
urban and rural areas. Most of them are illiterate or of low educational level. Although 
there has been some progress, these improvements are not satisfactory. either because 
the pace of development is very slow or setbacks have emerged in some areas like the 
increase in malnourished children. Moreover, a large proportion of the rural 
population is still deprived of basic social services as result of the retraction of the 
state due to economic reform. 
As a result , it is apparent that the Egyptian government failed to meet internal 
economic demands, with economic reforrn (i. e. macroeconomic stabilisation and 
structural adjustment) leading to heightened socio-economic crisis. The situation of 
the majority of Egyptians deteriorated rapidly during the period of economic reform 
in the 1990s. This rather uneven distributional impact resulted in the balance of power 
in society between rich and poor widening in scope, as the business class who 
championed the direction and extent of economic reform were able to benefit 
economically as a result of the limited privatisation and trade liberalisation which the 
FoNPtian state underwent. Given the lack of socio-economic development, which 
resulted from economic reform and the inevitable heightened social dissent, what was 
required was a social safety net to deal with the socio-economic concerns and 
problems of the Egyptian people. The provision of basic needs such as access to 
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education and health had to be dealt with by the Egyptian government. with the 
market having excluded many. The idea of a social safety net came into the mind of 
the Egyptian government to deal with the heightened socio-economic crisis in Egypt. 
The key objective of a social safety net is to compensate the most vulnerable groups, 
particularly those that have been harmed by structural adjustment and the consequent 
shrinking of the subsidies system (Kheir el Din, 1996). The safety net became 
common with the idea of neo-liberal economic reforms in the 1980s to provide a 
'human face' in the midst of social and economic crisis. Ghana was one of the first 
countries to put a 'human face' to structural adjustment. In 1987, on realizing the 
social costs that the structural adjustment programme was inflicting on the general 
populace, the Government of Ghana introduced the Programme of Action to Mitigate 
the Social Consequences of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) (ODI, July, 1996). Since then, 
a number of programmes and policies targeted at poverty reduction have been 
introduced; some with a limited mandate targeted at a specific vulnerable group 
(Sowa, 2002). The Egyptian government in order to provide a 'human face' 
established the Social Fund for Development (SFD) in 1991 to alleviate the harsh 
effects of economic reform policies on the poor, during the phases of macroeconomic 
stabilisation and structural adjustment. One of the mandates of the SFD when initially 
established was to support the Egyptian government's economic reform and structural 
aqjustment programme and to work as a-, 
'Social safety nets to protect those most vulnerable to the adverse effects of the 
reforrn programme. Measures were to be developed to assist unemployed and 
displaced workers, all within the goven-iment's fiscal targets- either through the 
commitment of ncNN7 ftinds, or through the reallocation of existing subsidies or 
transfer funds. The adN-erse effects of economic restructuring on workers were 
to be minimised through this social safety net' (Social Fund for DeN, elopment, 
1999, p 12) 
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The Egyptian government promised $1.1 billion to the SFD, but it failed to meet such 
a commitment, consequently the SFD did not have the financial resources to deal with 
the ensuing socio-economic crisis in Egypt. To compensate for this obvious short 
coming the Egyptian government turned to the NGO's and began to highlight the role 
of NGOs' in providing, socio-economic services, at a time of economic reform. The 
NGO's entered the limelight, thus making it important to explore this sector in the 
context of the process of economic and political change in Egypt. In particular, the 
impacts, if any of the process of economic reform, on NGO-state relations, therefore 
subsequently the process of political change in Egypt. 
3.5 Economic Retraction- The Egyptian State and the Rise of Egyptian NGOs 
The rise of NGOs as economic service providers in Egypt in the 1990s can be traced 
to the market policies advocated by the IMF and WB. Both actors were instrumental 
in promoting the process of economic liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation in 
Egypt (Clark, 2000). These processes in due course meant the economic retraction of 
the Egyptian state in providing socio-economic services. This social contract (i. e. the 
provision of socio-economic services) has been slowly eroded under the successive 
regimes of Sadat and Mubarak, although it is fair to make the point that the erosion 
escalated under Mubarak due to the implementation of economic reform in 1991 
(Bayat, 2003, Gutner, 1999). Thus the provision of socio-economic services in Egypt 
m the 1990s fell into the context of NGOs (Chilriboga, 2002, Michael, 2002). 
The ability of NGOs to act as a good social safety net in Egypt vaned from time to 
time and place to place- no (reneralisation can be made of their performance. In fact, 
the ability of NGOs to replace the Egyptian state as it withdrew from economic 
activity involved two interrelated factors (Clark, 2000). The first was the service 
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capacity and sustainability of the NGOs. The second was political, depending on 
whether NGOs. as service providers were given the political space in which to emerge. 
work and operate. Each of these factors need to be discussed, as they NA-ill alloýv an 
understanding into the impact of economic reform on NGO-state relations and the 
process of political change in Egypt. 
First, in the face of the rising socio-economic problems in Egypt, NGOs did not, have 
either the service capacity, or the sustainability to address the needs of the increasing 
number of poor in society (Clark, 2000). Egyptian NGOs on many occasions did not 
have the financial means and personnel to intervene in order to provide much needed 
socio-economic services. Second, the work of the NGO sector in Egypt was 
obstructed by the fact that the Egyptian governtuent did not retract politically. This 
meant that the NGOs, as service providers were not given the political space in which 
to move, operate and function. This is because; the Egyptian state post 1952 had 
become accustomed to comprehensive control and power, through, the introduction of 
restrictive laws and legislation, in particular corporatist structures and relationships. 
Corporatism reached its peak under Nasser, within the context of his larger 
programme of socialism and nationalisation (Pratt, 2004; Abdel Rahman, 2004). 
Nasser restructured group activity in each occupational group into new corporatist 
groups producing a political system under state control. Sadat and Mubarak reshaped 
the corporatist structures they inherited into more reliable instruments of control and 
co-optation. Therefore, the process of corporatism has been a source of control and 
incvitablc power, preventing the existence of actors beyond the control of the state, in 
case they developed power to challenge the hegemony of the Egyptian state. 
Therefore. in this context of sun-ival, power and hegemony. the Egyptian state post 
19-52, has checked and monitored the performance and behaviour of NGOs through 
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restrictive legislation and corporatism. in case they evolved into a force capable of 
challenging the economic policy and decision making process of the state (El Said, 
Interview, 2004-, El Fattah, Interview. 2004). The need to have consensus is the first 
part of a state continuing with its hegemony. The capacity of NGOs to challenge this 
consensus, in particular economic policy resulted in the Egyptian state keeping a close 
eye on NGOs since 1952. 
In Egypt, NGO-state relations and the process of political change at a time of 
economic reform in the 1990s needs to be viewed through the prism of corporatism, 
which has been exercised through Law 32 of 1964 (Clark, 2000). The existence of 
Law 32 had for decades restricted the NGO sector in Egypt and NGOs in Egypt had 
been calling for a long time for the Egyptian government to change Law 32. This law 
allowed state monopoly over NGOs. Law 32 required citizens wishing to forrn 
voluntary organisations of any type to obtain permission from the Ministry of Social 
Affairs (MOSA). This permission was often denied on vague grounds, including 
determinations that the NGO was not needed or was redundant. Once approved NGOs 
had to inform the Ministry of all activities notifying three government offices of the 
agenda and location of meetings. The law also closely regulated fundraising, allowing 
only membership dues and offerings given dunng religious services to be collected 
without MOSA pen-nission. Pennits for any other type of fundraising were frequently 
denied or sig-nificantly delayed, including permission for the receipt of foreign 
funding, so ceiitral to NGOs (Posusney, 2005, Langhor, 2005). Unless changes were 
made the state would inevitable still continue to control the establishment, expansion, 
functioning and administration of NGOs. As a result this affected the ability of NGOs 
to providc sci-viccs, and challenge the econom" Z7, ic consensus surrounding economic 
policy, which the state was constructing. 
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In reaction to growing pressure at a time of socio-economic crisis and the inability of 
NGOs as service providers to act effectively. in May 1999, the government enacted 
Law 153, with the intention that it would replace the restrictive LaNA, 32 of 1964. This 
change was driven by two key factors. The first factor was international donor 
discourse on the importance of NGOs to provide much needed socio-economic 
services at the time of economic reform. The second factor was that the Egyptian 
government hoped that this change would bring recognition to its intentions toward 
the process of political reform at a time of socio-economic crisis (Langhor, 2005). 
However, like the previous restrictive legislation the Law continued to restrict NGOs, 
which provided services and also criminalised the political work by advocacy NGOs. 
The restrictions imposed and the government's continuous interference in NGO 
funding resulted in Egypt's Constitutional Court abolishing Law 153, in June 2000. 
Law 153 was declared unconstitutional, primarily on the technical grounds that the 
necessary bodies prior to passage had not approved it. In response to the striking 
down of this Law and the obvious embarrassment to the Egyptian government, the 
People's Assembly passed Law 84 of 2002, the new NGO Law (Al Ahram, June, 6- 
12 th, 2002; Al Ahram, November, 7-13 th , 2002). The Law was 
initiated in reaction to 
the repeal of the previous Law and like previous ones the political restrictions 
remained on NGOs. As a result, of this law access to foreign funding was further 
restricted. In previous laws NGOs had been allowed to accept money fTom foreign 
agencies already in the country without prior MOSA pennission but now with the 
advcnt of this law all such funding required permission. The new law continued its 
predecessors insistence that MOSA, not the courts had the nght to dissolve NGOs and 
it allowed the ministry to freeze the funds of NGOs that joined non-goverrimental 
association networks- including international networks, without MOSA permission. 
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Therefore, despite these changes in the Law regulating NGOs, the corporatist 
structure between NGOs and the state remained in tact, with the state continuing to 
regulate closely the work of NGOs and subsequently acting as an obstacle to the 
process of political change. However, restrictive laws and the process of corporatism 
have not been the only means through which NGOs have been controlled in Egypt 
(BBC News, September I gth , 2000; Abdel Rahman, 2002). Furthen-nore, ministers 
and bureaucrats have not been willing to relinquish power and its associated perks. In 
addition, despite the process of economic reform, Egypt's political elite remains ftilly 
intact, this has blocked any substantial progress towards the process of political 
reform. As a consequence avenues to greater political participation and policy 
advising have not opened up for NGOs. The process of economic reform leading to 
socio-economic crisis provided the opportunity for new actors (i. e. economic NGOs) 
to enter the social domain to deal with the failings of the state. However the NGO 
sector was looked upon suspiciously by the Egyptian state in case it disturbed the 
economic consensus of the state by challenging its economic policies and strategies. 
As a result the Egyptian state accepted the existence of the NGO sector but in an 
autocratic framework and context. This can be seen from the fact that the Egyptian 
government has continued to apply restrictive laws and continues with its corporatist 
structure, which remains firmly in place, preventing the NGOs from becoming 
independent from state control. 
It is clear the political space for NGOs to provide services whilst economic reforms 
were on going in the 1990s was something of a misnomer in the context of Egypt. 
This lack of a defined space for NGO's has been an area of concern in Egypt. 
According to Mohammed EI-Said Said, a human right activist and deputy director of 
the Al-Ahram centrc for Political and Strategic Studies, the line between the Egyptian 
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government and NGOs is fuzzy at best. According to Said, there Is no real civil space 
in which NGOs independent from the state can thrive in Egypt. He added that, civil 
institutions and organisations that enjoy full political and economic autonomy do not 
exist in Egypt, a problem which he attributed to the 'modemity trap' (Al Ahram, 
November 8-14 th 
, 2001). As a result, of this 
lack of defined political space, modem 
civil organisations and associations such as political parties, trade unions and NGOs 
failed to check and balance the economic and political power of the Egyptian state. 
Nabil Abdel-Fattah, a researcher at the Al-Abram Centre for Political and Strategic 
Studies, also believes that the official policy of the Egyptian state is tilted towards 
policing NGOs rather than promoting them (Al Ahram, November 8-14 th 2001). This 
has been a major obstacle to the process of political change in Egypt, with the 
Egyptian government increasing its policing of NGOs at a time of heightened socio- 
economic crisis when it felt most vulnerable to challenges, in particular criticism 
towards its economic reforrn strategy. 
This fear of challenges to its economic policies led the Egyptian state to go beyond 
merely policing NGOs to begin exerting excessive political control over the whole of 
society, reversing the limited political openings witnessed during the 1980s. This 
process of rolling back political openings known as political de-liberalisation, 
coincided with growing socio-economic changes, which had not abated from the 
1980s. This crisis exerted excessive socio-economic pressure on the power and 
structure of the Egyptian state leading to perceptions of great political risk and danger 
by the political elite. In response the political elite reacted by the introduction of a 
draconian political strateov, Nvl-iich would have far reaching consequences for the It, - 
process of political reform in Egýpt. 
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3.6 Economic Crisis, the Egyptian State and Political De-liberalisation- 
The process of political liberalisation began in the 1970s under Sadat but was quickly 
reversed after the signing of the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel in 1979 
(Hinnebusch, 1985). However, this process of liberalisation resumed once again xA, Ith 
the advent of President Hosni Mubarak in 1980. Mubarak spoke in the early years of 
his presidency of administering 'democracy in doses'. He allowed the freeing of 
political prisoners and press criticism of government ministers. The representation of 
political opposition rose to a high of 20 percent in the 1987 elections, NGO's grew in 
number, student unions became politically active and professional syndicates were 
given more room to function and operate (Kienle, 2001; Zaki, 1995). This allowance 
on behalf of Mubarak can be put into the context of Mubarak's search for legitimacy. 
On entering the presidency, Mubarak was not well known, thus to acquire legitimacy, 
lie began to talk of political change. This was done by, showing his commitment to 
the rule of law and courting the political opposition. Mubarak continued in the 1980s, 
with this political ploy, in search for legitimacy (Shukrallah, 1989). 
However, the prospect for political reforin. in the 1990s took a downturn, with the 
Egyptian state changing its political strategy, resulting in a movement towards 
political de-liberalisation, enforcing political control over society- in both urban and 
rural areas. The Egyptian government re-imposed constraints, on political parties, 
student unions and the media. In 1995/96, new legislation was introduced by the 
Egyptian government. which restncted the freedom of journalists, making it easier for 
the state to arrest them. Howevcr, in reaction to fierce backlash from the journalists 
and eveii pro governmcntal 'oumalists the Egyptian (tovern-ment had to back track and 
oN-crtum the legislation. From 1999 to 200. ',, ', civil soci n It, iety was exposed 
to rest ictions 
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in new legislation. The arrest of Saad Eddin Ibrahim sent a clear message to all 
leading civil society activists to keep quiet or face the coercion of the Egyptian state. 
The Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights that has operated in Egypt since 1985 
was denied a license to operate officially in 1998 following the arrest of its founder 
Hafez Abu Saeda. As a result it was forced to turn down western funding and to scale 
back its activities (Sorenson, 2003). This political strategy by the Egyptian 
government diminished the level of political participation and pluralism in Egypt 
excessively during the 1990s, which culminated with increasing levels of state 
violence in the 1995 and 2000 parliamentary elections (Brownlee, 2002; Ryan, '100 1 -. 
Mustafa, 1995; Rubin, 1990). 
The extent of the draconian response of the Egyptian state in the 1990s can be 
understood in the context of the growing socio-economic crisis, resulting from 
economic refonn and the political weight of the Islamist opposition, in particular the 
MB, which posed a challenge to the state's powers and its structures (Kienle, 2001, 
2004). First, the level of socio-economic crisis- notably the increasing levels of 
poverty and unemployment had led to internal social and political dissent, which 
endangered the Egyptian states power and its structures. A fear of internal riots like 
the 1977 bread riots led to the Egyptian state introducing draconian policies in order 
to control society (Bayat, 1998). It was this fear of a social backlash and de- 
legitimisation, which facilitated the process of political de-liberalisation, which was 
introduced in society dunng the 1990s. Second the Egyptian state faced a challenge 
from the MB, which had evolved into a key political actor in the 1990s. The MB was 
working at all levels in Egýj-)t. It was ln\, olved at the social level through providing 
social scrviccs. in student unions, teaching clubs. professional syndicates and the 
parliamcnt. Therefore the MB \výis vvorking inside and outside the system, pos' ing a 
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major challenge to the Egyptian state in the context of growing sOcio-economic 
problems. As a result, the MB was a growing concern for the Egyptian government, 
resulting in it directly launching an attack on the MB, to weaken its ability to 
challenge the state's powers and its structures. 
The Egyptian state used its coercive ann to launch an attack against the structure of 
the MB. The regime sent 54 MB members to prison in 1995 and detained thousands 
without charge (Brownlee, 2002). The 1995 elections are viewed as the worst of all 
the elections under the Mubarak regime, with approximately 60 people killed and 
hundreds injured as a result of excessive intimidation and violence conducted by the 
Egyptian police and security forces. The MB was severely intimidated and its 
members were detained in the run up to the 1995 elections. The Egyptian government 
perceived a direct challenge to its power by the MB; therefore it applied its coercive 
instruments towards the MB (Brownlee, 2002; Goodson and Radwan, 1997). The 
Egyptian government in its pursuit of weakening the MB resulted in it closing down 
lllzl) al Amal (The Labour party) and its organ Al Shaab (Abdalla, 2003; Arab Refonn 
Bulletin, December, 2004). It was able to do this by capitalising on the party's 
agitation against a novel accused of being heretic in mid 2000. However, it was clear 
that this agitation of the party against a novel was merely an excuse for the Egyptian 
government to suppress the party as it was active in society and was seen as a 
mouthpiece for the influential MB. The party activities to date remain suspended by 
the state and there is not much prospect of them being activated in the near future. 
It is hard to dispute the fact that the 1990s saw the process of political de- 
liberalisation in EgNpt. This resulted in the Egyptian goverment tightening its control 
ovcr societv, through the consti-iction of political space (Brownlee. 2002, Kienle, 
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1998). What emerged in the 1990s was an inter play of t-%, o main contending factors, 
which forced the hand of the Egyptian state- first the heightened socio-economic 
crisis and second the political weight of the MB. If one is to prioritize any of the txvo 
factors for the Egyptian governments policy of political de-liberalisation it must be 
the political weight of the MB. This is because it was able to exert pressure on the 
Egyptian government due to its existence inside and outside the political system, 
through its involvement in teaching faculty clubs, student unions, professional 
syndicates and the parliament. The MB's existence inside and outside the system 
contributed to its ability to survive state coercion and to continue with its challenge to 
state power and its structures. Therefore the MB emerged as a contester to state 
power in the 1990s, while the Egyptian government was pushing ahead with its 
economic reform programme and its process of political de-liberalisation. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the process of economic and political reform in Egypt since 
1991, in particular its impact on the power and structure of the Egyptian state. In the 
1990s, the Egyptian government pursued economic reform, resulting in the reduction 
of expenditure on much needed socio-economic services to the Egyptian people. This 
led to heightened socio-economic crisis, which threatened the legitimacy and survival 
of the Egyptian state. As a result the Egyptian state introduced a policy of political de- 
liberalisation to contain challenges to its power and its structures. The breathing space 
in civil society was severely restricted, resulting in the suffocation and paralysis of the 
political opposition. However, the MB was able to escape political extinction and to 
continue to challcrige the Epptian state, as a result of its broad involvement in civil 
society. Given the importance of the %1B, in challengin, (,,, the Egýptian state's powers 
72 
and its structures in the I 990s, it is important to explore the evolution of the -MB. 
through examining its growth and development. This allowed the MB to contest state 
power. Its ability to do so was strengthened through a process of change in its shape 
and character resulting in its participation in parliament and professional syndicates. 
This changing shape and character allowed the MB to position itself to directly 
challenge the Egyptian govenu-nent in the 1990s. 
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pt- Growth and Development, 1928 Chapter 4- The Muslim Brotherhood in Egy 
1975 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins the examination of the MB at a time of heightened socio- 
economic crisis from 1928 to the 1970s. I develop the case study of the MB because I 
view it as an important political actor at the time of economic refon-n in the 1990s, 
being able to challenge the state's power and its structures. Thus the examination of 
the MB is important, as it will allow an understanding into the evolution of a key 
political actor in Egypt, through a focus on its growth and development. 
4.2 The Muslim Brotherhood- The Life and Experiences of Hassan Al Banna 
Hassan Al Banna had a modest conservative upbringing in rural Egypt. As result, Al 
Banna was secluded from Egyptian life in urban areas, such as in Cairo and 
Alexandria. His father, Shaykh Ahmad Abd al Rahman al Banna al Sa'ati (1881-1958) 
combined a trade as a watch repainnan with religious scholarship. As was customary 
in Egyptian society, Al Banna followed in his fathers footsteps (Reflections Issue, 
March 4 th, '1005). He learnt to repair watches and acquired an elementary religious 
education. At the age of twelve, he registered at a local state primary school but at the 
same time lie continued to pursue a religious vocation by joining a number of Islamic 
groups, such as the '-Society for Moral Behaviour' and the 'Society for Preventing the 
Forbidden' (Mitchell, 1969. Lia, 1998, Ikhwanweb, March 1", 2006). These societies 
put pressure on fellow townsmen to observe Islamic teaching and sent letters to those 
they detected \vere violatUig, Islamic standards. However, Al Banna would not remain 
xvith such societies long. as he would be attracted bv the 'Hasqfýiv' Sufi order. which 
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he joined when he was thirteen (Esposito, 1993,2002). This Sufi order appealed to 
him because it strictly observed Islamic teachings and practices. Al Banna's 
attachment to this Sufi order made him appreciate the importance of a strono bond ltý 
between teacher and student (Gilsenan, 1967,1973,1985). In his memoirs, Al Banna 
described how one of his first teachers taught him to value the emotional bond which 
can grow between a teacher and student. 
In 1923 Al Banna moved to Cairo. This move to the capital city would open A]- 
Banna's eyes to the lifestyle in the urban areas (Dessouki, 1982). Al-Banna was 
shocked by the lifestyle, which was existent in Cairo. Al-Banna witnessed, gambling, 
materialism, the availability of alcohol, prostitution and promiscuity (Mitchell, 1969-, 
Lia, 1998; Aboul Enein, 2003; Husani Musa, 1956). To Al-Banna, all of this depicted 
an attack on Islamic values and norms. Al-Banna blamed the so called 'Intellectual 
and social liberation movement' of Egypt, then the anti religious trend for facilitating 
the erosion of Islamic values in Egypt (Ikhwanweb, March 15 th , 2006). Also, to Al- 
Banna, the atheists, the liberal organisations, magazines, books and newspapers 
worked hard to promote secular ideas which weakened the influence of religion in 
public life. As a result of these experiences in Cairo, Al Banna came to acknowledge 
the existence of two camps in Egypt, that of seculansm and that of Islam, with the 
fon-ner seen by Al Banna to be hannful to the future of Egypt. 
To combat the spread of secularism, Al Banna sought and found men who shared his 
concerns at Dar ul Loom, Al Azhar, the Law College and the Salafiya library in Cairo. 
Amon,, his neNN, acquaintances was an Azhari scholar, Shaykh Yusuf al Dijwl, who 
had founded a society devoted to Islamic refonn (Lia, 1998. Bayyumi. 1979). Shaykh 
al Di 1\\, i told AI Banna that salvation was through following Islam and there was a 
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need to promote individual Islamic reform in society. Al Banna disagreed with 
Shaykh al Dijwi and urged him to draw on the power of the Muslim world. As a result 
Al Banna's first idea for a programme of action involved the forination of societies 
under a singular religious leadership, which would inspire Islamic refon-n in Egypt. 
This resulted in the establishment of the Young Men's Muslim Association (YMMA) 
(Aboul Enein, 2006). This religious association, formally established in November 
1927 , illustrates the type of reformist movement which Al Banna would emulate 
several months later when he founded the MB. The YMMA sought to revive Muslim 
society through a true Islam as it is found in the Qur'an. As a long term goal the 
YMMA wanted to revive the Islamic Caliphate (Ikhwanweb, April 3 rd 2006). 
After Al Banna graduated from Dar ul Loom in 1927, the Ministry of Education 
appointed him Arabic language teacher at a primary school in Ismailiya (Lia, 1998). 
The socio-economic problems, Al-Banna experienced in Cairo were evident in 
Ismailiya. This was compounded by foreign domination and exploitation in Ismailiya. 
European managers of the Suez Canal Company resided in luxurious accommodation 
while Egyptians lived in miserable huts. As a result, Al Banna wanted to awaken the 
people to the problems, which existed in Ismailiya to lead a process of reform, 
according to his vision of Islam. Al-Banna would visit the town's three main coffee 
houses, where he would regularly deliver brief talks. At the beginning Al Banna's 
ideas were welcomed rather cautiously by those who gathered in the coffee houses but 
after a while, he soon began to attract a regular audience. This led to some followers 
asking Al-Ban-na to lead discussions in a smaller, more pnvate setting (Rahnema, 
1994, Jarneelah, 1980). Thus, Al Banna would lead pnvate talks, and it was these 
talks, which would bring Al Banna. into contact with like minded people, who shared Z-- 
AI Banna's vision for Ismailiva and the rest of Egypt (Ahmad. 1996). This led to A] 
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Banna. with six Egyptian labourers, in Ismailiya, in March, 1928 to establish the I B. 
with the purpose of promoting true Islam (Freedman, 2004; Mitchell, 1969: Avubi. 
1991; Bayyumi, 1979). 
4.3 The Muslim Brotherhood- Factors and Causes behind Expansion and 
Growth 
From 1928, the MB,, would establish branches in other Canal Zone towns in the 
Egyptian Delta. Between 1929 and 1932, the movement grew- it had five branch 
offices by 1930, fifteen by 1932 and three hundred by 1938. While exact membership 
figures are unknown, the three hundred branches probably represented between 
50,000 and 150,000 members (Mitchell, 1969). Thus, in a short period of time, the 
MB increased the number of its branches and its membership size, which can be 
explained by 3 key factors. 
The first factor, which was important in the growth and development of the MB, was 
that the MB provided services, to the people, such as education for boys and girls, 
cheap medical care, financial help and vocational training schemes. The provision of 
such services brought millions of Egyptians into contact with the MB and its vision 
regarding Egypt. Importantly, the provision of services allowed the MB to 
demonstrate its ability to deliver on social and economic promises to the Egyptian 
population (Munson, 2001). This led commentators to describe the MB as a state 
within a state (Al Ahram, July 7-13 th, 2005). This was important as it distanced them 
from the centric Sufistic (i. e., individual religious reform) approach to society which 
was a popular trcnd in Egypt during the earl,,,, growth and development of the MB Z-ý - 
(Ralinenia, 1994, Lia, 1998). At the time of hei(,, -htened socio-economic cnsis in the 
1930s and 1940s. the ability of the MB to provide much needed services added to the 
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weight of the MB, thus the challenge it was able to construct to the E(-T%-ptian 
govemment. 
The second factor, which was important in the growth and development of the MB, 
was the extensive use of the mosque (Yakran, 1998). Other than sporting evems 
mosques were the only other forum in which the government would permit large 
congregations to gather. Mosques were also safe from raids or obvious government 
interference (Ikhwanweb, April 3 rd 1 2006). Even the government had to abide by the 
rules of the mosque due to its sacred role in Islam. Despite formal government control 
over the mosques and preachers, mosques greatly protected the ability of the MB to 
recruit new members and publicize their views to a large mass of people. Mosques 
also gave the movement's preachers an aura of respectability, which they might not 
have otherwise attained if they spoke during rallies in the street. Speeches within the 
mosque tied their call to Islam and further legitimised the movement in society. Thus, 
mosques were critical to the successful birth, growth and development of the MB 
(Munson, 2001). While the MB's leaders used numerous styles such as, street 
demonstrations and public rallies to mobilise the Egyptian people, the mosque 
reinained the primary source of mobilisation and recruitment throughout 1932-1954 
(Al Ahram, January 22-28 th 2004). 
The third factor which was important in the growth and development of the MB as a 
force in society was the charismatic qualities of Al Banna. He was able to attract huge 
gatheriiios of people to his seminars and talks mesmerising them by his fiery speeches 
and emotional rhetoric (Goldberg, 1986). Al Banna's personality would draw in 
hundreds of recruits to the MB. The magnetism of his personality, his ability to 
inspire and lead by example WýIS important in the growth and development of the %IB 
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into a nationwide movement with mass support (Hussain. 1988: Ban, 1995). As a 
result of this mass following which Al Banna would develop. at first many considered 
the MB as a new Sufi order as result of the central role that Al Banna played in NI B 
recruitment, organisation and planning (Mitchell, 1969, Lia, 1998). A comparison was 
made between Al Banna's followers and their utter devotion to him to that of 
believers in a Sufi saint. Al Banna devoted his energy to membership recruitment, 
private discussions of religion and moral reform, all of which was facilitated by his 
dynamic and charismatic personality. Al Banna's popularity allowed him to act as a 
religious advisor to the Egyptian Monarchy and Egyptian state. He wrote letters to the 
King on matters of national importance and he sent dozens of memorandums to 
Egypt's Prime Ministers and cabinet ministers to offer pressing advice. Al-Banna's 
memos stressed the need to enforce Islamic law, promote ties with the Islamic world 
in general and Arab countries in particular, support the Palestinian cause (Choubaky, 
Interview, 2004; Hamzawy, Interview, 2004). In publicised letters, Al Banna called 
for specifics, such as the banning of usury, the banning of alcohol, the expansion of 
hospitals and clinics, the improvement of working conditions, and a minimum wage 
(Mitchell, 1969; Bayyumi, 1979). Thus, Al Banna, through his religious role, was able 
to impart his reformist vision onto the Egyptian monarchy and the Egyptian 
govemment. The ability to do this was facilitated by the movement's involvement in 
politics in the late 1930s, which would herald a shift in the movement from its 
orthodox focus on spiritual elevation to political activism, which would be escalated 
'1006). in the 1980s and 1990s (1khwanweb, March 31", ý 
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4.4 The Muslim Brotherhood- From Political Activism to Confrontation 
The MB started off, in the late 1920s and early 1930s as a movement concerned with 
the spiritual elevation of Egyptian society. However, this would change in the late 
1930s with the MB developing a more political outlook, in reaction to heightened 
socio-economic crisis and the continual spread of secularism. This would begin a 
process of change and shifts in the MB, although it was minimal compared to ý, vhat 
the MB would undergo in the 1980s and 1990s. The MB's shift towards politics was 
recognised by Al Banna in the first issue of the MB weekly, Al- Nadhir in May 1938. 
The appearance of this weekly Al Banna said marked the beginning of the MB 
involvement in the internal and external political struggle. The external political 
struggle was the Palestinian crisis which had started in the region (Jankowski, 2001). 
The movement's conference in 1939 marked the beginning of the movement's 
effective political activity in Egypt and defined the movement, inter alia as a political 
organisation. This movement towards political activism seems to have been timed to 
coincide with the MB's growing sense of organizational and structural power in Egypt. 
Al Banna's political activism became evident. For example Al Banna co-operated 
with Ismail Siddiqi, the Prime Minister on a number of occasions concerning the state 
of affairs inside Egypt. In 1936, the MB participated in the coronation of King Farouq 
(Mitchell, 1969; Lia, 1998). Al Banna was called to the palace in 1946 for 
consultation regarding the appointment of a new Prime Minister. The MB's relations 
with the palace was helped by the fact that Al Banna. did not reject constitutional life 
iii Egypt, howevcr lie aimed to refon-n it by working inside the political system. 
Thcrefore, Al Banna's political strategy Nvas designed to introduce MB 
representativcs to parliament in a sN-nibolic way, througth elections. However, the 
Egy ian Prime Ministcr Ahmad Maher on excluding the group from the I% pti II 
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elections. He falsified election results and excluded the MB's candidates. This was a 
knock back for the movement but it would nevertheless continue with its political 
activism. This was aided by the heightened socio-economic crisis in Egypt, which 
allowed the MB to expand its organisational and structural power. This concerned the 
Egyptian state, which felt vulnerable to a possible challenge to its powers and its 
structures from the MB. In reaction, the Egyptian government took drastic measures, 
leading to the banning of the MB, its members being arrested and its newspapers 
closed down. However, these measures by the Egyptian government against the MB 
did not last long, as the goverment was preoccupied with World War Two (Mitchell, 
1969). The movements meetings and forums resumed, its leadership was released 
from prison and the MB continued to expand rapidly. The movement, continued to 
involve itself in political activism, adding to its power, but its power would be 
weakened as a result of the violent situation, which would emerge in the 1940s in 
Egypt. 
4.5 The Muslim Brotherhood- The Turn to Political Violence and Assassination 
The British colonial presence in Egypt led to resistance, through the use of political 
\! iolence and assassinations by various groups during the late 1930s and 1940s. 
Between 1937 and 194-1 groups appeared in Egypt staging military operations against 
British camps. The Egyptian Zionist Organisation blew up the Antonias Palace in 
Cairo and assassinated the British Minister resident in the Middle East. Between 1946 
and 1949, political violence in Egypt escalated to new heights. The assassinations of 
Ahmad Maher, Eilypt's Pnme Minister and the President of the Hizb al Wqfd (The 
delc(, ation Partv) created a very unstable and turbulent political climate (Lia. 1998). I 
In Fcbruarv 1945. the MB's special Linit engaged in its first operation. Special Unit 
81 
head al Sanadi monopolised the movement's leadership and staged attacks against 
British troops and Egyptian Jewish groups for their perceived co-operation with the 
Zionist movement in Palestine (A] Ahram, November 6-12 th , 2003). The special unit 
was also involved in the killing of a prominent magistrate, Ahmad al Khazendar who 
had sentenced a MB member to prison for attacking British soldiers (Lia, 1998: 
Rishwan, Interview, 2004). At this time, Al Banna felt there was an imbalance in the 
movement's leadership and moreover he did not want to involve his group in conflict 
with the Egyptian government. Al Sanadi had enough backing inside the special unit 
to have his own way. He unleashed the special unit's entire destructive power against 
the British and the Zionist entity in Palestine. The special unit's violence would 
undennine the political weight of the MB. This is because the violence acts ga\, e the 
Egyptian goveniment the justification to launch attacks on the organisation and 
structure of the MB. The Egyptian government banned the MB's branches in 
Ismaillyya and Port Said and arrested a large number of its members (Harris, 1964). 
The final nail in the coffin of the MB came when a vehicle was captured in an ambush 
set by the security forces and the special unit of the MB was exposed. In December 
1948, the government of Prime Minister Mahmoud Naqrashi banned the MB, closed 
down its offices and confiscated its funds and properties. The Egyptian government 
justified this move by demonstrating the MB stocked arms, fabricated bombs and 
explosives, attacked commercial and security facilities and instigated nots. The 
Egyptian courts acquitted the MB of many of the accusations; according to the 
judiciary the Arab League had approved the use of weapons in the Palestinian war. 
In the face of such a political crisis which had inundated the MB, Al Banna decided to 
change the name of the movement or merge it in the Muslim Youth Association. He Z7% 
SUbmitted a proposal to King Farouq to turn the %IB into a religious group which 
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would help the king and the throne resist communism. However. the king rejected this 
proposal. This rejection of the proposal submitted by Al Banna resulted in a 
comprehensive divorce and alienation between the MB and the Palace. This was the 
first time such closure of communication between the two had occurred since the 
emergence of the MB. This led to frustration inside the ranks of the MB. leading to 
the assassination of the Prime Minister Mahmoud Naqrashi by a MB member (Shia 
News, April 22 nd , 2001; Rishwan, Interview, 2004). The member named Hassan 
Taleb claimed that the Prime Minister was a traitor, who had neglected the Palestinian 
cause, fought Islam and banned the MB. In retaliation the government arrested 
thousands of MB members, tortured them and forced the issuing of religious decrees 
condemning the movement and calling for its dissolution. Al Banna attempted to start 
a process of reconciliation with the government and the king. However, this was short 
lived as Al-Banna was assassinated by the secret police in February 1949. The 
assassination of Al Banna was a huge blow for the MB, as he had presided over its 
growth and development since the inception of the MB. 
Hassan Hudaybi was the next elected leader of the MB, a former court judge and a 
well-respected member of the Egyptian elite. He adopted a policy based on the 
'dua wa' (Islamic Call) with 'wisdom and good exhortation' and a less confrontational 
style, which had charactensed the movement previously (Munson, 2001; Rishwan, 
Interview, 2004, Choubaky, Interview, 2004). The shouting of slogans and emotional 
language ývhich characterised MB demonstrations and public rallies were stopped by 
the new leader, as he wanted the movement to adopt a more professional outlook. 
This policv ultimately clashed xvith the NIB's radical trend calling for political 
-It, . ptian state. 
This intemal conflict intensified so much that struggle with the Egy iII 
Hudavbi was accused of making peace agreements xvith King Farouq and prevcnting 
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the MB from fighting the British (Lia. 1998; Mitchell, 1969). The altercation 'within 
the MB was not surprising, as the MB had become accustomed to a certain manner of 
leadership and management, which was embodied in the charismatic and dynamic 
personality of Al Banna. Anyone succeeding him would have a difficult task to fulfil. 
While Hudaybi was not as charismatic, dynamic and did not have the same leadership 
style as Al Banna it would be naive to write Hudaybi off as an ineffectl\, e and 
incompetent leader (Daily Times, August 1", 2004). Hudaybi kept the movement 
intact and functional in spite of, facing challenges over internal leadership, the 
detention of over four thousand of its members and its forinal dissolution by the 
Egyptian government. This was even more impressive as Hudaybi's, leadership 
coincided with the surfacing of Sayed Qutb and his political discourse, which was 
diametIrically opposed, to what he believed (Beinin, 2005). 
In the context of this crisis and clash inside the MR, the existing regime was decaying. 
On July 23,1952 a small cadre of military men known as the Free Officers overthrew 
the existing regime. This is a significant event in relation to the MB as various 
members of the movement had strong links inside the military and with the Free 
Officers which took power in Egypt. This provided the MB, with an opportunity to 
iiifluence the political system, according to its Islamic vision. However, they would 
be disappointed as the Free Officers vision for Egypt would not coincide with that of 
the MB, thus bringing to the surface conflict between the two dominant actors in 
Egyptian politics at that period of time. 
4.6 The Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers 
Gainal Abdel Nasser, Abdel Monem Abdel Rauf, Khaled Muhiyeddine, Kamaleddine 
HLisscin and Hassan Ibrahim founded the Free Officer's first cell in July 1949. The-v 
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were all former members of the special unit between 1944 and 1945. Abdel Nasser 
sought the support of all political powers, relying heavily on the support of the MB. 
The movement's general leadership convened and declared its support for the 
revolution based on reforms founded on Islam. Despite approval and support for the 
revolution by the MB, difficulties between the factions would appear. In September 
1952, the Major General Mohammed Naguib, who was named commander in chief by 
the Free Officers, formed a government and excluded the MB from participation, 
prompting the MB to position itself in opposition to the new Egyptian leadership (Al 
Ahram, June 27 th -3 rd July, 2002). When the law regulating the activities of political 
parties was issued toward the end of 1952, Hudaybi reallsed that the Free Officers 
planned to ban political parties. He made every effort to prevent registering the MB as 
a political party, as a continuation of his policy to exclude the movement from 
involvement in conflicts. In November 1953, all parties were banned except the MB. 
The MB was pressured to join the Free Officers Freedom Committee as a political 
organisation but refused to do so. Hudaybi stated 'parties with principles cannot be 
established through the anny and the police' (Al Ahram, June 27 th -3rd July, 2002). 
By May 1953, tensions between the movement and the new regime began to intensify. 
Nasser issued a warning to Hudaybi demanding that the MB stop any membership or 
recruitment activity within the army and the police (Mitchell, 1969; Lia, 1998). He 
also demanded that the MB dissolve the movement's branches in the anny and 
security forces, as well as the dissolution of the special unit. In a brave move, 
Hudaybi defied and rejected the demands from the regime and he began to attack 
dissidents from the movement xho supported Nasser in their defiance of his 
leadership of the NIB (Choubaky, Intervicw, 2004; Rishwan. Interview, 2004). 
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As a result of non compliance by the movement and its stubbornness in bowing doxn 
to the demands of the regime. the regime decided to dissolve the MB in January 19- 54. 
The pretext for the dissolution was that the movement maintained contact NA-ith the 
British Embassy in Cairo-, they were opposed to agricultural reform and attempted to 
overthrow the regime. In reaction the MB convened a conference in Damascus which 
condemned the leaders of the 1952 revolution and their decision to ban the MB in 
Egypt. The MB came to realise that it was virtually impossible to reach an agreement 
with Nasser who had began to perceive the MB as a political danger to his rule. The 
deadlock resulted in frustration inside the ranks of the MB. This led to a member of 
the movement to try to assassinate Nasser, while he was delivering a speech in 
Alexandria in October 26,1954. This failed, resulting in Nasser cracking down hard 
on the MB, to destroy its structure and organisation (Al Ahram, June 27 
th 
-3 
rd July 
2002; Al Jazeera, June 22 nd 2005). 
The Egyptian state detained over 4000 members of the movement and began 
dismantling the movement through the 'people's tnbunal', which issued harsh 
sentences to those convicted. The MB called for a popular uprising to overthrow the 
regime and Hudaybi stated that the uprising was aimed at restoring political freedoms, 
parliamentary life, releasing prisoners and handing power to civilians. In reaction to 
this stir by the MB and the risk of political disturbances throughout the country. the 
kpeople's tribunal' then issued death sentences against Hudaybi and many other MB 
leaders (Choubaky, Interview, 2004, Rishwan, Interview, 2004). Nasser refused the 
Syrian governments and the Syrian MBs call not to execute the brothers and also 
failed to listen to protests from Jordan, Pakistan and Sudan. This effectively eroded 
and weikenecl the power of the NIB in E,,,, pt with a large membership base detained 
and members executed. 
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After 1954 the MB stopped its open activities in Egypt and lost its power as the 
central leadership of the MB in the Middle East. The leadership consequently moved 
to Syria and established an 'executive bureau' for the MB in the Middle East. It was 
led by Issam Attar, the general supervisor of the MB in Syria. During this period of 
much turbulence for the MB when the Egyptian regime came down heavily upon the 
movement, the general MB maintained its structure through a committee known as 
the Executive Office of the MB, located in the Middle East (Rishwan, Interview, 2004, 
Choubaky, Interview, 2004). The committee included Isaam Attar (the MB's leader in 
Syria), Mohammed Abdel Rahman Khalifah (the MB's leader in Jordan) Fathi Yakan 
(heads of Al Jammaa al Islami a in Lebanon) and leaders from other MB branches yy 
in the Middle East. At that time, the executive office formed a commando base under 
the flag of the Palestinian faction Fatah in Jordan. However conflicts arose within the 
executive office leading to its collapse in 1969. 
By 1974 all detained MB were freed. Hudaybi aimed to reconstruct the MB after his 
release from prison. He took advantage of the pilgrimage season in Mecca in 1972 
and 1973 to hold a meeting in Saudi Arabia of the group's leaders in an effort to unify 
the MB leadership across the Middle East. During the pilgrimage of 1975, the MB 
convened a meeting for the Founding Committee (later called the International Shura 
Council) to complete their organisational. structure amid a climate of division. 
Therefore through the initiative of Hudaybi, the MB was able to overcome another 
hurdle which Hudaybi had come accustomed to since taking leadership of the MB. 
HoNN, cN, cr, this hurdle was of vast importance as would revive the ailing organisation, 
allowing it to operate in a co-ordinated manner in the Middle East and re-directing 
leadership back to Ewqit- Importantly, this would set the basis for the MB to develop, tl- - 
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once again into a key political actor in Egypt, being able to challenge the state's 
powers and its structures. 
4.7 The Muslim Brotherhood, Sadat and His Search for Legitimacy 
The fortunes of the MB in the 1970s would be assisted through Sadat's pursuit of 
legitimacy. Sadat realized the importance of religion in constructing much needed 
legitimacy. Even, Nasser was aware of the powerful role of religion in constructing 
legitimacy; which led to the co-optation of religious institutions into the state, such as 
Al Azhar. Religious verdicts from Al Azhar were used to ensure domestic control and 
promote his foreign policy objectives. Subordinating Al Azhar to the state would also 
allow Nasser to balance the influence of the MB, which threatened to challenge the 
state's powers and its structures (Barraclough, 1998). Moreover, Nasser understood 
that Al Azhar's influence extended well beyond the borders of Egypt and that 
government control over the most respected and influential institution of Islamic 
scholarship would be an important tool in furthering Egypt's leadership of Arab and 
Islamic nations. As Islam is the dominant religion in Egypt and the wider Middle East, 
it was politically expedient and shrewd by Nasser to use Islam in order to develop 
legitimacy to persist in power. Like Nasser, for Sadat the use of religion through Al 
Azhar was politically shrewd given the rise of Islamic consciousness in Egyptian 
society in the aften-nath of the 1967 Arab defeat at the hands of Israel. Sadat in the 
1970s initiated a debate in his semi official press through the Al Azhar over what was 
described as the 'Islamic economy' and its compatibility with capitalist ethos and 
values (Moustafa, 2000). In addition, Islam was used by Sadat to project an image of 
religious piety towards the public. Sadat promoted himself as the "believing 
president" and was constantiv seen at praver. more and more. The 1971 constitution 
88 
stipulated that 'Islam is the religion of the state; Arabic is the official language and 
principles of the Islamic Shariah are a principal source of legislation'. Even more 
significant than the inclusion of this article into the constitution was the Ec; Nptian 
states relationship with the MB. The MB had gone underground in response to their 
outlawing by Nasser and the campaign of persecution that followed, resulting in 
thousands of MB members being jailed and a similar number fleeing to surrounding 
Arab countries to escape persecution from Nasser. Sadat's perception toward the MB 
was somewhat different compared to Nasser. Sadat realised the importance of the MB 
in boosting the Islamic image of the state and acting as a counter balancing force to 
the leftist opposition in society (Kodmani, 2005). As a result, Sadat in the early 1970s 
developed a policy to accommodate the MB, in society. The Egyptian state released 
detained members of the MB, and allowed exiled members to return to Egypt, like 
Yusuf Al Qaradawi, Ahmad al Asaf and Salim Nijm (Al Awadi, 2004). Also, the MB 
was allowed to reclaim its headquarters in Cairo, reconvene its regular meetings 
inside the mosques, activities on university campuses and recruitment of new 
members to the movement (Kodmani, 2005). Thus, the MB was allowed to re-enter 
society by the Egyptian state, which would start a new phase in the life of the 
movement. This new phase would result in the MB undergoing changes to its shape 
and character, leading to its participation in parliament, professional syndicates and 
the forming of party alliances- thus allowing the MB to construct a challenge to the 
state's powers and its structures at a time of economic reform in the 1990s. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the evolution of the MB, through an examination of its growth 
18 to the 1970s. This allowed the MB, to become a key and dcvelopment from 19. 
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political actor in Egypt. However. from the 1970s onwards, the political weight of the 
MB was extended through extensive changes it would undergo in its shape and 
character. This would lead to its transition ftom the spirit to politics, through its 
involvement in the parliament, professional syndicates and the construction of party 
alliances. This would allow the MB to construct political power to challenge the 
Egyptian government at a time of socio-economic crisis, resulting from economic 
refonn in the 1990s. 
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Chapter 5-The Muslim Brotherhood- its Transition from the Spirit to Politics 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues to explore the changing shape and character of the NIB from 
spiritual piety to political activism. This is done by examining the introduction of the 
MB into formal politics in the 1980s, through its participation in parliamentary 
elections. This represented a key change in the shape and character of the MB, which 
allowed it to construct political weight to challenge the Egyptian state's powers and 
its structures at a time of heightened socio-economic crisis in the 1990s. 
5.2 Changing Political Discourse- From Hassan A] Banna to Sayed Qutb 
During the 1930s, the MB was viewed to be a social movement with its activities 
predominately devoted towards the moral and spiritual refon-nation of society 
(Mitchell, 1969; Abd al Monein and Wenner, 1982). However, the movements 
transition to politics in the late 1930s, led Al-Banna to set forth more specific political 
and executive goals for governance. The first objective was to bring an end to the 
party-system and point the political community into one direction (Hassan, 2005; See 
Al-Banna, Majmu'atu Rasa'el al-In7am al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna. ). According to 
some Islamic interpretations by scholars, such as former Egyptian Grand Mufti 
Sheikh Sayyid Sabiq, the party-system is considered "destructive" in the sense that 
ccrtain political parties coalesce with segments of the population to represent groups 
NN, hich alienate themselves from the Islamic Shari'ah which divides the Umnia 
(Muslim community) and places groups at odds with one another further causing 
some forrn of sectarianism rather than cohesion (Hassan, 2005). Another objective Al- 
Banna declared Nvas to strengthen the ties between the Islamic circles internationally, 
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II Also especially in the entire Arab region to revive the Idea of the Islamic Cal iphate. 
Al Banna stressed the need for Muslims to show concern for each other's suffering. 
through highlighting the concept of belonging to the Islamic Unima. Al Banna 
practically showed what it meant to belong to the Islamic Umma in reaction to the 
Palestinian crisis, which developed in the 1930s and 1940s (Hassan, 2005). He 
instructed the movement to address the Palestinian crisis, through the distribution of 
leaflets, mosque speeches and the holding of demonstrations to rally the Egyptian 
people. Therefore in the midst of Al Banna's social and economic thought, there ý, vas 
an expression of politics. However, this political discourse of Al Banna would be 
challenged during the 1950s and 1960s. This was due to the nse of Sayed Qutb, and 
the development of his political discourse. 
During his early career, Sayed Qutb devoted himself to literature as an author and 
critic, writing novels such as Ashwak (Thorns) and even elevating Egyptian novelist 
Naguib Mahfouz from obscurity. After his graduation from Dar al- Loom in 1933, 
Qutb began his teaching career and eventually became involved in Egypt's Ministry 
of Education (Khatab, 2006; Shepard, 1996). The Ministry sent him abroad to the 
United States to research western methods of teaching. He spent a total of two years 
in the United States fTom 1948 to 1950. During that time, Qutb studied at Wilson's 
Teachers' College on the east coast before moving west and earning a M. A. in 
education at the University of Northern Colorado (Abdel Malek, 2000, p 10). In "The 
America I Have Seen", a personal account of his experiences in the United States, 
Qutb expresses his admiration for the great economic and scientific achievements of 
America, yet he is deeply dismayed that such prosperity could exist in a society that 
rcmained 'abysmally primitivc in the world of the senses, feelings, and behaviour' 
(Qutb. 2000, p 11). By this, Qutb was alluding to values, such as freedom, 
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individualism and matenalism, which formed the functional basIs of American 
society (Shepard, 1996; Haddad, 1983; Mousalli, 1992: Khan, 1998). He believed that 
these values had led to the social problems, which America was facing, such as high 
levels of consumerism, sexual discrimination and promiscuity (Henzel, 2005. Al 
Ahram, March, II- 17 th , 1999). As a result 
Qutb believed that America was in a state 
of 'jahiliyyah' (state of ignorance) (Qutb, 2002; Shepard, 1996, Rahnerna, 1994; 
McGregor, 2003; Al Ahram, December 9-15 th , 1999). As a devout Muslim, Qutb 
believed that the prophet Muhammad was sent as a messenger of God's divine 
guidance, which was to be found in Muhammad's transchption of the Qur'an. Qutb 
believed that, the Qur'an is God's final guide for man to live a full and harmonious 
life that is in accordance with his nature. Therefore, for Qutb those who ignore it are 
guilty of 'jahiliyyah 'just as Adam was when he ignored God's message not to eat 
from the tree. Qutb believed that throughout human history men have disobeyed God; 
as a result God has sent man help whenever he falls into 'jahilhyah': 
'When this state of affairs is reached (jahiliyyah), God sends a messenger to 
human beings explaining to them the very same truth they had had before 
sinking into 'jahilýy. vah'. Some of them write their own destruction, while 
others are able to spare themselves by returning to the truth of the faith. These 
are the ones ... who listen to their messenger as 
he says to them: 'My people, 
worship God alone: you have no deity other than Him' (Abdel Haleern 
Translation- Qur'an 7, p59). 
Therefore, 'jahilýiyah' results whenever man ignores the divine commands giving by 
God's messentyers. Qutb used Surah 7 in the Qur'an as an extensive example of how 
truth (Islam) and falsity (jahili. iyah) have battled throughout human history. He 
believed that this Surah 'portrays how those in the procession of faith try to rescue 
man every time he strays far away from the right path' (Qutb, 2002. p1 -12). Like the 
American society. to Qutb, the Nasserist regime had also strayed far away from the 
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right path, which led him to reject the ideology, values and practices of the Nasser 
regime, classifying them as 'jahifi. vvah' as they contradicted the Islamic message 
(Khatab, 1996,2006; Qutb, 1991). Also, Qutb believed that Al Azhar had also strayed 
away from the right path by being pressed into the service of Nasserism (Choubaky, 
Interview, 2004; Rishwan, Interview, 2004). As a result. according to Qutb, Egyptian 
society had to be brought back to the straight path and the beginning point was to 
remove Nasser's regime to wash Egypt of his blend, of socialism and nationalism. 
This would also, according to Qutb allow AI-Azhar to break away from the shackles 
of Nasser's regime and to act in the service of Islam. Qutb, through his work, Ma'alim 
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fi al-tariq (Signposts or Milestones), centering on key concepts such as, jahilývyah', 
'haq' (truth) vs. 'batil' (falsity), 'kufar' (non-belief) and 'Al-Adala a1-Ijtima'i-vya ' 
(social justice) was able to create considerable zeal in the ranks of the MB. It also 
gave them the hope that they would be the vanguard to successfully challenge the 
dominant ideology of Nasseirism and lay the foundations for a truly Islamic 
community in Egypt. Shukri Mustafa led those who adopted Qutb's view that Egypt 
was a state of unbelief and that the Brothers should prepare for an active struggle to 
establish a proper Islamic state. After his release from prison, Mustafa established the 
Society of Muslims (Jama'at al-Muslimin), better known as the Takfir wa'l-Hijra 
group - meaning roughly to retreat from a society of unbelief (Kepel, 2002, Kramer. 
1996; Fuller, 2003). According to Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, 
'In a century in which some of the most important writing came out of pnsons, 
Qutb, for bctter or for worse, is the Islamic world's answer to Solzhenitsyn, 
Sartre, and Havel, and lie easily ranks xvith all of them in influence. It was 
Sayyid Qutb 'who fused togethcr the core elements of modem Islamism.... Qutb 
concluded that the unity of God and His sovereignty meant that human rule - 
oovcmment legislates its own behavior - is illegitimate- Muslims must answer 
to God alonc' (Simon and Beilliamin, 2002, p62). 
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The old guard leadership of the Muslim Brothers rejected the concepts expressed in 
Ma'allmfi al-tariq and affirmed their historic position that through preaching (da'iva) 
Muslims could be brought to a higher state of commitment and practice. In 1969 the 
society 1) s second General Guide, Hasan al-Hudaybi, wrote a strong riposte to Qutb: 
Du'a, la quda (Preachers not judges). Al-Hudaybi repudiated the violence employed 
by the Brothers' Rovers in 1947-49 and in 1954. 'Umar al-Tilemensani. who became 
General Guide in 1973, shared these views with the old guard leadership (Choubaky, 
Interview, 2004; A] Ahram, March 11-17 th , 1999). However, unlike the old guard 
leadership, Umar al-Tilemensani, was pragmatic, a visionary and would want to lead 
the MB to new ground, by shifting it from its traditional focus on spiritual piety to 
political activism. This shift would be indicative of the changing shape and character 
of the MB, which would be stepped up in the 1980s and 1990s. 
5.3 Umar Al Tilemensani and Shifts in the Muslim Brotherhood 
In the 1970s, the MB experienced a new lease of life, as thousands of Its members 
were released from prison, exiled members were allowed back into Egypt and the 
movement was allowed to recommence its activities. As a result of this, the 
movement began to actively pursue two simultaneous objectives. The first objective, 
for the MB was to secure a legal status from the Egyptian government, which they 
had lost since 1954. The second objective was to rebuild the organisation, which had 
been destroyed by Nasser (Choubaky, Inter-view, 2004: Ella Madi, Interview, 2004). 
Achieving the first objective would be an arduous task but nonetheless an important 
oýjectlve, for the MB to have a secure future in Egypt. 
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Thus, to acquire a legal status for the MB. in October 1977. Tilemensani filed a court 
case against Nasser's decision to disband the organ1sation In 1954 (Baker, 1990). 
Tilemensani's argument was based on the premise that the revolutionary council 
lacked any real legislative or constitutional rights. Consequently the decision of the 
Nasserist regime to outlaw the MB was invalid. This decision to contest the outlawing 
of the MB was strengthened by Sadat's political refonns, such as the political party's 
law of 1976 (Al Awadi, 2004). The transition from a one party system to a multi party 
system gave the MB hope that their illegal status would be overturned soon. However, 
the hope that encircled the MB was short lived, as Tilemensani's case was not settled 
by court. The MB realised that even Sadat's judicial system, however independent it 
appeared to be on the surface, was in reality part of the state apparatus without any 
real independence. The relentless delay in the courts reaching a verdict upon the 
future of the MB, led to frustration inside the ranks of the MB. Tilemensani could not 
understand why the court was taking forever in reaching a decision upon overturning 
the ban on the MB. Given this delay in outcome, Tilemensani was realistic that a 
decision may never anse or the ban may not be overturned (Al Awadi, 2004). Also 
Tilemensani was aware of the fact that the Egyptian government's rather tolerant 
policy towards the movement could change with the government possibly reverting to 
a policy of coercion as seen under Nasser. Thus, having examined all possible 
scenarios, which were not positive, Tilemensani reallsed that the movement had to 
change to force the overturning of the ban and to avoid possible coercion from the 
Egyptian ioN-emrnent. Tilemensani, believed, the change that was needed was a shift 
in the Nvork of the movcment, from its traditional focus on spiritual piety to political 
activism. This transition ftom spintual piety to political activism would indicate a 
change in the shape and character of the movement, which would allow the M. 13 to 
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become once again a key political actor in Egypt, able to challenge the state's pow-er 
and its structure in the 1990s at a time of failing economic reforms (Choubaky, 
Interview, 2004; Rishwan, Interview, 2004; Ella Madi, Intemew, 2004). 
However, this change, which Tilemensani wanted to commence, faced resistance and 
opposition from the old guard leadership in the movement, who were conservative in 
their thinking and approach. The old guard were formed by the harsh experience of 
the MB's repression under Nasser. For example, the present 'Murshid', Mohammed 
Akhef, was already a member before Al-Banna's assassination in 1949 and was 
sentenced to death after the failed 1954 assassination challenge on Nasser and was 
imprisoned until 1974. He and others of his generation, who fon-n the core of the old 
guard are generally more zealous, conservative, and committed primarily to long-term 
spiritual work and to preserving the movement's unity (Altman, 2006). The old guard 
was and continues to be deeply suspicious of other groups and unforgiving toward 
fortner political rivals such as the Nasserists, Arab-Nationalists and Marxists due to 
ideological differences and bitter past confrontations. The old guard followed the 
religious teachings of Al Banna, who although later in his life involved himself in 
politics, remained sceptical of the nature of politics, especially party politics in Egypt. 
To Al Baima party politics represented a key source of conflict, and division, inside 
society (Mitchell, 1969). This perception of Al. Banna towards politics was shaped 
through his stay in Cairo between 1923-1927, when party politics was inundated by 
corruption, conflict and ri\, alry. As a result politics was viewed to have had done 
mucli more harin than good to society. Therefore, according to Al Banna, there was a 
need to distance oneself away from party polltics to prevent the movement from 
falling into the vicious trap of party politics that involved corruption, conflict and 
nvalry. Instead, Al Banna stressed the need to give advice to the Egyptian %lonarch-v 
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and government, to allow the MB to discharge its religious duty to the political order. 
without getting dragged into the dirty life of party politics. Al Banna's political 
thinking shaped the way of thinking of the old guard leadership. As a result they were 
uncomfortable with a transition of the MB from the spirit to politics (Lia, 1998). 
Given the fact that the old guard leadership played a key role in decision making and 
was institutionallsed inside the chain of command of the MB, Tilemensani knew he 
would have a difficult time in convincing this faction to support the change in the 
shape and character of the movement, from its traditional work on spiritual piety to 
political activism. As, Tilemensani, saw this changing shape and character of the 
movement, as being vital for its future, he was willing to take on the dominant old 
guard leadership to present his vision and to drive the change in the movement. 
A process of change was evident, when Tilemensani began to speak about the 
prospect of the MB participating in Sadat's parliament. In reaction, there was a strong 
objection from the old guard who saw this move as being out of line with the MB's 
orthodox role of spiritual guidance. Tilemensani did not object to the old guard raising 
thcir concerns, in fact he welcomed the concerns to begin internal discussion on the 
changing shape and character of the MB. He continued to stress the transition of the 
MB from spirit to politics, to force the overturning of the ban and to avoid possible 
coercioii from the Egyptian government. Despite, the on going clash in the MB, 
Tilemensani hoped that Sadat would agree to admit the MB into the parliament on the 
basis of it representing an independent socio-economic political trend in Egyptian 
socictv. This hope by Tilemensani could be seen as compromise with the old guard, as 
Tilemensani did not demand the movement to be admitted into the parliament on the 
platfon-n of a political party (Al ANN-adi, 2004: Rishwan, Interview, 2004). However, 
Sadat had major concems, in case the %1B evolved into an effective political 
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opposition to the Egyptian goverment, thus was disinclined to allow the MB thi is 
independent representation in parliament. Instead, Sadat gave the MB the option to 
participate in parliament through a coalition with any of the three existing political 
parties, which had emerged after the dissolution of the ASU in 1976. However, 
Tilemensani refused such an offer from Sadat. For Tilemensani, any fon-n of coalition 
with the secular political opposition was perceived as damaging to the public image of 
the movement as an Islamic actor in Egyptian society (Choubaky, Interview, 2004: 
Ella Madi, Interview, 2004). As a result the MB rejected this option presented by 
Sadat. However, this knock back would not deter Tilemensani-, as he was convinced 
that the Egyptian state would be forced to accept the MB, if it continued to shift its 
shape and character, leading to its transition from the spirit to politics. As a result, 
Tilemensani wanted to see more changes in the movement and this would be 
facilitated by the rise of the new guard in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which would 
introduce a new culture of politics into the MB. The new guard would drive the 
process of change and the contestation of political power, resulting in the movement 
developing into a key political weight at the time of economic reform in the 1990s. 
Thus, allowing the MB to challenge the Egyptian state's power and its structures. 
5.4 The Rise of the New Guard in the Muslim Brotherhood 
Siiice the time of Al Banna, the old guard leadership have focused on maintaining 
tlicir own power, neglected the need to educate new leaders and have worked to 
maintain the character of the MB (Al Jazeera, December 4 th , 2002). This 
focus by the 
old pard meant that they were seen to care more about the internal structure to 
maintain their position and power than about the process of change to allow the MB 
to construct a challenoe to the state's powers and " t, its structure (Altman, 2006). 
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However, the old guard after decades of domination within the MB would eventually 
be challenged with the emergence of a ne", guard in the MB. This new guard had 
different ideas to the old guard leadership upon key issues of how internal decisions 
should be made, the election of a leader, the state, the west, and the function of the 
movement. Therefore, this new guard, with its blend of Islamic politics and 
pragmatism, would facilitate the changing shape and character of the movement. 
The new guard entered the scene during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Choubaky, 
2004). The new guard's experiences were different from the old guard, which 
influenced their thinking and approach. For example, the new guard did not 
experience the oppression of Nasser, which the old guard experienced in the 1950s 
and 1960s. The new guard had become familiar to limited political openness and 
participation in student politics through the Jama'at Islamiyya (Islamic student 
movement) in the 1970s (Olav Utvik, 2005; Baker, 2003; Brown et al, 2006). 
Through student politics, which entailed daily interaction with students of different 
ideologies, rapprochement with different student groups and standing for student 
union elections, the new guard was able to acquire a greater taste for politics. This can 
be deduced from the fact that the new guard assigned greater importance to politics 
than to the spirit, saw Egypt rather than the Muslim world as the MB's real frame of 
reference, and showed interest in building alliances with secular political 
organizations to deal with pressing socio-economic issues. This new guard included 
people like, Essam EI-Erylan, assistant secretary-general of the Doctors Syndicate, 
lbrahnn EI-Zaafarani, secretary-general of the Alexandria chapter of the same 
syndicate, Mohamed Habib, an Asiut University professor and Abu Al Futuh from the 
Guidance Bureau Council (Choubaky, Interview, 2004: Rishwan, Interview. 2004). 
When these individuals joined the MB, they were followed by a large section of the 
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rank-and-file members of the Islamic student movement, which had been led In the 
1970s by new guard activists such as Essam El Eyrian. Abu Ella Madi and Abu Al 
Futuh (Olav Ut-vik, 2005). As a result the new guard would have a loyal support base, 
which would support the changes it was pushing for, leading to inevitable clashes 
with the old guard leadership. These clashes were evident in the 1980s but escalated 
in the 1990s, as the new guard with its pragmatism speeded up the process of change 
in the MB. 
In the mid 1990s the new guards drive to change the shape and character of the MB, 
led to the fon-nation of a party manifesto for the 'Hizb al Wasat' (centrist party) 
(Stacher, 2001,2002; Olav Utvik, 2005; Rumaihi, 1997). This was a clear endeavour 
by the new guard to form a legal arm through which they could operate in society. 
However, the political parties committee rejected 'Hi*-b al Wasat'S' application for 
legal status. This rejection caused problems inside the ranks of the MB over how to 
proceed next. New guard members such as Abu Ella Madi and Salah Abdul Karim 
wanted to continue with the party initiative to push further the change in the shape 
and character of the MB (Ella Madi, Interview, 2004; Stacher, 200 1; Olav Utvik, 
2005). Thus, they wanted to adapt the party manifesto to make it more palatable to the 
Egyptian government. However, the old guard did not see the benefit in continuing 
with this party initiative. They believed it would be rejected by the Egyptian 
i, ovcmment regardless of the number of amendments which were made to the 
manifiesto (Ella Madi, Interview, '1004). As a result of this deadlock and disagreement, 
., \I)u Madi, Abdul 
Karim and other well seasoned new guard members left the 
movement in order to proceed with the 'al It asat' group. The 'Hizb al Wasat' 
represents certain elements of the new guard inside the movement which became tired 
of the dogn-natic approach of the old guard leadership and decided to branch out, in 
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order to try their own luck in Egyptian politics (Stacher. 2002). For example, in a 
January 1995 editorial in the magazine of the Engineers Union, editor Salah Abd al- 
Karim, later a central member of the al-Wasat group, indirectly criticized the 
domination of the old guard and pointed out the necessity of a proper division of work 
among the two generations, a division whereby the party elders should restrict 
themselves to the role of advisors (Olav Utvik, 2005). Much more explicit criticism 
was expressed in a speech, 'Al-in tah al-na i wal-'amal-al-'amm' (Psychological if, ffs 
openness and public work), given at an internal meeting for Brothers active in the 
unions. As the title suggests, the old guard was criticized for being too narrow minded 
and inward looking when there was a need for openness toward social and political 
forces other than the Muslim Brothers (Olav Utvik, 2005; Rumaih, 1997). 
The central founders of 'Hizb al Wasat', Abu Madi and Abdul Karim have pursued a 
liberal approach and professed it to be an 'civilisational' party for all Egyptians 
without excluding anyone based upon race, religion or ethnicity (Ella Madi, Interview, 
2004; Choubaky, Interview, 2004). Abu Madi and Abdul Karim have argued that 
"Hizb al Wasat' has a clear position on key issues, such as human rights, Coptic's, 
democracy and women (Olav Utvik, 2005; Stacher, 2001,2002). To some 'Hizb al 
W'asat' could be viewed more to the left of the political spectrum, as it promotes, 
social work, trade unionism and is cntical of economic policies, such as privatisation 
and reduction of state subsidies (Hamzawy, Interview, 2004). The intellectual elite in 
Egypt is supportIN-e of Abu Madi and Abdul Karim, as they view 'Hizb al lfasat'as 
providing an counter balance to the sole religious trend represented by the MB (Ella 
Madi, Interview, 22004). The intellectual class is supportive of the new guard in the 
mowmeiit, but remains suspicious of the old guard leadership, which continues to 
hold a dominant position in the movement. D'aa Rs hwan, an expert on Political Islam 
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at the Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. predicts two potential 
scenarios, if the Egyptian government decides to allow 'Hl'zb al Wasat'to function in 
society (Rishwan, Interview, 2004); 
1) Waves of MB members, especially the new guard defect to the 'Hizb al [Jasat'to 
control it and change it to follow their political thinking, approach and outlook 
towards Islam. 
2) The MB does not co-operate at all with the 'Hizb al Wasat'but attack it. As a result 
the 'Hizb al Wasat'will find it difficult to make any impact in Egyptian society. 
The possible scenarios can be predicted but one will have to wait and see what 
develops if 'Hizb al Wasat' is given pen-nission to be legal in Egypt. It is clear, that 
the case of 'Hizb al Wasat' indicated a cultural clash between the old guard and the 
new guard. In particular to the old guard leadership, it indicated the need to keep the 
new guard content otherwise risk endangering their positions of power inside the 
movement. This was a key factor behind the old guards appointment of Mohammed 
Akhef, as the new General Guide in 2003. Although Akhef was from the old guard, 
his appointment by the conservative faction was indicative of the need to recognise 
the growing role of the new guard inside the movement. This is because Akhef, 
although from the old school in thinking and approach, he was willing to listen and to 
take into consideration the ideas and views presented by the new guard from the likes 
of Abu Futuh and Essam El Eyrian. However, the present leader Mohammed Akhef 
is Aso viewed by the old guard leadership as the actor able to check and control the 
rise of the new guard to secure their positions inside the movement. The old guard 
Nvill continue to play a key role in the MB, but there is no doubt that the new guard 
has risen to prominence in the MB. This can be seen from the fact that the new guard 
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dominates the public face of the MB, through its participation in the People's 
Assembly, professional syndicates and the media over the last 25 years. In fact it was 
the new guard's participation in the 1983 parliamentary elections. which set into 
process the rise of the new guard and its drive to change the shape and character of 
the MB. This would set the basis to allow the MB to become a key political actor at 
the time of economic reform in the 1990s. 
5.5 The New Guard, Politics and Party Alliances 
Hosni Mubarak faced his first parliamentary elections in 1993. To ensure a 
comfortable 2/3rds majority for the NDP, the electoral law was changed. The 1983 
electoral law confined political activism only to legal political parties, thus excluded 
independent candidates from standing in the parliamentary elections (Hassan, 2005; 
Ibrahim, 1988). Also according to this electoral law participating political parties 
needed to obtain a threshold of 8 per cent to acquire seats inside the People's 
Assembly. The threshold was extremely high, which reduced the chances of political 
parties acquiring seats in the parliament (Tripp and Owen, 1991; Wickham, 2002; 
Abdel Kotob, 1995). In reality it was a mam-moth task given the autocratic control 
which the Egyptian government had over society, through the use of its coercive arin 
and the state of emergency. This electoral law would lead the new guard and 
Tilemensani to consider changing the shape and character of the movement to allow it 
to participate in the 1983 parliamentary elections. As, in 1983, there was no 
possibility for the movement to overtum its ban, the only way for it to compete in the 
elections, was through constructing an alliance with the secular opposition (Al Awadi, 
2004). In addition, to competin, (,,, in the elections, the new guard and Tilemensani 
believed, that an alliance with the secular opposition, would benefit the movement in 
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other ways as well (Choubaky, Interview. 2004-, HamzaA, v. Interview, 2004). For 
example, they believed that the construction of an alliance would allow the movement 
to develop a public platfon-n in society, through which the movement could 
demonstrate its shift from the spirit to politics. Also, they believed that a political 
alliance would give the movement essential polItIcal. experience which it lacked in 
comparison to the secular opposition. This political experience and exposure, , vas 
important for the new guard to change the shape and character of the MB, allowing it 
to challenge the power of the Egyptian government (Choubaky, Inter-view, 2004; 
Rishwan. ) Interview, 2004). 
After long deliberation, the MB decided to build a political alliance, with the al Wafd 
party. This political alliance was a daring move, given the stark ideological 
differences and historical confrontation between the MB and the al Wqfd party. The 
new guard was conscious of the obvious criticism which would emerge from the old 
guard leadership, which from the beginning was not comfortable with the changing 
shape and character of the MB (Choubaky, Interview, 2004). However, this criticism 
was something the new guard was willing to risk to allow the MB to enter the 
parliamentary elections, which would be a major step in the transition of the 
niovement from the spirit to politics. The political alliance between the MB and the al 
11'4d party in the 1983 parliamentary elections was successful. They secured 58 seats 
in the People's Assembly. with 8 of the seats belonging to the MB (Maye, 2004', 
Wickham, 2002, Langhor, 2001). The conduct of the brothers in parliament surprised 
many from the political opposition. The political opposition expected the MB to use 
overt religious polemics and slogans in parliament. However this did not matenalise, 
in contrast the MB's behaviour was viewed to be very competent and professional. 
The MB articulated its opinions without overtly religious connotations, which the 
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secular opposition had feared. Also. the MB's presence in parliament indicated the 
possible challenge it could pose to the Egyptian govem-ment. However, the E(-, \ptian 
govemment failed to act as Mubarak sought legitimacy. This failure to act by the 
Egyptian government would backfire as the MB would undergo further changes, thus 
allowing it to construct a key political role for itself to challenge the Egyptian 
government at a time of heightened socio-economic crisis in the 1990s. 
The success in the 1983 parliamentary elections and the new guard's political 
competency indicated to the new guard and Tilemensani that the movement had the 
capacity to survive in the political system to challenge the Egyptian government. 
However they believed that further changes in its shape and character were necessary 
for this to occur. In response, Tilemensani began to contemplate the creation of an 
independent political party to act as a legal cover for the MB. In the minds of the old 
guard leadership, the acceptance of an independent political party was not easy but it 
was much easier for them than the transformation of the 'tanzim' (Movement) into a 
political force, which was the point of discussion during the late 1970s (Ella Madi, 
Interview, 2004-, Choubaky, Interview, 2004). Therefore, a compromise had been 
reached were the 'fanzim' could effectively co-exist alongside a legal political cover 
for the MB. The plan was that the 'tanzim' could continue working at the horizontal 
level in doing spiritual work, whereas the independent political party would make 
inroads politically, speeding up the process of change in the shape and character of 
the movement led by the new guard (Ella Madi, Interview, 2004). Despite, this 
apparent compromise, there was a need by the new guard to convince the old guard, 
that a political arm NVOLI]d not endanger their positions and power in the movement. 
By, the below statement Tilemensani was able to distinguish between the roles of the 
. f(inzini'and the visualized political organ of the MB: 
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'The Ikhwan is an international organisation and their concerns encompass the 
entire world and continents. This is different from political parties. which have 
domestic concerns. The (ruling) democratic party does not have branches in 
England or America, while the Ikhwan has branches all over the world' (Al 
Awadi, 2004, p83) 
As a result, Tilemensani not only dealt with the concerns of the old guard leadership 
by emphasizing the importance of the 'tanzim' but also dealt with the growing 
demands of the new guard, by directing the preparation of a party manifesto which 
would act as the platform for a potential political arm of the MB. In response to this 
directive by Tilemensani, two separate drafts of a party manifesto were prepared by 
the brothers led by the new guard. One draft of a manifesto was for the 'Hi,: h al Islani 
al Misri' (Egyptian refonn party) and the second draft was for the 'Hizb al Shura' 
(consultation party) (Al Awadi, 2004; Choubaky, Interview, 2004-, Ella Madi, 
Interview, 2004). Despite the preparation of the drafts which would act as party 
manifesto's neither draft was submitted to the Egyptian state, for fear of outright 
rejection by the state. The belief of the new guard was that the movement had to 
undergo more changes to its shape and character, before the Egyptian government 
would allow it to proceed in creating a political arm (Al Awadi, 2004). 
The 1987 parliamentary elections provided the new guard with another opportunity to 
demonstrate further the changing shape and character of the MB. In these elections 
the MB fon-ned another political alliance but this time the MB moved to form an 
alliance xvith the al Amal party and 'Hizb al Ahrar'(Liberal party); which was further 
evidence of the MB's changing shape and character, as it was willing to cross more 
ideoloigical barriers and differences to add to its growing political weight in E(-,, Nptian 
politics (Al Ahrain, October '26 th -1" November, 1995). Despite sharply di\-ergent 
ideologies and political programmes, these opposition parties united with the MB to 
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support programmes of democratic reforms aimed at breaking the electoral 
stranglehold of the NDP. The MB obtained 36 seats which was a massive increase 
from the 8 seats it won in the 1983 elections. The MB by this impressive showing had 
created a concerted political oppositional bloc inside the legislative body. This posed 
a challenge to the dominance of the NDP inside the People's Assembly given that the 
36 members of the movement in the 1987 People's Assembly were from the new 
guard. As a result, they were young, educated, professional, politically aware and 
responsive to the needs of the constituents that they represented through addressing 
broader issues such as criticism of the government's policies in health, and education. 
Also they were crItical of the Egyptian government's attitude to economic problems 
such as growing unemployment, corruption, inflation, debt and massive consumption 
(Al Awadi, 2004). As a result of this political outlook, the new guard in the People's 
Assembly could not be distinguished from other secular opposition in their thinking, 
behaviour and conduct marking a clear shift in its shape and character away from 
spiritualism to politics (Hamzawy, Interview, 2004; Choubaky, Interview, 2004). 
The 1990 parliamentary election was boycotted by the MB along with the other 
sccular opposition (except the al Tagammu party). This boycott was due to a number 
of reasons, such as corruption and continuation of the state of emergency (Maye, 
2004). However, the decision to boycott the 1990 elections was not a move which was 
acccpted by all in the movement, in particular the new guard (Maye, 2004). The new 
guard wanted to take the opportunity to strengthen further the political position of the 
movement and to win over the skeptics by demonstrating further changes to its shape 
and character. Thus. frustration was apparent inside the MB. However, this boycott 
did not indicate an end to the changging shape and character of the movement nor did it 
indicate a victory of the old guard ovcr the new guard. This is because the %1B would 
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participate in the 1995 People Assembly elections. There was much enthusiasm 
surrounding the 1995 elections, as the elections witnessed an unprecedented rise in 
the number of independent candidates standing for elections. The official estimates 
indicated that more than 4,000 candidates contested the People Assembly's 444 seats, 
439 were from the NDP, 181 from the al Wafd party, 107 from the al An7al party, 170 
from the MB, while the rest belonged either to smaller parties or were independents 
(Al Ahram, November, 2-8th, 1995). However, this enthusiasm, would end as the 
1995 elections were marked by an unprecedented level of violence and intimidation 
by state security forces, including coercive interference to prevent the political 
opposition from succeeding in the elections, in particular the MB (Kienle, Spring 
1998). Hundreds of political activists and voters were harassed by the police and the 
security forces. Approximately 60 people were killed during the voting process and as 
many as 878 were severely injured as a result of the violence and disturbances outside 
voting stations (Maye, 2004; Al Ahram, December, 14-201h, 1995). 
In reaction to the violence seen at the 1995 elections, the Egyptian governiment began 
to provide a number of justifications for the coercive response which was enacted by 
the police and security forces during the elections (Campagna, 1996). The Egyptian 
clectorate was portrayed as the culprits and instigators of violence with the police and 
security forces merely responding to the ensuing crisis. Despite the Egyptian 
government's justification for its brutality, there is no doubt that the key reason 
behind the brutality of the E(., ý, ptian government was a result of the MB's decision to 
put forward 170 candidates in the elections (Brownlee, 2002, Al ANN-adi, '1004). The 
Egyptian iovernment realised that if the MB was left to participate in a free and fair 
election, an overwhelming proportion of the movement's candidates would acquire 
scats within the People's Assembly. This scenario of a MB bloc in the People s 
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Assembly was a fearful one for the Egyptian government. For example if 140 out of 
170 MB candidates gained seats this number would pose a direct challenge to the 
NDP domination of the People's Assembly. This prospect of a counter hegemonic 
bloc shaped by the MB in the People's Assembly posed many dilemmas to the 
Egyptian government, which was made even more difficult as it would be led by the 
new guard who were skilled in politics and aware of social and economic realities in 
Egypt. In addition, the People's Assembly was to nominate Mubarak for a fourth term 
as president in 1995, and a powerful presence of the movement could ine,,, Itably 
obstruct the nomination process in the People's Assembly (Al Awadi, 2004; Brownlee, 
2002). Thus, the fear of a strong MB presence in the People's Assembly, at a time of 
socio-economic crisis, determined the political strategy of the Egyptian govenunent, 
leading to the Interior Ministry to interfere in the 1995 elections excessively. The 
impact of this interference by the Interior Ministry can be seen through the outcome 
of the 1995 elections as out of 170 MB candidates only one MB candidate succeeded 
in gaining a seat (Al Awadi, 2004). However, even the single MB representative, 
Essam El Eyrian's stay in the People's Assembly was short lived. He was 
immediately accused of belonging to an outlawed religious movement and as a result 
his membership to the People's Assembly was revoked (Maye, 2004; Choubaky, 
Interview, 2004). The Egyptian government's policy of accommodation towards the 
MB as witnessed during the 1980s ended, with the state adopting a more coercive and 
confrontational policy towards the MB. This was because the movement dunn(., the 
1990s was a different entity compared to the 1980s, as the movement had built its 
'tanzint', increased its membership and had shifted more fTom the spirit to politics. 
All of this allowcd the inowment to pose a political challenge to the Egyptian 
oovernment at a time of heightened socio-economic crisis in E(ppt. Z-ý -- 
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The Egyptian government's coercive policy towards the movement, in the 1995 
elections raised concerns in the old guard. The old guard believed that the Egyptian 
government was genuinely autocratic and it did not contemplate the existence of a 
contester to its power and its structures in society. As a result, according to the old 
guard the possibility of the movement evolving into a political power was minimal 
indeed and changes in the movement's shape and character was doing it more harm 
than good (Ella Madi, Interview, 2004; Rishwan, Interview, 2004). The old guard 
began to emphasise the need for the MB to revert back to focusing upon its traditional 
spiritual work in order to build society according to religious virtues and principles, 
rather than changing the shape and character of the movement to challenge the 
Egyptian government. The old guard began to assert its influence over the MB but 
the new guard would not be de-motivated by this incident but continued to push for 
change in the movement in order for it to become more political. This further 
politicization was exciting to the new guard, as they were fully conscious of the fact 
that the Egyptian government was vulnerable in the context of heightened socio- 
economic crisis which had developed in Egypt in the 1990s. 
As a result, the new guard participated in the 2000 parliamentary elections. The MB's 
performance in the 2000 elections was much better compared to the 1995 elections, 
xN, Iiich were marred by violence and excessive security clampdowns. The MB 
acquired 17 seats in the People's Assembly. This meant that it would be the largest 
oppositional force in parliament after the ruling party. The MB's victory took 
cN-ervbod,,, including the group itself, by surprise (Choubaky, Interview, 2004). The 
result was not predicted by the Egýptian gm-cminent as it believed that the MB NAas 
too weak (-, i,, -cil the clampdown on the movement since 1995. This moral boosting t, 
Victory against the autocratic state indicated the resiliant nature of the movement, in 
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particular the new guard. It also indicated that reprisals by the Egyptian government 
were not going to deter the new guard from changing the shape and character of the 
movement, leading to its transition from spiritual piety to political activism. 
Therefore, through participation in parliamentary elections since 1983, the new guard 
was able to change the shape and character of the MB, allowing it to challenge the 
Egyptian government. This challenge was a source of concern for the Egyptian 
govemment in the 1990s. This was complicated by heightened socio-economic cnsis, 
resulting from economic reform and also the participation of the new guard in 
professional syndicates. The new guard was making use of all possible spaces in 
society to challenge the hegemony of the Egyptian govemment, which was made even 
more enticing at a time of heightened socio-economic crisis in Egypt. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the transition of the MB from spiritual piety to political 
activism. This was done by studying the new guard and their contribution to the 
movements changing shape and character, resulting in it entering parliamentary 
politics and forming party alliances. This allowed the movement to become a more 
viable source of political opposition and to challenge the Egyptian government in the 
1990s, at a time of heightened socio-economic crisis. As a result of this, opposition 
and challenge from the MB, the Egyptian government used its coercive apparatuses to 
contain and weaken the MB. A clear example of this was the violence which 
surrounded the 1995 and 2000 parliamentary elections and the large scale detention of 
the movements mcnibers from 1995-2000. A further problem for the E, -, vptian 
government was the ability of the MB to challenge its hegemony through alternatiive z: l 
institutions In Civil society. such as professional s\mdicates. The syndicates xA,, ould 
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become central to the movement, in its challenge to the hegemony of the Ec-Typtian 
government at a time of heightened socio-economic crisis. This makes it important to 
explore the role of the MB in civil society, in particular in the syndicates to detennine 
how it was able to construct a challenge through the syndicates to the Egyptian 
government at time of economic reform in the 1990s. 
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Chapter 6- The. Art of Politics- The New Guard, Syndicates and Power 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will explore the MB's involvement in professional syndicates in Egýpt. 
In particular it examines how the MB's new guard used such institutions in order to 
build up its power base in order to challenge the position of the Egyptian state at the 
time of socio-economic crisis in the 1990s. This will be done by exploring the entry of 
the MB into professional syndicates during the 1980s and how the MB was able to 
dcvelop a political platforin in the syndicates, allowing it to build support and 
mobilise syndicate members in opposing and challenging the Egyptian government. 
6.2 The Egyptian State and Professional Syndicates 
There are approximately 24 professional syndicates in Egypt with a total of 3.5 
i-nillion members (Fahmy, 1998,2002). The objective of professional syndicates is to 
protect the professional interests of its members, including salaries, pensions, 
conditions of work and regulation of entry into the profession. According to Dr 
Qandil, an expert on MB involvement in syndicates, 'the syndicates also provide an 
avenue within which less influential and less prestigious subgroups of various 
professions may attempt to further their socio- economic and political causes' (Qandil, 
Interview, 2004, See Appendix A). For example, doctors, teachers and lawyers 
employed by the Egyptian state have all attempted to increase their economic status 
and rewards through syndicate activities in the past (Wickham, 2002). 
Besidcs providing social settimp through which personal contacts and relations can be 
made, syndicates have perforined an important political role and function as well. The 
syndicates have pressed the E,.,,, ptiaii go-overnment for demands which go beyond the 
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traditional remit of syndicate work and act, vIty. The syndicate of physicians 
successfully resisted the introduction of fully socialised medicine in the early 1960s 
and the joumalists syndicate since the 1950s has been the most vocal advocate of the 
relaxing of media censorship in Egypt (Choubaky, Interview, 2004, See Appendix B). 
The lawyers syndicate during its heyday in the 1970s challenged the Egyptian state on 
domestic and foreign policy issues, such as economic liberalisation, privatization and 
the Camp David Peace Accords (Al Abram, July, 14-20th 2005). Ahmed El-Khawaga, 
a Nasserist, pursued highly publicised and often ferocious battles against the Egyptian 
government in the 1970s through the lawyers syndicate, challenging the goverranent 
on economic and political issues (Al Ahram, July, 14-20th , 2005). In addition other 
syndicates have also sponsored debates and published commentaries in their 
magazines with political overtones, such as land ownership (the agricultural engineers 
syndicate), the SUMED pipeline (the engineers syndicate) and educational curricula 
(the teachers syndicate) (Al-Ahram, July, 14-2 oth , 2005; Choubaky, Interview, 2004, 
See Appendix B). 
The real political significance of syndicates lies in their role as vehicles through 
w, hIch they can mobilise the support of the professional class in Egypt (Choubaky, 
Interview. 22004, See Appendix B). According to Dr Choubaky, a leading 
commentator on the MB, 'the Journalists, doctors, engineers, lawyers and other 
professionals represent Egypt's articulate sector and if mobilised could represent a 
real challenge to the Egyptian state's power' (Choubaky, Interview, 2004, See 
Appendix B). As a result the syndicates have since 1952 been an arena of concern and 
interwntion from the E, (,,,,, ptian state (Bianchi I , 1989, p106). The Egyptian state has 
dissolved syndicate boards, co-opted syndicate chairmen, infiltrated syndicates 
through thc usc of its securit-N, apparatus and relied upon the compliance of state 
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employees within syndicates (Fahmy, 2002). Nasser and Sadat kept a close eye and 
check on syndicates in order to keep the professional class under their rule and 
preempt any challenges to their rule. However, Nasser and Sadat both resorted to a 
major crack down on syndicates when they felt threatened by them. For example, 
between, 1964-1967 Nasser launched a massive campaign to weaken and discredit 
syndicates (Al Ahram, July, 14-20th , 2005; Qandil, Interview, 2004, See Appendix A). 
This action was taken by Nasser to deal with the perceived political danger of 
syndicates and to present the ASU as the principal organization of popular 
mobilisation in Egypt. In addition, Sadat turned against the syndicates, in particular 
the lawyers syndicate after it criticised the peace agreement with Israel (Choubaky, 
Interview, 2004, See Appendix B; Hamzawy, Interview, 2004, See Appendix D). This 
led to the development of conflict and struggle between the Egyptian state and the 
lawyers syndicate. 
However, the fortunes of syndicates in Egypt changed after the assassination of Sadat, 
when Hosni Mubarak came to power in 1980. President Mubarak began a process of 
Iffnited political liberalisation, where the Egyptian state began to allow limited 
political space to emerge and exist in society (Hamzawy, Interview, 2004, See 
Appendix D). Political space began to open up for student activity on university 
campuses once again and the political opposition was encouraged by Mubarak's 
promises of political reform and constitutional change. In relation to syndicates, 
Mubarak's position towards them was to loosen state restrictions on them and allow a 
degree of iiidepeiidence but without giving them absolute autonomy from the 
ptian government (Choubaky, Interv eýv, '1004, See Appendix B: regulation of the Egy 
Hamza\\, \-, Interview, 2004, See Appendix D). The lawyers syndicate was allowed to 
resume activity after it was disbanded under Sadat as a result of its criticism of 
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Egypt's peace agreement with Israel. The fact that Egypt's diplomatic relations Nxith 
Israel and America 'had deteriorated' in the early 1980s, made Mubarak's decision in 
allowing the lawyers syndicate to resurface much more easier. As a result Mubarak 
did not take any action as Sadat had done against the lawyers syndicate Nvhen It 
resumed its criticism of the Camp David peace accords with Israel in the 1980s 
(Bianchi, 1989). According to Abu Ella Madi a fonner leading figure in the MB, 'it 
was quite clear that Mubarak in his quest for legitimacy did not foresee syndicates 
becoming a major sphere of MB activity and source of mobilisation, which would 
contest state power and hegemony in Egypt' (Ella Madi, Interview, 2004, See 
Appendix Q. President Mubarak assumed that the 'corporatist' links between the 
Egyptian state and the syndicates offered sufficient guarantees and protection from 
political forces which aimed to challenge the power and hegemony of the Egyptian 
state (Fahmy, 2002). 
This line of thinking by Mubarak was based on the evidence from the tenure of 
Nasser and Sadat. However, the 1980s was a different reality altogether as the MB 
was undergoing a process of change in its shape and character adding to its political 
wcight in Egypt. This would lead the MB to enter the game of syndicate politics in 
Fgypt (Al-Ahram, February, 7-14 th , 2007). The 
MB use of syndicates in the 1980s 
and 1990s would become central to the political agenda of the MB and its 
development into a key political actor in Egypt (Hamzawy, Interview, 2004, See 
Appendix D, Choubaky, Intemew, 2004, See Appendix, B; Hasan, 2000, p235). In 
fact, MB involvcment in syndicates gave the MB the opportunity to appeal to all 
sectors of Egyptian society. According to Dr Amr Harnzawy, a leading expert on the 
MB, 'the NIB, through political alliances xvith political parties was able to appeal to 
the political elite. through the provision of social services it was able to appeal to the 
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grassroots, strengthening its social base and Its participation In the syndicates gave the 
MB direct access to the professional class, an important sector in any potential 
challenge to the power of the Egyptian government, which the MB would launch in 
the 1990s' (Hamzawy, Interview, 2004, See Appendix D). Also. aaccording to Abu 
Ella Madi, 'the MB decided to participate in all democratic institutions which 
included professional syndicates in the 1980s, so that the MB's ideology could reach a 
far more larger and important faction of society - middle class professionals and also 
to demonstrate the efficiency of the MB in civil activities' (Ella Madi, Interview, 
2004, See Appendix C). In other words, the MB's influence over syndicates provided 
important political and social sites for experimentation in which leadership skills were 
demonstrated, an Islamic sub-culture was enhanced and the access to the important 
middle class became much easier (Wickham, 1996,2002, p 179). 
6.3 The New Guard, Syndicates and the Egyptian State 
The professional syndicates in Egypt in the 1980s had a number of problems such as a 
political in-fighting between rival political factions, a lack of transparency, corruption 
and financial mismanagement (Al-Ahram, December, 23-29th, 1999; Fahmy, 2002, pp 
137-142). According to Dr Choubaky, 'the professional class had become dissatisfied 
with the perforinance of the syndicate boards in dealing with their economic, social 
md political concerns' (Choubaky, Interview, 2004, See Appendix B). It was in this 
failing political and socio-economic context, that the MB pragmatic new guard would 
enter the syndicates and participate in syndicate elections. The MB candidates to the 
executive boards of the medical and engineenng syndicates ran on an Islamic 
programme, pushing the slogans of 'al-Islam Huiva al-Hal' and 'A'am Nuriduha 
Lvlcunývu' ('Islam is the solution' and 'Ycs, we want it to be Islamic') (Choubaky, 
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Interview, 2004., See Appendix B: Ella Madi. Intervim, 2004, See Appendix Q. The 
syndicate elections featured candidates such Dr. Essam El Eynan and Dr. Abu Futuh, 
whom would become key new guard activists in the future. The elections of the mid- 
1980s in the medical (1984) and engineering syndicates (1987) brought the first 
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victories of the Islamist camp (Al Ahram, December, 18-25 , 1999). The gradual 
takeover of the syndicates was accompanied by a mobilization of members in favour 
of Islamist politics (Ella Madi, Interview, 2004, See Appendix C, HamzaNN, y, 
Interview, 2004, See Appendix D). According to Dr Choubaky and Abu Ella Madi, 
these two syndicates constituted fertile ground for such activities, given the 
preponderance of engineering and medical students in the membership of the Islamic 
Student Movement in the 1970s (Choubaky, Interview, 2004, See Appendix B; Ella 
Madi, Interview, 2004, See Appendix Q. In a short period of time the MB was 
making inroads in a host of other syndicates, such as the phan-nacists, journalists, 
dentists, scientists, agronomists and commercial employees (Al Ahram, December, 
lh 18-25 1 1999). In order to demonstrate the inroads the MB made and its rise in the 
syndicates, I will examine the cases of the doctors and the engineenng syndicates. 
6.3.1 The Doctors Syndicate 
This syndicate was established in 1920, and is the second oldest syndicate in Egypt 
after the lawyers' syndicate. The syndicate is of a medium size in terms of registered 
members, with it having approximately between 100,000- 150,000 registered members. 
This is a small membership size in comparison to the large teachers and commercial 
professions syndicate xvhich represents 700,000 and 350,000 members accordin(. y to 
figures of 1994 (Qandil. 1996, p 16). According to infon-nal statistics. about 40'r, o of 
the membcrs of the svndicate are younger than 35 years which was mainly due to the 
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increasing number of medical school graduates in the past few decades. As for the 
constituency of the members, they can be dIvIded into four main groups accordin(-, to 
their professional status: 
1) Doctors of the Ministry of Health, who are considered more or less the 
constituency of the Egyptian govemment and the NDP especially in elections. 
2) The doctors of the military establishment who represent with the former group 
the majority of members and is also strongly affiliated with the Egyptian 
goveniment 
3) University faculty, who usually work outside the Egyptian government circles 
either in private hospitals or their owned clinics 
4) The final group is the doctors working in the area of special health services 
(Qandil, 1996, p 17-18). 
The internal structure and organization of the syndicate is composed of the chain-nan 
and a council of 24 members. The council is elected for a4 year term and half of the 
council's members are elected every 2 years (Qandil, 1996, p23). According to Dr 
Qandil, 'the syndicate council is responsible for setting strategies, implementing the 
decisions made by the general assembly, making yearly budgets and several other 
functions' (Qandil, Interview, 2004, See Appendix A). 
The year 1984 was a turning point for the doctor's syndicate as the MB member's 
secured 3 seats in the council. This presence of the MB was followed in 1986 
elections with a more sweeping victory and the politicization of the syndicate role 
(Choubaky, Interview, 2004. 'Scc Appendix B). Despite the political role the 
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syndicate played during the 1970s especially against the Camp David peace process. 
the Islamic touch by the MB was clearly present after the success in the 1986 council 
elections (Qandil, 1996, p33). According to Dr Qandil, 'this role was manifested in 
the heightened political confrontation with the regime on internal issues such as the 
emergency law, the political parties' law and political participation' (Qandil, 
Interview, 2004, See Appendix A). Also the syndicate had a very active law on 
intemational issues such as the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. 
The doctor's syndicate's political dynamics can be clearly observed throu(.,, h the 
internal practices of the syndicate. The syndicate members were mainly divided into 
an Islamist constituency, a pro-government, national and leftist constituencies (Qandil, 
1996, p72). This healthy political atmosphere encouraged political and voting 
participation among the members which is manifested in the doubling of the 
percentage of voters who participated in elections from 1982 to 1992 - in 1982 only 
22% of eligible voters participated while in 1992 it was nearly doubled to 43% 
(Qandil, 1996, p69). Moreover, democratic practices and transparency was evident in 
several aspects such as the regular meetings of the general assembly, composed of all 
members, which oversaw the performance of the council, publicly representing 
financial and technical reports to the members and the unbiased treatment of members 
bv Providing scrvices or assigning in committees members regardless of thei I political 
or rcligious affiliation (Qandil, 1996, p43). The MB was highly involved in this 
political dynamics and would demonstrate its political skills and proficiency not only 
to the professional class but also to rival political factions, which previously had 
viewed the N1B as being mainly a religious movement without political views and 
solutions to common problem,,;. 
121 
6.3.2 The Engineers Syndicate 
The Engineer's syndicate is famous for being the first victim. of Law 100 in 1993 as 
the Egyptian government placed it under judicial control in the same year ý, vhere it 
Ih 
still remains (Al-Ahram, October, 21-27 , 1999). The syndicate was established in 
1946 and it represents almost 200,000 engineers, larger than the doctor's syndicate 
but smaller than the teachers and commercial professional syndicates (Arafa, July, 
2001). The syndicate is managed by a 61 seat council including the chainnan which 
is elected every 4 years (Arafa, September, 2001). 
The engineers syndicate was co-opted by the Egyptian state to a very large extent as it 
was headed during the 1970s by the construction tycoon Osman Ahmed Osman who 
was also Sadat's friend and related to Sadat through marriage (Wickham, 2002, p 186). 
However, the MB gained presence for the first time during his term as chairman in 
1985, but did not actually secure a victory until 1987 when they won 45 seats from 
the 61 seats of the executive board followed by another victory in 1991 by securing 
46 seats (Wickham, 1996,2002; Hamzawy, Interview, 2004, See Appendix D; Qandil, 
Interview,, 2004, See Appendix A). As in other syndicates, the MB began to provide a 
ýN, Ide range of services mainly targeting youth members who accounted around 35 % 
of the syndicate's members. 
According to Dr Harnzawy, 'under the MB influence and control, the syndicate 
became more politically oriented and concerned with domestic, pan-Arabic and 
Islamic ISSLICS' (Hamzawv, Inten7iew, 2004, See Appendix D). This was manifested 
in the change in position regarding the peace treaty Nvith Israel which Nvas previously 
accepted by the syndicatc and the position on the Palestinian intifada and the Gulf 
War (Choubaky, Intervicw, 2004, See Appendix B-, Qandil. Interview, 2004. See 
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Appendix A; Arafa, September, 2001). However, with the assistance of liberal and 
leftist factions in the syndicate who were concerned xvith the domination of the MB, 
the Egyptian government succeeded in placing the syndicate under judicial 
management and control supposedly for financial mismanagement within the 
syndicate (Al Abram, July, II_I 8th , 2005); Abdul Hafiz, 2003, p 173). The engineers 
syndicate remains under judicial control in a clear violation in its affairs by the 
Egyptian state (Al-Ahram, April, 13-1 91h 2006). 
6.4 The Consolidation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syndicate Politics in the 
1980s 
The MB's rapid rise in professional syndicates in the 1980s was followed by a policy 
of consolidation by which the MB aimed to tighten their influence over the 
professional class in the syndicates. As a result of their positions on syndicate boards, 
the MB tackled head on socio-economic problems such as corruption, and financial 
mismanagement in the syndicates. The leading MB activists such Essam. El Eyrian, 
Abu Futuh and Abu Ella Madi would tackle corruption in a direct manner with no 
concern for upsetting, personalities, political figures or political parties in the 
syndicates (Ella Madi, Interview, 2004, See Appendix Q. This was done by the 
launching of big and impressive campaigns against fasad' (corruption) in the 
syndicates (Ella Madi, Interview, 2004, See Appendix C-, Choubaky, Interview, 2004, 
See Appendix B). According to Dr Choubaky, 'the challenge in dealing with 
corruption and improving the financial performance of syndicates was assisted by the 
expenence of the new piard, such as individuals like Abu Ella Madi and Essam El 
Eyrian from their time on university campuses and involvement in student politics 
during the 1970s' (Choubak-v, Interview, 2004. See Appendix B). In addition the 
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Islamic Student Movement experience pro\, ided this generation of new guard activists 
a vast array of political skills ranging from being experienced in providing sen-ices, 
calling for the Islamic ideology, challenging different political groups and negotiating 
with the regime (Ella Madi, Interview, 2004, See Appendix C. Wickham, 1996,2002. 
pl 17). These skills were instrumental behind the MB in successfully dealing with 
corruption and allowing the provision of social services to their constituents within 
the syndicates. In the engineer's syndicate, which included almost 200,000 members, 
the number of beneficiaries of the health scheme initiated by the MB had increased by 
36 per cent since 1989 (Al Ahram., July, I I_ I 8th , 2005). The same was true in the 
medical syndicate. In addition the MB worked hard to extend medical insurance to 
syndicate members and their families, establish social and recreational clubs and not 
just in large cities but rural areas, increase the stock of housing available to members 
at lower prices, and assist the families of those members arrested or otherwise 
detained by the Egyptian regime (Ella Madi, Interview, 2004, See Appendix C-, 
Qandil, Interview, 2004, See Appendix A; Fahmy, 1998). According to Dr Hamzawy, 
by such actions, 'the MB syndicate activists renewed the legacy of social Islam, 
pioneered by the pragmatic new guard and allowed the MB to deal with socio- 
economic problems being faced by the professional class in the syndicates' 
(Hamzawy, Interview, 2004, See Appendix D). As a result the MB was able to 
consolidate its position in the syndicates, through securing the support of the 
professional class. This was reflected through a rise in turnout for syndicate elections, 
which indicated the MB's growing popularity in the syndicates. Table 2 demonstrates 
the rise in registered voters for the Physician syndicate; 
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Table 2: Trends in Voting Patterns and Number of Candidates 
In Physicians Syndicate (1982-1992) 
Year Register Fee Percenta Actual Percenta Number 
ed paying ge of number ge of of 
voters member Total of voters Total candidat 
s es 
1982 50,000 201,000 40 2,000 4 34 
1984 60,000 30,000 50 6,000 10 85 
1986 75,000 40,000 53 11 NO 15 59 
1988 90,000 509000 56 12,000 13 62 
1990 1005000 65,000 65 21,000 21 130 
1992 110,000 
11 
70,000 
1 
64 30,000 
11 
27 
1 
180 
1 
Sources: Qandil, Amany. "Occupational Groups and Political Participation" in The 
Reality of Political Pluralism In Egypt, Ed. Mustafa El Sayid, Cairo: Madboull, 1996. 
In addition to the dealing with, corruption, financial mismanagement and the 
provision of social services, there are a number of other reasons which can be used to 
explain the consolidation of the MB in the syndicates during the 1980s (Ella Madi, 
Interview, 2004, See Appendix C; Qandil, Interview, 2004, See Appendix A). The 
MB's effective organization and efficient management of syndicate affairs was central 
to the movement's success in the syndicates. The decentralized structure in the 
movement and coordination among different branches enhanced the efficiency of 
managing the syndicates through the exchange of experiences and ideas between 
different controlled MB syndicates (Choubaky, Interview, 2004, See Appendix B; 
Qandil, Interview, 2004, See Appendix A; Al Awadi, 2004, p67). According to Dr 
Choubaky and Abu Ella Madi, another key reason that can not be ignored is the 
Islamic appeal the movement had (Choubaky, Interview, 2004, See Appendix B, Ella 
Madi, Interview, 2004, See Appendix C). Many members of the professional class 
supported the Islamist bloc, as they were considered respectable figures, anti-corrupt 
and of high moral and ethical values which were charactenstics lacking in their 
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Wickham, 1996.200", competitors and rival political factions in the syndicates (' 
p 199). 
As a result of a combination and inter play of the above reasons the MB was able to 
rise and consolidate quickly its position in syndicate politics in Egypt during the 
1980s. The MB created a niche for themselves in the syndicates, and a series of 
episodes in the 1990s, would raise further the profile of the movement in the 
syndicates. According to Abu Ella Madi, 'these episodes provided the MB with the 
opportunity to demonstrate their power, through the further politicisation of 
syndicates and to mobilise the professional class to challenge the Egyptian state at a 
time of heightened socio-economic crisis in the 1990s' (Ella Madi, Interview, 2004, 
See Appendix Q. These episodes included the 1991 Gulf War, the MB's victory in 
the lawyers syndicate in 1992 and the Egyptian earthquake in 1992 (Ella Madi, 
Interview, 2004, See Appendix C; Choubaky, Interview, 2004, See Appendix B). 
Each of these episodes needs explaining, as they allowed the movement to further 
politicise the syndicates and to directly challenge the power and structure of the 
Egyptian state. 
6.5 The 1991 Gulf War 
The MB was quick to condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and it asked 
Saddam Hussein to withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait in order to end the conflict. 
This was the same position taken by the Egyptian government. However, western 
involvement in the crisis, leading to tile bombing of Iraq, led to a break in relations 
between the MB and the gyptian govemment (Al Awadi, 2004). The MB used their 
control over student unions and syndicates in order to challenge the Egyptian 
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governments' policies in support of the war with Iraq and NA-ith it toeing US polic,,., in 
relation to Iraq. 
In response, the syndicates under the control of the MB began to form coalitions to 
co-ordinate their actions and for the first time in the syndicate's history, a Committee 
for Coordinating the Action of Syndicates was established in 1990 (Ella Madi, 
Interview, 2004, See Appendix C; Al Awadi, 2004). The idea behind the Committee 
was not new having been thought of in the late 1980s but it was a daring move and a 
provocative statement by the MB. The Committee, in an important statement 
condemned the Western military presence in the Gulf and held the Egyptian 
goverriment responsible for the safety of Egyptians working in Kuwait and Iraq (Ella 
Madil Interview, 2004, See Appendix C; Al Awadi, 2004). The Egyptian government 
responded quickly and forced the chain-nen of the syndicates not under the control of 
the MB to withdraw from the Committee and to comply with the Egyptian 
govemment's official policy towards the Iraq war. Despite, this setback, the MB 
continued with its political challenge against the Egyptian government through the 
Committee. The Committee went further and in a second statement harshly 
condemned Egyptian involvement in the war and demanded the return of Egyptian 
troops. This had a powerful impact on the Egyptian government's populist legitimacy 
aiid it forced the NDP to declare that Egypt was not a secular state but an Islamic state 
in order to combat the religious discourse of the MB. In addition the Egyptian 
institution in order to combat the government employed the AI-Azhar religious 
religious rhetonc of the MB (Hamzawy. Interview, 2004, See Appendix D; Choubaky, 
Interview, 2004, Sec Appendix B). At the same time, the MB became victims of a 
smear campaign led by the media and powerful NDP individuals such as Yusuf Wali 
ptian and Karnal al-Shadhili, who accused the MB of disloyalty and treason to the Eg\ i 
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nation (A] Awadi, 2004). The syndicates became a concern for the Egyptian 
government and the level of concern would be heightened by the victory of the -NIB in 
the influential and politically active lawyers syndicate and its strong presence in other 
politically active syndicates. 
6.6 The Muslim Brotherhoods Success in the Lawyers Syndicate 
The lawyers syndicate was established in 1912, being the first professional syndicate 
in Egypt (Abdul Hafiz, 2003, p24). The syndicate assumed a political role ever since 
it was established. The syndicate has a long history of political stands against the 
British occupation, the Nasserite coercive policies, the open door policy in the 1970s 
and the restricted liberties under Mubarak (Abdul Hafiz, 2003). The main political 
factions of the syndicate were the Wafdists, the leftists and Nasserites and the 
Islamists. It is noteworthy that the Wafdist lawyers had a very important role in 
politicizing the syndicate as they controlled it for several decades (Abdul Hafiz, 2003, 
p75). 
In the 1980s, intense political and legal disputes between rival political cliques diluted 
the lawyer's syndicate's performance in defending liberal and national causes for 
which it had become known. By the early 1990s, chronic political infighting between 
political rivals paralysed the executive board in the lawyers syndicate. The MB"s new 
guard, who had gained exposure and credibility through their work in the lawyer s 
syndicates committees on civil liberties and Islamic law, took advantage of the 
intemal political cnsis in the elections of 1992 (Ella Madi, lntervieý, v, 2004, See 
Appendix C-, Hamzawy, IntcrvicNv, 2004, See Appendix D-, Choubaky, Interview, See 
Appendix B 2004). The new guard's superior election campaign, organisation, 
financino. and tactics allowed them to Nxin the support of the lawyers in the syndicate. t, I 
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The new guard organised its candidates on a single national list under the leadership 
of Sayf a] Islam a] Banna, the son of the MB founder Hassan al Banna. The MB won 
seats on the executive board and this was echoed by its strong presence on other 
politically known syndicates (Wickham, 1996). Table 3 below shows the presence of 
MB members on key syndicate boards in 1992: 
Table 3: Muslim Brotherhood in Boards of Professional Syndicates 
1992 
Syndicate Total number of Number of Islamists on 
members of board board 
Physicians 25 20 
Engineers 61 45 
Lawyers 25 18 
Pharmacists 25 17 
Source: Qandil, Amany. "Occupational Groups and Political Participation" in The 
Reality of Political Pluralism In Egypt, Ed. Mustafa El Sayid, Cairo: Madbouli, 1996. 
Qandil, Amany. The Process of Democratization in Egypt (1981-1993), Cairo: fbn 
Khaldun Center for Development Studies, 1995 
The success of the MB in these politically known syndicates, in particular the lawyers 
syndicate indicated the growing political power and stature of the MB (Asharq al 
Awasat, February, 27 th , 200 1, Mattoon, 1992, p 16). According to 
Dr Choubaky, 'the 
MB began to use its presence in these syndicates in order to address wider economic 
and political issues in Egypt' (Choubaky, Interview, 2004, See Appendix B). The MB 
organised seminars, in which political actors from other political parties were invited 
to participate. Essam El Eyrian, the head of the Medical Association, had been 
instrumental in making the association a national platform for dialogue and discussion 
for all key economic and political issues that Egypt faced. The seminars held in the 
svndicate addressed key issues such as Islam and secularism. economic reforins and 
pressing political concerns, such as the Egyptian role in the Gulf war (Choubaky. I 
lnter\, ic\\,, 2004. , -', cc . -Nppendix 
B. Qandil, Interview, 2004, See Appendix A, El 
1,19 
Diwani, 2003). In addition the MB held several seminars in which they addressed 
issues such as housing, development, terronsm, freedom. po',, 'erty. unemployment and 
relations with Israel (Ella Madi, Inter-view, 2004, See Appendix C; Olav Utvik. 2005). 
This politicisation of the syndicates in the 1990s by the new guard was reflective of 
the changes in the MB, showing the developing political outlook and confidence of 
the MB. In the process, the new guard had significantly transformed the syndicates 
themselves, making them the vehicle to extend the message of social Islam, to define 
its larger vision of centrist Islam and to challenge the hegemony of the Egyptian 
government, which was coming under severe pressure due to heightened socio- 
economic crisis resulting from economic reform in the 1990s (Asharq al Awsat, 
February, 27 th , 200 1; Olav Utvik, 2005). 
6.7 The Egyptian Earthquake 
The Egyptian earthquake, in October, 1992 was another episode which indicated to 
the Egyptian govemment the political weight of the MB and this would have political 
implications for the MB. In response to the earthquake the new guard employed their 
resources in the syndicates, as well as the 'tanzim' and the new guard in the 
syndicates ensured a rapid and efficient transfer of resources towards rescuing the 
victims of the earthquake (Ella Madi, Interview, 2004, See Appendix C; Al Awadi, 
2004). This quick response by the new guard outstripped the perfon-nance of the 
g ian oovernment and embarrassed it in the eyes of the Egyptian public. ypt 
In addition, the performance of the MB during the earthquake was praised in Egypt 
and abroad as \\, cll. which concerned the Egyptian government. The xestern, media 
noted the contrast betwecii the MB's success and the E(-lyptian government's failure in ItN 
rescuing and providing adequate help to the victims of the earthquake (Al Awadi, 
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2004). President Mubarak at the time of the earthquake was on a visit to China and he 
returned immediately not only to coordinate efforts in dealing with the earthquake but 
was also concerned with the politicisation of the syndicates and how the NIB was 
using the earthquake to expand its social base in Egypt. 
The MB used the increased publicity resulting from its relief efforts in the earthquake 
in order to promote its Islamic ideology and to mobilise support in syndicates and 
wider society (Qandil, Interview, 2004, See Appendix A, Harnzawy, Interview, 2004, 
See Appendix D). In the midst of its relief efforts, the MB displayed banners on tents 
and in front of the relief headquarters situated at the syndicates under their control that 
carried slogans such as 'Islam is the Solution' (Ella Madi, Interview, 2004, See 
Appendix Q. This use of political slogans would lead to confrontation with the 
security services, which would instruct the MB to remove the slogans. The medical 
syndicate complied with the instructions and removed the slogans but other syndicates 
mitinued to use political slogans, which continued to concern the Egyptian 
govemment. 
6.8 The Egyptian State and its Confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood 
In response to the political weight of the MB in the syndicates which was 
strengthened as a result of the Gulf War, victory in the lawyer's syndicates and its 
relief efforts in the earthquake, the Egyptian government began to try to understand 
how the MB was influencing syndicates. According to Dr Qandil 'the Egyptian 
,, overriment commissioned her to prepare a report looking into the strategies and 
policics used b%, the MB to influence and succeed in syndicates' (Qandil, Interview, 
2004, See Appendix A). The findings by Dr Qandil indicated that the MB ýN-as able to 
address the real concems of the professional class and did this in an organised and 
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professional manner (Qandil, Interview, 2004, See Appendix A). Soon after this 
report had been presented to the Egyptian government, it issued the Associations Law 
100, February 16 in 1993, 'the law concerning the insurance of democracy within the 
syndicates', which was a direct attempt by the Egyptian govern-ment to reduce the 
growing influence of the MB within the syndicates (Al-Ahram, October. 21-27'h . 
1999; Al Awadi, 2004). The Egyptian government defended the law on the basis of its 
attempts to increase voter participation and democracy within the syndicates. 
However, the true objective behind the introduction of this law was clear for all to see. 
The Law could be seen as a direct response to the growing role of the MB in the 
syndicates and their politicisation. by the MB, as result of the Gulf War, victory in the 
lawyers syndicate (as well its control of 19 branches of the lawyer's syndicate in other 
provinces) and the Egyptian earthquake (Choubaky, Interview, 2004, See Appendix B, 
Ella Madi, Interview, 2004, See Appendix C; Qandil, Interview, 2004, See Appendix 
A). The Law specified that for the elections to be valid there must be at least a 50 per 
cent turn out in the elections. However , if this mark was not reached, the elections 
could be re-run twice in which case if a turnout of 33 per cent was not reached in the 
second re-run, the syndicate would fall under the administration of officials appointed 
by the Egyptian government until new elections were held (Kienle, Spring, 1998. Al 
Awadi, -1004). In reaction, the MB organised demonstrations and work stoppages, 
drafted petitions to the speaker of parliament and sponsored special plenary sessions 
and joint conferences to mobilise the professional class against Law 100 (Wickham, 
1996,2002). This failed in forcing the Egyptian government to remove Law 100, 
howcver, it did make the government realise the need to further tighten its control 
ovet- the syndicates. In February. 1995, the Egyptian govenunent introduced new 
amendments to Law 100. This gave extra powers to the judges to supervise syndicate 
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elections, as well as the right to disqualify candidates. 'When the new amendments 
also failed to do their intended job, the Interior Ministry. which had been assigned to g 
enforce the powers of the judges, intervened and halted the syndicate elections. on the 
basis that the Islamists candidates belonged to an outlawed movement. This happened 
to Essam El Eyrian in the medical syndicate in 1995 and to Sayf al Islam al Banna in 
the lawyers syndicate in 1996 (Ella Madi, Interview, 2004, See Appendix Q. In 
addition to this, following a court case to do with financial irregularities, the engineers tN 
syndicate was also placed under the supervision of judges until another date had been 
set for the elections (A]-Ahram, October, 21-27 th , 1999). The new guard saxv the 
timing of the case as an orchestrated campaign to stop them winning seats in the 
elections, and as a result the new guard refused to comply with the courts ruling. 
When the security forces broke into the syndicate to enforce the ruling and suspended 
the board of council, the council which was dominated by the MB, filed a court 
against the Egyptian government for the suspension. The arrests and trials of members 
of the medical, lawyers and engineers syndicates confin-ned that the Egyptian 
government was overtly concerned with the use of syndicates as political platforms by 
the MB in order to challenge the power of the Egyptian state (Choubaky, Interview, 
2004, See Appendix B; Ella Madi, Interview, 2004, See Appendix Q. Furthennore, 
\vliat occurred in the engineers syndicate showed that the new guard would not easily 
ing to gl\, e up what they had worked towards and achieved in the syndicates. Accord' 
Dr Hamza\\, v, 'this reflected the broader spirit in the new guard xhich emphasised the 
fact that the MB should not be deterred ftom their prog-ress in influencing syndicates 
and politics but it should aim to expand that Influence further to weaken the 
hegernom, of the Egyptian state' (Hamza\N, y, Interview, 2004, See Appendix D). 
Therefore, despite, this crackdown directed towards NIB involvement in the 
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syndicates, the new guard stepped up their demands for political and constitutional 
reforms in Egypt. Importantly the new guard continued to use syndicates as venues 
for meetings and seminars, maintaimng the political significance of the syndicates 
(Ella Madi, Interview, 2004, See Appendix C). 
For example, according to Dr Qandil, 'the MB's new guard continued to use their 
skills as organizers and alliance builders to develop support for their political 
demands in the syndicates not only amongst the professional class but also with 
political activists with varying political affiliations' (Qandil, Interview, 2004, See 
Appendix A). A two-day Conference on Freedoms and Civil Society was held in 
October 1994 at the medical association and organized by Dr. Essarn EI-Eyrian and 
Abu al-Ella Madi, bringing together hundreds of prominent activists and intellectuals, 
including goverrunent figures, to hammer out a consensus on basic rights (Choubaky, 
Interview, 2004, See Appendix B). A delegation from the conference that included the 
two co-organizers visited the Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz in hospital to express 
high-profile support and condemnation of his stabbing by militant Islamists. At the 
same time, the MB were issuing communiques condemning every attack by militant 
Islamists on Egyptian government figures and tourists, and even brokered a cease-fire 
deal between the radical Islamists and the Egyptian government dunng the United 
Nations' Cairo Population Conference (Choubaky, Inter-view, 2004, See Appendix B, 
Qandil, Interview, 2004, See Appendix A). 
These moves by the MB to build support for its demands and to remove the 
restrictions on the syndicates, led to pressure being imposed on the Egyptian 
jII c, overriment. In response in 2001 the Egyptian government lifted the judicial control 
th 
over the ]awvers syndicate and allowed for free elections (AI-Ahram, March, 10-16 , 
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2005). The MB had a sweeping victory in the 2001 elections by securing 23 from the 
24 council seats (Choubaky, Interview. 2004, See Appendix B; Asharq al Axvasat. 
February, 27 th 
, 2001; Arafa, September, 2001). The chairman position was won by 
the Nasserite Sameh Ashour who is a famous opponent to the MB. This situation 
between the council and the chairman created tension in their relations which was 
unfortunately reflected on the efficiency in carrying out syndicate affairs. Earlier in 
2005, new elections took place and Ashour won his seat again while the MB secured 
15 seats (Al-Ahram, March, 24-30th, 2005). The MB accused the Egyptian 
government in interfering in the election process and rigging the results for the benefit 
of their ally Ashour, and filed a law suit contesting the results of the elections (Al- 
Ahram, March, 24-3 01h 5 2005). Therefore, despite allowing syndicate elections to take 
place, the Egyptian government has continued with its policy of interference in 
syndicate affairs in order to curb the power of the MB. This was explained by Dr. 
Essam El Eyrian who, believes that the paralysis of the syndicates is a result of the 
MB's political challenge to the Egyptian govemment; 
They want to stop [us] from presenting an example of effectuality and from reaching a 
strong podium to air our political views in the absence of political life. But our 
success was obvious from 1984 and 1985 when we first appeared. The syndicate here 
was nothing but two rooms where very little work was done. Today our activities 
have reached all comers of the globe. Wherever we go, from Afghanistan to Iraq, we 
show the true face of Egypt. They fear our success, and they don't want us to show 
our abilities. The Brotherhood was able to gain the trust of a broad section of the 
Fgýjitian people. Despite the campaign against, Islam and against Islamic movements, 
the Brothcrhood continues to win any elections because of this trust. (Egypt Today, 
June, 2006). 
In addition Essarn El Eyrian believes that the Egyptian state has done much more 
harn-i to itself than the MB through its control of syndicates in Egypt. 'This is going to 
make [the govemment's] image even worse in front of the rest of the world, ' 
explained Essam EI-Eynan: 
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'All reform initiatives talk about civil society and the importance of encouraging civil 
work. Professional and labour syndicates are the backbone of civil society. And what 
has the government done? It has nationalized labour syndicates, frozen professional 
syndicates and paralyzed the actions of NGOs. It looks very bad, ' he said. 'Now the 
government wants to beautify itself with nominal changes. It's ridiculous. Our stance 
as professionals is clear: Law 100 must be cancelled and syndicates should be left to 
their members, to be run according to their own internal laws, ' he said (E(-, \-pt Today, 
June, 2006). 
According to Dr Harnzawy 'the Egyptian government is unlikely to change its policy 
towards professional syndicates any time soon, given the rise of the MB in the 
Egyptian parliament, and its increased social base in Egypt' (HamzaNN-v,, Interview, 
2004, See Appendix D). The movement through the syndicates has been able to 
demonstrate its political weight to the Egyptian government and demonstrated its 
ability to address pressing socio-economic issues, which put pressure on the Egyptian 
government at a time of economic crisis in Egypt (Hamzawy, Interview, 2004, See 
Appendix D; Choubaky, Interview, 2004, See Appendix B). The MB continues to 
exist and work in the syndicates; however the syndicate's effectiveness to challenge 
the state's power has been weakened, as a result of coercive legislation introduced by 
the Egyptian government. In reaction, to this the movement, in particular the 
pragi-natic new guard has searched for new avenues through which they can continue 
to challenge the Egyptian government through undergoing more changes to its shape 
and character. A new phenomenon in the portfolio of the new guard has been its 
ýN, illingness to fonn alliances with civil groups and organisations, which is an 
indication of its desire to drive further changes in the shape and character of the 
moveiiient. This came to the forefront leading up to and after the 2005 presidential 
and parliamentary elections, which has increased further the political weight of the 
MB in E,,, Npt, iiviiig it the abilitv to extend is social base to make it more diverse and 
morc political in naturc and outlook. 
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6.9 The 
-NeNN Guard- From Syndicates to 
Civilian Alliances 
'We simply have no choice but to reform, ' the MB's Second Deputy Supreme Guide 
Khairat EI-Shater wrote in a commentary titled 'No Need to be Afraid of Us' in the 
Guardian newspaper in response to the MB's bolstering success in the 2005 
parliamentary election runoffs (Al Ahram., November, 24-3 Oth , 2005; Al Ahram, 
December, 15-21", 2005). Khairat El- Shater went further to define the MB's goal as 
to 'end the monopoly of government by a single party and boost popular engagement 
in political activity' (Al Abram, November 24-3 Oth , 2005) At only halfway through 
the second stage of the parliamentary election in 2005, the MB had already secured 
24.6 percent of the seats contested with a target to achieve one fourth or 100 of the 
total 444 seats in the Egyptian parliament. However, unlike the 1983 and 1987 
elections where alliances were in context of the party-system, nearly two decades later, 
coalitions involving the MB would move beyond the framework of political parties 
and more along the lines of civilian activism. This has been a move by the new guard 
to find new avenues of opposition to the Egyptian state in reaction to civil institutions, 
such as the syndicates being weakened by state intervention. As a result the new 
guard fon-ned a strong alliance with the 'Kefayah' movement leading up to and post 
the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections. 'Kefqi, ah' is a movement, which 
has risen to be a powerftil voice of Egyptian civilians of different political 
backgrounds and persuasions who have come to a consensus on the need of economic 
and political change in Egypt. The strength of the MB alliance with 'Kefqvah' is 
reflected by the fact that Wc, /(ýyah's' manifesto is reflective of the political demands 
NvIuch are being made by the MB. Similar to the MB, is 'Kefqvah's' understanding of 
political refon-n which is the 'termination of the current monopoly of power at all 
levels, starting with the seat of the President of the Republic' (See Kefql-ah al 
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Harakah al-Masrhyah min Agl al-Taghieer. available from 
http: //harakamasria. org/about; Intemet). Furthermore 'Kefayah' like the MB further 
aims to break the hold of the ruling party on power and all its instruments; cessation 
of the Emergency Law; cessation of all laws which are constraining public and 
individual freedoms; and constitutional reforms that allow for direct elections of the 
president and vice presidents from within several candidates as well as limit their 
period in office to two terms, in addition to parliamentary election reforms and 
freedom of association and press. Therefore 'Kefayah'and the MB undeniably share a 
common foe and therefore a common cause. As Wael Khalil -a socialist and a 
'Kefavah' activist -articulated to AI-Ahram WeekIv, 'The Muslim Brotherhood is, 
without question, my ally [in the battle for reform]... [Government] thugs attacked 
voters and innocent citizens and we're pontificating about the Muslim Brotherhood's 
commitment to a civil state' (Al Ahram, November 24-30 th 2005). The MB's alliance 
with 'Kc-, fiiYah' is indicative of the new guard's willingness to cross ideological 
barriers in order to boost the social and political power of the MB. The pragmatic new 
guard is comfortable with this alliance, given its past experience of making alliances 
with political parties and organisations of different political persuasions. It is this 
shifting of the MB, from one place to another, which has been difficult for the 
Egyptian state to deal with. The flexibility of the MB has been a key factor which has 
allowed it to build political power and weight, which has made life difficult for the 
Egyptian (government. Given, the clear political role which the MB has been able to 
develop for itself in Egypt, through participation in the parliament, syndicates and 
fonning of alliances (i. e. political and civil), it has put the Egyptian govemment on 
the back foot, which is cven more dangerous for the Egyptian government as it aims 
to mana(, c the process of political succession in Egypt. 
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6.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the role of professional syndicates in the quest of the 
pragmatic new guard to construct power in order to challenge the hegemony of the 
Egyptian govemment at a time of heightened socio-economic crisis in the 1990s. This 
was done by exploring the entrance of the MB into syndicates in the 1980s and how 
the MB was able to rise quickly in the syndicates resulting in their domination of 
syndicate boards. This success provided the MB with the opportunity to use the 
syndicates as tools in their challenge to the Egyptian govern-iment. This materialised in 
the 1990s due to the Gulf war, victory in the lawyers syndicate and its relief efforts in 
the 1992 Egyptian earthquake. These episodes allowed the MB to politicise the 
syndicates and to use them for political ends. This politicisation of syndicates resulted 
in a crackdown on syndicates by the Egyptian government. Therefore the political 
strategy of the Egyptian government began to evolve around the political threats and 
challenges which they perceived from the MB. The MB continues to have a bearing 
on the Egyptian government's political strategy today, especially given the political 
ii important to explore succession process which is underway in Egypt. Therefore 
the politics of succession, taking into consideration the processes and actors involved 
in the politics of succession. Also it is important to examine key political actors. such 
as the MB, in the context of their influence and impact on the succession process in 
vpt. I-- 
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Chapter 7- The Politics of Succession in Egypt 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis so far has examined the process of economic and political reform in Egypt 
and the overall impact of reform on the MB, which allowed it to develop into a kc,,, 
political actor, and pose a challenge to the Egyptian government in the 1990s. Central 
to this challenge was the MB's changing shape and character, which allowed it to 
contest state power through its presence in parliament and professional syndicates. 
This led to repressive action by the Egyptian state. However the MB was able to 
survive this offensive owing to its presence inside and outside the system, making it 
difficult for the Egyptian state to deal with the challenge which they posed. In 
reaction to the MB's political weight the Egyptian state has had to pursue a careful 
process of managing socio-economic and political demands in order to survive. Since 
2000, the Egyptian state has had to be shrewd in the way it has handled and managed 
the process of political succession in Egypt. This is a major political development in 
Egypt over the last 6 years, which requires exploring and unpacking as it is closely 
Mated to the key themes of the thesis, such as refonn (i. e. economic and political) 
and the MB. This chapter examines how the Egyptian government has managed the 
process of political succession, through introducing controlled economic and political 
reform. This will allow an understanding into the process of grooming, actors and 
forces nivolved in the politics of succession in Egypt. In addition, this will allow an 
examination of key political actors, such as the military and the MB in tenns of their 
influence and impact on the state managed process of political succession in Egypt. 
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7.2 The Economic and Political Grooming of Garnal -Nlubarak 
Gamal worked as a banker and investor in London until his return to Cairo in 1996. 
His banking and financial skills gave him the much needed credentials of being a 
potential manager and reformer of the ailing Egyptian economy. Also his liberal 
economic outlooks inspired confidence and support from the influential business 
community within and beyond the confinements of Egypt (Washington Post, 
December 17 th ý 2003; Al Jazeera, March 
29th 
, 2005). Gamal's first signIficant 
appointment was in 1997 to the US- Egypt's president's council. At that time it 1. vas a 
prominent body that brought together business persons from the two countries. The 
mixing and interaction with various leading Egyptian businessmen began and the 
network of contacts he made within this important business sector began to expand 
over time. For example, presentations and attendance at various business associations, 
including at the influential American-Egyptian Chamber of Commerce as well as 
affiliation with economic think tanks, most visible of which is the USAID funded by 
the Egyptian centre for economic studies have contributed to his expanding 
networking into the business class (Zenati, 2004). 
His political packaging has been handled in an equally strategic fashion. The initial 
step was to present Gamal Mubarak as a champion of youth, a category of citizens 
who ha,,,, e suffered disproportionately from poverty and unemployment (Nafa. 
Interview, 2004, El Said, Interview, 2004). If ignored the unemployed youth could 
pose the most serious threat to the prospect of economic and political stability in 
Egýjit. In response, the Future Generation Foundation was created by the Egyptian 
gm-ernment in order to provide a N, clilcle through which the 
disaffected youth could o 
be addressed (Ghobashy, 2003). The growth of the foundation raised suspicion 
141 
amongst the political opposition that it would be used by Gamal as a platform in order 
to run for the presidency. By 2000 it was clear that the foundation was not to be used 
by Gamal in order to mount a challenge for the presidency. In January 2000. he joined 
the NDP's General Secretariat. At the September 2002 party conference he was 
elected as head of the policy secretariat which quickly became the NDP's key 
decision making body (BBC News, September 29th , 2003). The policy secretariat was 
charged with the task of fon-nulating NDP policy, modernising the NDP and its 
mandate extended to reviewing legislation before it was submitted to parliament. The 
policy secretariat had 200 members, but it was apparent that the process of decision 
making lied in the hands of a small group associated closely with Gamal (Al Ahram, 
September 23-29th , 2004). For example, Gamal as head of the policy secretariat 
seeded the NDP with his entourage. Among them are his spin doctor, political 
scientist Aly Eldin Helal; Ahmed Ezz, a multi millionaire businessman known as the 
'emperor of iron'; Rachid Mohammed Rachid, the Minister of foreign trade and 
industry and Mahmoud Mohieddin, the Minister of Investment and who would lead 
the process of privatisation. 
Gamal's appointment to the new policy secretariat coincided with a spate of 
corruption cases against former ministers and high ranking officials. This was done 
cunningly by Gamal to project his own image of a reformer and moderniser but was 
also a political move to marginalise the powerful old guard, who had dominated the 
NDP for decades (Al Ahram, October 20-26 th, '1005). For example, the riuht-hand 
man to old-guard NDP powerhouse Youssef Wali was charged with accepting bribes 
to import carcinogcmc French pesticides into Egypt. At the party congress, the NDP 
N'eteran Youssef Wali was shoved out of his post as NDP secretary-general to make 
room for Infomiation Minister Safwat a]-Shenf (Ghobashy, 2003). Gamal became 
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substantially more influential over policy issues than the Prime Minister, within a 
short space of a few months. The ambiguity surrounding the exact role and powens of 
the policy secretariat triggered a wave of criticism, particularly withýin opposition 
circles. Some considered it to be tantamount to a secret society within the party while 
others described it as a centre of power that operated behind closed doors. Political 
pundits agreed upon the fact that the policy secretariat has become the NDP's political 
backbone. According to Hussein Abdel-Razeq, the leftist al Tagamnizi party's 
assistant secretary-general, the 2002 September NDP congress was mandated to place 
Gamal Mubarak at the helm of power. 'It is now clear, ' said Abdel-Razeq, 'that the 
Policy Secretanat was created especially for Mubarak to lead, and has been 
transformed into Egypt's supreme policy- making body' (Al Ahram, May, 15-21", 
2003). Nabil Abdel Fattah, an expert in civil society and Islamic movements at the Al 
Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies believes the NDP has effectively 
been reduced to the policy secretariat. He believes the danger lies in the fact that the 
policy secretariat members wield power without legitimacy. They have not been 
elected and they do not owe their position to any clear demonstration of political 
expertise (el Fattah, Interview, 2004). Neither does Abdel Fattah believe the policy 
secretariat made progress in its mission of modernising the NDP. In addition he 
believes the policy secretariat has failed to develop the party's internal infrastructure. 
Nor has it challenged conservative and dogmatic ideas long dominant within the party. 
The eiidgame was not so much about modernising the party but creating a launch pad 
for the president's son to enter the political scene, from where he could present his 
economic and political stratep, for the future of Egypt (el Fattah, Interview, 2004). 
Gamal has also vested his energy in harnessing support for the inte"Ided succession 
ftom Washin , -, toil. 
Garnal was put in charge of high level delegations to the US capital 
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11 ficials. on two occasions in 2003. During such excursions Gamal met with senior US of 
such as Dick Cheney and others (Ghobashy, 2003; Middle East Media and Research 
Institute, July 8'h, 2003). He was also chosen as the source to reveal ne-,. vs that 
Washington was pressing the Egyptian govermnent to announce political reforrn or 
the news was timed to coincide with his visits. For example the release of the 
American University of Cairo professor Saad Eddin Ibrahim immediately preceded 
Gamal's first Washington visit of the year, as did a statement of willingness to meet 
with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The abolition of the penal code's hard 
labour penalty and the creation of a national council for human rights, were all handed 
out by Gamal through the NDP policy secretariat (Nafa, Interview, 2004; El Said, 
Interview, 2004). The clear message intended by these steps was to show that Gamal 
would be willing to make concessions with the US in the areas of foreign policy, 
human rights and liberal economic refon-n. As a result this picture of Gamal willing to 
make concessions boosted the image in Egypt and in the US of Gamal being a 
reformer and moderniser in the context of economic and political reform. 
This has helped in packaging Gamal to appeal to the Egyptian desire for much needed 
economic and political reforrn (Middle East Media and Research Institute, July 24 & 
25,2000). He has spoken frequently of the need for refonn especially of the ruling 
party. The NDP in Egypt has a bad image amongst the Egyptian people, it is viewed 
as an ageing and an out of date organisation run by an autocratic leadership that is 
concerned xvith the maintenance of self interest rather than pushing for genuine and 
serious economic and political reform. Gamal's repeated calls for 'new faces' 
especially young ones to enter the party, parliament and political elite more generally. 
reinforced by his visible association with a relatively young circle (45-60 years old) of I 
technocrats and business men has promoted the perception that with Gamal a new 
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generation of Egyptian's will take power (AI Ahram. August 5-1 1 th. 2004). A new 
generation interested in pushing forward real economic and political reforms in Egypt. 
The vital constituency of devout Muslims has not been left off Gamal's agenda. The 
run up to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 saw the NDP co-ordinating anti-war 
demonstration with the AI-Azhar religious institution and the influential MB. The 
objective was to develop religious legitimacy through AI-Azhar and the MB, evcii 
though the state has consistently been fearful of AI-Azhar and MB developing 
strength and posing a challenge to the Egyptian state and the succession process in 
Egypt (Nafa, Interview, 2004; El Said, Interview, 2004). Therefore what becomes 
apparent is that no constituency of society which is seen as being vital has been 
missed in the economic and political grooming of Gamal. The business men, the 
technocrats and the Egyptian people have all been addressed directly or indirectly by 
Gamal. However, the military, the principal arbitrator in Egypt and the guarantor of 
regime stability has not been over looked. The courting of this institution has been an 
on going process since Garnal's return to Egypt in 1996. Every president since the 
July 1952 revolution has come from the military establishment. Therefore the support 
and consent of the military, a backbone to the Egyptian state is important for the 
Egyptian goveniment to manage the process of political succession in Egypt (Nafa, 
hiterview, 2004: El Said, Interview, 2004). 
Fvcn though what seems to be a clear grooming process, the NDP has been quick to 
dismiss the rumours that have been circulating around Egypt concerning Garnal and 
political succession. In September 2002, presidential adviser Osama, El Baz told 
Newswcck that 'Garnal Mubarak is not running for any official office. He is interested 
in public issues, like any young man interested in the future of his country but he is 
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not going to pursue any official position' (Schanzer, Octo er 17 th , 2002). In May 
2003, Gamal himself told an audience of 600 at his old university the American 
University in Cairo: 
'There are rumours that I am being groomed for the post, but they are baseless 
and have nothing to do with reality. Scaling down my activities is not an option; 
I want to encourage the youth to be active and I will not alter the role I believe 
in' (Al Ahram, May, 8-14th, 2003). 
Gamal was asked in the US, the following month whether he would be Egypt's 
president one day, he told the interviewer on US television; 
'The issue is not to try and personalise the process of change; the Issue Is to 
focus on the process and to shed light on the reality of Egypt today. A lot of 
young Egyptians are stepping forward to play a leading role in shaping the 
future' (World Talk, 26 th June, 2003). 
In spite of of the denials expressed in the statements by senior NDP officials and 
Gamal himself, the Egyptian opposition is not persuaded. They see these emphatic 
denials as effectively signalling the road that is being paved for the political 
succession of Gamal after his father. The political developments post 2004, have 
further persuaded the opposition that Gamal is being prepared to succeed his father at 
some point in the near future. 
7.3 The Economic and Political Strengthening of Gamal Mubarak- The 2004 
Cabinet Reshuffle and the 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 
To many political analysts, the evidence of this growing power of Gamal has 
increased since the cabinet re-shuffle in July 2004 (BBC News, July 14 th. 2004). The 
critics to the inhentance of powcr believc that Hosni Mubarak has smoothed Gamal's 
path to presidency by placing his son's colleagues in key positions. through the 
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cabinet re-shuffle in July 2004 (el Fattah, Intemew, 2004-, El Said, Intervie, '. 4 -10() 
One opposition newspaper ran the headline 'Gamal Mubarak's Government' (Al 
Ahram, July 15-21 s, 2004). The cabinet, largely composed of diehard NDP members, 
began to be embedded with young western educated individuals who shared the same 
ý 
_I I 
th, liberal vision in economic reform embraced by Gamal (Al Ahram, August - 
2004; Al Ahram, July 15-21", 2004; Al Ahram, September 23-29th , 2004). Seven of 
the new Ministers appointed in the cabinet re-shuffle, also serve on Garnal's 
influential policy secretariat, which formulates policy for the NDP. Three of the new 
Ministers have been referred to as his 'lieutenants' in the media. Many reflect his 
ethos; they are young, savvy, economic reform minded, technocrats from academia or 
business, who have worked or studied abroad (El Said, Interview, 2004; Nafa, 
Interview, 2004). For example, Mahmoud Mohieddin, the Minister for Investment, 
got his doctorate from Warwick University and Mohammed Rachid, the Minister for 
Foreign Trade and Investment, credentials include advanced management studies at 
Stanford, MIT and Harvard. Hani Shukrallah, the fon-ner editor of Al-Ahram weekly, 
described Gamal and his refonnists when he stated; 
'They are modernists, more fluent in English and other languages, educated 
abroad, belonging to the younger generation. They are more open to western 
management techniques, more exposed to Western culture and definitely 
economic liberals'. (NBC News, July 28 th 2004) 
The re-shuffling has been evident not only at the governmental level but within other 
sectors, such as banking, finance and the media. For example, it has been noticeable 
in Cairo since 2004 that the three economic Ministries and the Central Bank. have 
been recruiting a large number of young, westem educated staff members to drive the 
process of economic reforni, in particular the process of pnvatisation (Nafa. Interview. 
1004, El Said. Interview. 2004. Cunningham, 2005). It is these new appointments, 
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which have tightened Garnal's grip on power in Egypt. This power has been enhanced 
through the Egyptian presidential and parliamentary elections in 2005. 
Gamal was a guiding force behind his father's campaign for Egypt's first ever multi 
candidate presidential elections in September, 2005 (www. arabnews. com, September 
3 oth 5 2005). He was ever present behind the scenes at the presidential events but did 
not address the audiences or the media himself The presidential campaign team was 
put together by Gamal and his reformists, assembling in the process a 103 strong team 
of politicians and media advisors to secure victory for his father. For example, the 
team included Lamees al Hadidi, 38, a charismatic fon-ner NBC and Neý, v York Times 
reporter and Dina al Imam, a reader in political science at UCLA Berkeley (Telegraph, 
September 4 th , 2005). The polished campaign tactics, including US gimmicks and US 
style presidential advertisements all emphasised the influence of Gamal on his fathers 
presidential strategy and campaign. After the presidential elections Gamal further 
stamped his authority on Egypt at the annual NDP conference in September 2005. He 
declared his camps victory over the old guard in the NDP. In a keynote speech to 
members of the NDP, Gamal took much of the credit for his father's election 
landslide and set the tone for the parliamentary elections that followed in November: 
'During the presidential elections, the party proved its ability to modernise. ) 
proved its worth of the ideas it has been promoting since the party took a new 
orientation in 2002' (Arab News, September 3 Oth 2005). 
The conferencc had been billed as a watershed in the party-, with Gamal gaining new 
prominence after masterminding his father's 2005 presidential victory. The 
conference did not only consolidate the position of the reformers within the party but 
saw them push the old guard to the side. Gamal throuih the presidential elections and 
the NDP conference had built up morrienturn. which he would use leading into the 
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parliamentary elections. Gamal launched the, NDP's parliamentary election campaign 
iin Cairo on the 29'h of October, 2005 at a gathering in front of the Abideen 
presidential palace in Cairo for the presentation of the NDP's Cairo candidates. The 
NDP candidate list for the parliamentary elections included 176 newcomers. This 
reflected the influence of Garnal to introduce fresh new faces to parliament. This 
introduction of fresh new faces in the parliamentary elections was made clear by 
Mohammed Kamal, a key associate of Gamal and a member of Gamal's presidential 
-26 
th 
, 2005, Al Ahrarn, September 2 
9th 
_, ýth campaign team (Al Ahram, October, 20 
October, 2005). This dominant role of Gamal in the presidential and parliamentary 
elections has not escaped the attention of the Egyptian opposition. Ayrnan Nour of the 
a/ Ghad party contends that the Egyptian government is preparing Gamal's succession 
by making the NDP, with its hold on patronage and government bureaucracy, 
Gamals' personal vehicle to power. Nour believes that the influence and power of 
Gamal has become so extensive over the last year that Gamal is effectively running 
the country by proxy (Washington Post, September 24 th 2005). 
Therefore it is clear that the economic and political strengthening of Gamal since 
2004 has put Gamal in a strong position to succeed his father. Despite, the rise of 
Gamal through this process of economic and political packaging, it is important to 
take into consideration whether there are any real political competitors (i. e. military or 
civilian) to Gamal, which have constructed a similar economic and political profile. 
allowing them to compete with Gamal for the position of president in Egypt. 
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7.4 Challengers and Competitors to the politics of Succession in Eg-. Npt 
Garnal Mubarak has been singled out as the only real contender to replace his father. 
which is understandable given the continuous process of economic and political 
grooming which he has undergone since 1996. Despite this ever increasing focus 
upon Gamal, the most widely mentioned name as a competitor to Gamal is that of 
Umar Sulaiman, the head of Egyptian General Intelligence (BBC News. July 14 th , 
2004). Prior to 2002 to well informed people concerning the Egyptian security scene, 
his name would be common knowledge but to the rest of society he would have been 
an unknown actor in Egypt (El Said, Interview, 2004; Nafa, Interview, 2004). 
Therefore publicity and visibility was a key to build Umar Sulaiman's profile and to 
familiarise him with the Egyptian public. Beginning in 2002, Umar Sulaiman began to 
be brought out of the closet which he had occupied for so long. From a state of 
dormancy, he was catapulted into the limelight allowing him to build the platform to 
launch his challenge for presidency. His photos were visible in the newspapers and 
previously 'hush hush' diplomatic missions to Palestine were publicised, emphasising 
his role in dealing with the Palestinian conflict. The Amencans had come to realise 
that in the context of Egyptian and regional security, the one who pulled the strings in 
Egypt was Umar Sulaiman. He already had a following among American diplomatic, 
military and security personnel, as he was considered to be politically competent and 
shrewd (El Said, Interview, 2004; el Fattah, Interview, 2004). 
Urriar Sulaiman can be seen to have a broad appeal and influence over key institutions 
ni Ec, ý, pt. Umar Sulaiman has been a central figure in dealingwith Islamists in Egypt, 11 
therefore lie would be an ideal person to deal with this important constituency rather 
than someone new without any exposure or without experience in dealing ý, vlth the 
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Islamists (El Said, Interview. 2004). Similar to the Defence Minister Tantawi, Umar 
Sulaiman participated in the 1967 and 1973 wars, which would do him no harm in 
courting the high ranking military officers whom would also have been involved in 
the wars of the past. A major problem that might materialise is of Umar Sulaiman's 
current role as head of the Egyptian intelligence service, a bureaucracy that has 
traditionally been in conflict with the military. The rivalry and hostility between the 
military and the security services could potentially obstruct his chances and he must 
be aware of the fact that support of the military is much more important than the 
security forces given the power base and backbone that it represents in Egyptian 
politics (el Fattah, Interview, 2004; Nafa, Interview, 2004; El Said, Interview, 2004). 
Therefore Umar Sulaiman must inevitable be cautious in striking a balance between 
the two, without alienating or undermining the military. 
In fact, parallels have been drawn between Umar Sulaiman and Vladimir Putin, the 
president of Russia. Putin took over the presidency in Russia after pursuing a career in 
the KGB, the Russian intelligence service. However, comparatively the strength of the 
intelligence service within Russia vis a vis the military is much greater than in Egypt. 
Although a similarity maybe drawn between the careers of Sulaiman and Putin, 
institutionally the power is much more excessive within the Egyptian Military than 
the intelligence service (EI Said, Interview, 2004; Nafa, Interview, 2004). In addition 
the current Russian trend towards increasing centralisation of power, nationalization 
and the conviction of powerful businessmen will not enhance Sulaiman's portfolio 
amongst the powerful business sector domestically and internationally. The fear of 
centralisation of the economy under the Epptian state without doubt will create many 
reservations within the business community and the intemational community but one 
Could argue that it is too simplistic to draw parallels from the experience of Russia 
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under Putin. as Egypt has stronger relations with international donors such as the IMF 
and WB, making a reversal of the liberal economic reform, which E(Yypt has adopted ltý 
a somewhat unrealistic prospect compared to Russia (El Said, Interview, 2004). 
The sudden emergence of Umar Sulaiman into Egyptian political life is viewed by 
some as a strategy by Hosni Mubarak to prevent moves by another military officer to 
compete with Gamal rather than seriously viewing him as a potential contender for 
the presidency. His age and reported illness in 2003 have strengthened this suspicion 
that Umar Sulaiman is effectively being used as a diversion to prevent the military 
from putting forward their candidate and an attempt by Hosni Mubarak to appease the 
military by pushing Umar Sulaiman forward as a potential vice president under Gamal 
(El Said, Interview, 2004; el Fattah, Interview, 2004). The appeasement of the 
military is a crucial factor, in response a name being touted, although not as 
prominent as that of Umar Sulaiman has been of Magdi Hatata. He is chief of staff of 
the Egyptian anned forces and perhaps the next Minister of Defence (Sobelman, 
2001). However, given his lack of public profile may indicate that Magdi Hatata is not 
running to become president of Egypt at this moment in time, although it is clear that 
he would be a contender in the future. At the moment in time, there are more dynamic 
high ranking officers with greater popularity than Magdi Hatata in the military but all 
of them face the same obstacle, which is that none has a clear constitutional path to 
tile presidency. 
In terms of a possible civilian challenge to the politics of succession, the Egyptian 
state has been shrewd in the way it has sidelined any civilian competition to Gamal. 
The Egyptian state has used its powcr to re-shuffle the political elite; removc popular 
individuals and keep in place highly disliked personalities. Also, the Egyptian state 
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has created constitutional bamers for civilian candidates, thus removing possible 
challengers and competitors to the succession process (EI Said, Interview. 2004, el 
Fattah, Interview, 2004). The two most popular members of the cabinet in the past 
decade, Ahmad al Guwalli and Amr Mussa have both been transferred into the Arab 
League, where they have no direct access to the Egyptian public or political elite 
(Shehata, 2002). This process of removing popular personalities from public life is 
similar to what Hosni Mubarak did to the highly popular field marshal Abdel al Halim 
Abu Ghazzala in the 1990s, who has been under house arrest for more than a decade. 
The popularity of Abu Ghazzala was a constant strain on the legitimacy Mubarak, 
which resulted in Abu Ghazzala being sidelined and removed far away from the 
public eye (Nafa, Interview, 2004; El Said, Interview, 2004). The position of Minister 
of Interior has been frequently rotated and the present incumbent Habib al Adli is a 
rather dour technocrat with a background in state security, not a career which will 
bring public admiration towards him. His public rappour has been further weakened 
through demands of resignation after the assault on women journalists by security 
officials as they were demonstrating against the May 25 th referendum in 2005 
concerning the amendment of Article 76 in the constitution. The speaker of 
parliament Fathi Surur and the previous Prime Minister Atif Obeid are not held in 
high esteem by the public. Atif Obeid overlooked the controversial economic reforrns 
in tlie 1990s, which worsened the socio-economic plight of the Egyptian people. The 
Minister of Defence, General Tantawi, is relatively anonymous, which is a serious 
\vcakness. The 65 year old general and the veteran of the Arab Israeli wars (1956, 
1967,1973) is frequently at Mubarak's side and on occasions standing in for Mubarak, 
representing him at \*arious official events. like the 30 year old anniversary of the 
th )000). death of Nasser that took place in September 2000. (Al Hayat, September 28 .- 
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However, it appears that Tantawi is in poor health, has no substantial popular 
following and is widely rumoured to be without much needed support from xvithin the 
ranks of the military (Sobelman, 2001). 
In addition, to this process of political re-shuffling and keeping in place disliked 
personalities, the Egyptian state has created constitutional barriers for civilian 
competitors. For example, the constitutional revision of Article 76 put fonvard a 
major constitutional barrier in the path of civilian candidates. According to this 
constitutional revision independent candidates need the support of a minimum of 250 
members in governmental institutions such as the Shura Council, People's Assembly 
and Local Councils (BBC News, May 20'h , 2005). This is a difficult task as such 
institutions are dominated by pro governmental individuals and NDP members. As a 
result people such as the human rights activists, Saad Eddin Ibrahim were deterred 
from entering the presidential race in 2005 and this will also be the case in the 2011 
presidential elections unless another constitutional revision takes places. 
It appears that the Egyptian state, which is managing the politics of succession, has 
pursued a number of tactics in order to sideline possible challengers or competitors to 
the politics of succession. The jailing of the charismatic Ayman Nour, ruling him out 
to compete with Gamal is a clear example of this (Arab News, December 25 th 2005). 
HoxN, cver, despite the Egyptian state carefully managing the succession process. it is 
apparent that there are political actors, such as the military and the MB in Egypt 
xvlilcli liavc an interest in influencing and having an impact on the process of 
succession. These two actors have posed dilemmas to the Egyptian government, as it 
manages the succession process. This is because the military is a key institution and 
the MB is a key political weight in Egýpt, which means that the Egyptian states 
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management of the succession process is unlikely to sideline these two actors from 
wanting to have a say in the politics of succession in Egypt. 
7.5 The Role of the Egyptian Military in the Succession of Gamal'. Nlubarak 
The question of the military has always lingered around the issue of succession given 
the prominent role this institution has played in Egyptian political life since the 1952 
revolution. It is fair to say that Gamal has constructed a relatively comfortable niche 
for himself but it is not comprehensively secure without the consent and approval of 
the military, which will be a decisive actor in deciding whether Gamal succeeds his 
father or not (el Fattah, Interview, 2004; El Said, Interview, 2004). The fact that 
Gamal is not a military officer and has no experience within the military would pose 
certain dilemmas to the military hierarchy, in particular whether Gamal would secure 
the interests of the military. This was not a problem under Nasser, Sadat or Hosni 
Mubarak, as they were all from within the confinements of the military. Although one 
saw a more civilian cabinet emerge under Sadat and Mubarak, both of them continued 
to secure the economic and political interests of the military (Harb, 2003). In return 
the military would act as a guarantor of security for the Egyptian govenunent. For 
example, the Egyptian government turned to the military on several occasions during 
the 1970s and 1980s to deal with internal political instability. For example the 
military had to be relied upon to deal with the bread nots in 1977 and Islamic 
radicalism in the 1980s (Sid Ahmed, 1987-1988). Therefore, in essence, there was an 
element of trust and understanding between the previous Egyptian govemments and 
the military, where the military would guarantee state security and in return their 
interests would be takcii care of by the EgYPtian oovemment. 
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This trust factor is crucial if the military are to back Gamal's succession process and 
the Egyptian government has been fully aware of this. In fact the Egyptian 
government has managed the succession process in a way that it does not raise any 
eyebrows or concerns in the confinements of the military hierarchy (El Said, 
Interview, 2004; Nafa, Interview, 2004). For example, initially the Egyptian 
government began to package Garnal as a champion of the youth in Egypt through the 
establishment of the Future Generation Foundation. However, this process of pushing 
Gamal into the public domain did not receive the backing of high ranking military 
officers. They saw this tactic by the Egyptian government and Gamal as an attempt to 
side step the military, subsequently undermining the role of the military by not 
approaching them in the first place. Therefore, when this came to the attention of the 
Egyptian government a new path to present Gamal to the public was sought and since 
this episode and the rumours of displeasure within the military Gamal has been 
careful in courting support within the military circles, especially among younger 
officers witli prominent positions within the military circles (Sobelman, 200 1) 
The influence and impact of the military can be seen from the way the succession 
process has been managed by the Egyptian government and the relentless attempts by 
Gamal and his entourage to build contacts and support within the military to establish 
much needed trust and credibility. This is vital to Gamal in securing the consent of the 
military. However a key factor which could help Garnal in his quest to succeed his 
father is the US, which is seen to have already approved of Gamal. The US is a key 
ally to Egypt and a major donor of aid, therefore it has a key level of influence in 
tl- pti I important 
factor in determinnig, the Fgy ian politics and this influence could be an i 
sticcession process (Al Dostur, August, II th, 22006-, Sobelman, 2001). The former US 
ambassador to Israel. Martin I Tidyk has pointed out that the political succession 
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process common among Arab regimes is in line with a US policy of political 
continuity, as reflected by the successful transmission of power in Jordan. Morocco 
and Bahrain and by the close ties that have linked late ruler's sons with US 
institutions (Al Ahram, October 7-13 th , 1999). 
Given this US policy, it is inevitable 
that the US will work to amend any fences between Garnal and the military to help the 
Egyptian government in securing a smooth succession process. Gamal has been Nvell 
marketed to the Americans as the energetic young civilian of the nouveau 
entrepreneurial class with global views and business interests in the US itself This is 
very appealing to policy makers in Washington and there is no doubt that politicking 
in Washington will be important in swinging the sceptics in the Egyptian military 
towards supporting Gamal in his drive to succeeds his father as president in Egypt (Al 
Dostur, August, II th 2006). 
It is clear that the military is a backbone of the Egyptian power elite and its influence 
and impact has been evident on the succession process in Egypt. This influence and 
impact has been exerted behind closed doors and inside the strategic power elite in 
Egypt. However, there have been other political actors which have been exerting 
influence and impact on the succession process from in Egyptian society. There has 
been vocal criticism of the Egyptian government's succession process by the political 
opposition, in particular from the MB. Given the fact that the MB Is a key political 
\vcIght in Egyptian politics it is important to explore what influence and impact it has 
been able to have, if any on the succession process in Egypt. 
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7.6 The Muslim Brotherhood- Its Influence and Impact on the Succession 
Process in Egypt 
There is no doubt that the politics of succession has become a major talking point in 
Egypt over the last 6 years and has generated much criticism and opposition in 
Egyptian society. In particular, the process of political succession is something the 
MB has strongly opposed. The reasons behind the MB opposition to the succession 
process have not been consistent, with a divergence of reasoning between the 
orthodox old guard and pragmatic new guard (El Said, Interview, 2004, Nafa, 
Interview, 2004). For example, the new guard of MB activists have opposed the 
succession process as in their view the politics of succession would represent a 
manipulation of the political system and be a major setback to the process of political 
change and inevitably democracy in Egypt (Al Hayat, September 28 th , 2000). 
Therefore purely political reasoning has underpinned the new guard's resistance to the 
succession process in Egypt. On the other hand, the old guard, who are more orthodox 
in their understanding of Islam, have opposed the succession process on the basis of 
Islamic legitimacy. According to Sunni orthodox Islam, a leader without the consent 
of the people is illegitimate and the inheritance of power in Egypt would make Gamal 
Mubarak an illegitimate ruler (El Said, Interview, 2004; Nafa, Interview, 2004). In 
response to ideological reasons the succession process has been resisted by the old 
guard, who see it as contradicting a fundamental principle in Islamic governance. 
Despite, this dichotomy in ideological and political reasoning, it is clear that overall 
the MB has been in opposition to the succession process and this has been made clear 
by senior leaders of the MB, representing both the old and new guard in the 
movement. The supreme leader of the MB, Mohammed Akhef at a Ramadan fast 
breaking meal in Cairo. 2005 stated-, 
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'We categorically reject inheritance of rule In any form. We believe the 
constitutional amendment aims to enshrine inheritance, but God willin(-, - this 
wont happen and we will fight it relentlessly' (Haaretz. October 13 th . 2005). 
In addition Mohammed Akhef recently declared that his organization completely 
rejects the possibility of Gamal "inheriting" the presidency. In a May 2006 statement, 
the MB highlighted Gamal's elitist image, saying that the younger Mubarak "has 
nothing to do with the people and knows nothing about the people" (Shehata, 2006). 
Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammad Habib, representative of the new guard has made 
similar remarks. The voice of the MB has been strengthened by its success in the 2005 
parliamentary elections, with it acquiring 88 seats. This has provided the MB ýwlth a 
large oppositional bloc in parliament in order to raise its voice in opposition to Gamal 
Mubarak succeeding his father. Despite this obvious platfonn which the MB has 
developed in Egyptian politics, the extent of its influence and impact has depended on 
three factors. These include its willingness to join hands with alternative opposition 
actors, its ability to mobilise its social base in opposition to the succession process 
and its readiness to enter a new phase of mobilised. opposition to the Egyptian state, 
through street protests and demonstrations (El Said, Interview, 2004). The evidence so 
far indicates that the MB is willing to do all the above in order to exert influence and 
impact on the succession process, allowing it to make life as difficult as possible for 
the Egyptian government as it manages the succession process. 
The MB has used its position in the Egyptian parliament and syndicates in order to 
oppose and cnticise the succession process. The lawyer's syndicate has been a key 
svndicate in the MB's opposition to the succession process. This has allowed the MB 
to further politicise this professional class in opposition to Gamal succeeding his 
father (El Said, Interview, 2004). However, the MB has been aware of the fact that the 
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level of its influence and impact will also depend on its ability to create new mediums 
of opposition to the Egyptian state. This has resulted in the MB, going beyond 
criticism via the parliament and syndicates to involvement in political dissent through 
a series of street protests and demonstrations. This dynamism of the MB heightened 
the concerns of the Egyptian state, in fear of opposition to the succession process 
developing inside and outside the system, in particular the concern of a popular 
movement emerging led by the MB developing against the politics of succession in 
Egypt. The MB with other social forces such as the 20 March Movement for Change, 
the outlawed Communist Party, the would-be Al-Karama Movement Party and the 
Hisham Mubarak Law Centre (HMLC) launched the 'Popular Movement for Change' 
with the slogan "no to renewal, no to hereditary succession, yes to electing the 
president of the republic" (Al Ahram, 23-29 June, 2005). This represented the first 
oppositional alliance movement against the politics of succession and its impact has 
been significant in galvanising the Egyptian public, building public opinion and 
raising awareness against the inheritance of power in Egypt. In addition, the MB has 
participated regularly with 'Kefayah' in holding demonstrations against the 
inheritance of power. The MB was involved in the first ever anti Gamal Mubarak 
demonstration to be held in December 2004. This was significant as it was held in the 
run up to the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2005. In March 2005, the MB 
took to the streets in Egypt, with a number of demonstrations held throughout the 
various districts in Cairo. The objective of the demonstrations was to demand political 
reforin and protests in opposition to the inheritance of power were once again raised 
by the MB (Al Aliram, 23-29 June, 2005). In May, 2005, the MB held a number of 
pro refon'n protests in Cairo and other towns in Egypt. This regular taking to the 
streets bv the MB, its mobilisation of the Egyptian public and its willingness to cross 
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ideological lines by embracing the 'Kefayah'movement and the communist party. has 
been indicative of the MB' desire to put as much pressure possible on the Egýptian 
government leading up to the elections in 2005. This was in the hope of forcing 
political reform and obstructing the managed process of political succession in Egypt 
(Al Ahram, 16-22 September, 2004). 
This pursuance of a cycle of political dissent through regular taking to the streets has 
been a new addition to the MB's portfolio in its struggle with the E(, ), ýI)tian 
government. The MB's growing influence and impact on the succession process 
through its ability to mobilise the Egyptian people, it's joining of forces with 
alternative political actors, such as the popular 'Kefayah', its presence inside 
syndicates and its 88 seats in parliament has been a dangerous dynamic for the 
Egyptian government. In response the Egyptian government began to take measures 
to limit further political space for mobilisation and launched a major offensive 
directed towards the MB and other political actors, which were also viewed to be 
vocal and mobilising against the succession process in Egypt. 
Post elections 2005 the Egyptian government has renewed the State of Emergency 
Law and suspended municipal elections for 2 years. The MB criticised this and 
viewed it as the Egyptian states attempt to limit the influence of the MB in order to 
usher in the succession process. Mohammed Habib stated 'I see the main goal of 
dclaying the elections by 2 years as laying the foundations for the inheritance of 
powcr and opening the door wide open for Gamal Mubarak to be the candidate for the 
presidency' (The Daily Star, Junc, 2006). He added 'there is a view that dunng these 
two years it is possible to put Gamal Mubarak fonvard as a candidate. There was a 
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step taken with his appointment as an assistant Secretary General in the NDP' (The 
Daily Star, June, 2006). 
In addition, to this the Egyptian government launched a major secunty offensive 
against the MB. Hundreds of MB activists have been detained by the police and 
security forces. In fact the Egyptian government has been dealing ,, vith the MB in a 
different way compared to the 1990s. This time MB activists have and are being 
arrested during daylight, in restaurants, coffee houses and whilst picking up children 
from school. This is a new tactic of the Egyptian state to hit the MB whenever and 
wherever in Egypt. This has led to deterioration in relations between the MB and 
Egyptian government. In particular, the Egyptian government has directed its 
offensive towards the pragmatic new guard of MB activists, which have been 
instrumental in the changing shape and character of the MB, and have been the face of 
the MB in its opposition to the succession process in Egypt. Therefore leading 
new guard individuals like Essam El Eyrian, Ibrahim al Zafrani, Kharait al Shater, 
Mohammed Morsi and Hassan al Hayawan have all been detained on a number of 
occasion post elections 2005. This has been done strategically by the Egyptian state in 
order to take the wind out of the sails of the MB in its quest to challenge the political 
succession process in Egypt. 
The intense level of political oppression post elections 2005 has led the MB, to 
predict that President Mubarak, who is 78 years old, will transfer power to Gamal 
ovcr a period of a year. Mohammed Habib stated 'The matter will not go on for more 
than a year'. The MB expects an increase in restrictions on democracy, free speech as 
wcll as thousands of arrests of political opponents of the re(-, Ime, in order to enable 
Ganial. to become the new ruler of E, -, Npt. 'The government or the regime. is trying to 
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send a message to the brotherhood so that they reduce their activities. tone down their 
statements .... This requires more restrictions, persecutions. jailing and perhaps 
military tribunals, so that the atmosphere is prepared and the stage is set for the 
inheritance of scenario' Habib added (The Daily Star, June, 2006). In fact, this has 
been the policy of the Egyptian government, with the political situation in Egypt 
reminiscent of the dark days under Hosni Mubarak during the mid 1990s. The MB has 
entered a new phase in its struggle with the Egyptian government and this struggle has 
had an impact on opinion in the MB. In particular in relation to whether, it is in the 
best interests of the MB to continue with its political dissent, which has led to it 
facing a new phase of oppression from the Egyptian government. 
The clampdown on the MB by the Egyptian state, in response to its growing political 
weight and its anti-Garnal position has led to a divergence of opinion in the MB in 
relation to MB policy towards the succession process. Mohammed Akhef and the old 
guard see the need for the MB to continue with its campaign of dissent against the 
succession process or else the MB would be sacrificing its ideology (i. e. Islamic 
legitimacy of the ruler) and lose credibility with its social base. However, the 
pragmatic new guard who has faced the brunt of the clampdown have begun to show 
a different opinion to that expressed by the old guard. The new guard believes that the 
MB focusing prImarily on the succession process would affect the MB's long term 
interests in Egypt, such as political reform and legality (Altman, 2006). Instead, rather 
than continuing to oppose the succession process, the MB should change its stance 
and try to exploit the Egyptian governments difficulties with securing a smooth 
succession in order to end the State of Emergency and change Article 76 of the 
constitution. This position has been pushed by a leading new guard activist 
Moharnmed Al '--', Iiatir, who heads the MB parliamentary bloc. In response to this 
163 
toning down of the MB position, in particular ftom the new guard, representing the 
political face of the MB, there has been talk that the MB might strike a deal with the 
Egyptian government, therefore reducing its difficulties in managing the succession 
process of Gamal. In fact, there has been evidence to indicate that members of 
Gamal's Policy Secretariat have met with the new guard of MB leaders to secure the 
MB's neutrality and non-pairticipation in opposition activities against the succession 
process, although this has been denied by the MB (Altman, 2006). Given, this 
development, Muntasar al. Zayyat, a lawyer and leading expert on Islamist movements, 
has suggested that the MB will covertly co-operate with the Egyptian government to 
help it pass Gamal's succession (Altman, 2006). The Egyptian state is aware of the 
ideological divergence in the MB, between the orthodox old guard and pragmatic new 
guard. This has provided the Egyptian state with the opportunity to try to co-opt the 
MB, in particular the new guard in order to defuse the MB opposition to the 
succession process. The Egyptian states direction of violence towards the new guard 
has led to a reaction on behalf of the new guard leading it to change is views towards 
the succession process and move closer towards the Egyptian state to secure the MB 
interests. The Egyptian state sees the new guard as more willing to play by its rules of 
the game and therefore is willing to discuss with them, but the Egyptian states 
concern remains with the old guard which is less receptive to get entangled with the 
Egyptian state. However, this division in the MB provides the Egyptian state with the 
opportunity to try to manipulate the MB in order to weaken it and neutralise its 
opposition to the succession process. This would remove a major obstacle in ushering 
forward the transference of power from Hosni Mubarak to Gamal. 
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Overall, it is apparent that the MB has had and Is having an Influence and impact on 
the succession process, which has allowed it to demonstrate its political weight once 
again in Egypt. This led to the Egyptian government resorting to its usual policy of 
directing oppression towards the MB but this has failed to severely undermine and 
weaken the MB. At the same time, the Egyptian government has realised the danger 
of an oppressive policy towards the MB in terms of its implications for ftiture regime 
stability and survival. Therefore in response the Egyptian government has been forced 
into private meetings with the MB in order to secure its support and to neutralise the 
MB. This has been facilitated by the new guards change in views on the succession 
process and its willingness to entertain discussion with the Egyptian state. This 
neutralisation of the MB is likely to remove a key social and political obstacle to the 
Egyptian government and to push forward the succession bid of Gamal Mubarak. 
However for the MB , in particular the new guard the political weight of the MB has 
finally been acknowledged by the Egyptian goveniment through its attempts of 
reconciliation and pacification of the MB to secure and manage the process of 
political succession of Gamal in Egypt. 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the process of political succession, taking into consideration, 
the actors involved, the process of grooming and those driving the politics of 
succession in Egypt. In addition, to this I have explored the role of political actors 
such as the military and the MB in tenns of their influence and impact on the politics 
of succession in Egýpt. Both actors have had an influence and impact on the 
sticcession process and have been a source of concern for the Egyptian government. 
In order to deal with tile militarv the F(,, \I)tian government has adopted a policy of tl- 
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courting the military officials in order to win over their confidence to the succession 
process. Also the Egyptian government has relied upon support from the US, which 
has approved of Gamal's succession bid. Therefore although the military has had 
reservations over Gamal, this is likely to be overcome by US influence and the 
appointment of a vice president from in the ranks of the military or with close links to 
the military. On the other hand dealing with the MB has been much more difficult due 
to its political weight in Egypt. Despite the use of oppression by Egyptian government, 
it has not been able to deal with the power of the MB. In response, this has pushed the 
Egyptian government in pursuing a policy of negotiating with the MB in order to 
secure the succession process. The MB's new guard are likely to discuss and to accept 
concessions made by the Egyptian govemment, which will benefit the MB into the 
future, as a result clearing the way for the succession of Gamal. Given, the fact that 
the succession process of Gamal Mubarak is likely to proceed through the Egyptian 
government's careful process of management and policy of neutralising obstacles, it is 
important to explore the future process of economic and political change. In particular, 
it is important to take into consideration the level of continuity and discontinuity in 
the process of reform and the likely Egyptian state-MB relations arising from a 
succession process in Egypt. 
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Chapter 8- Continuity and Discontinuity, in Economic and Political Reform in 
Egypt 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter will begin by exploring the future process of economic and political 
change in Egypt, in particular the level of continuity and discontinuity in the process 
of economic and political change arising from a succession process in Egypt. This 
will be done by looking at the electoral promises which were made by Hosni Mubarak 
in the 2005 presidential elections and the progress to date in the context of economic 
and political change. Then, I will take into consideration the process of economic and 
political change which is expected with Gamal Mubarak succeeding his father. This 
will allow an understanding into any continuity and discontinuity in the process of 
economic and political change. This will be followed by looking at the future 
relations between Gamal Mubarak and the MB, taking into consideration the 
implications of these relations for the future process of political reform in Egypt. 
8.2 Mubarak's Electoral Promises: Economic and Political Transformation or 
Stagnation? 
Given wide socio-economic and political demands in Egypt, it was only natural for 
prornises of economic and political reform to encompass Hosni Mubarak's 
presidential campaign in September 2005 (Al Abram, August 4-1 oth , 2005, 
The 
Arabist, August 26'h, 21005). President Mubarak set out his economic and political 
reform agenda by a speech he made in Menoufiya, his home town on the 28 
th Of jUly 
2005. The following three excerpts from his speech indicate his emphasis on 
economic and political reforms, 
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'Together we will work towards greater democratisation. liberating our 
economy in such a way as to protect the interests of peasants and workers and 
with an eye on the welfare of the economically disadvantaged. ' (Al Ahram, 
August 4-1 Oth 2005) 
'The emergency laws have aided us in our fight against terrorism. Indeed, a 
great many nations are now enacting comprehensive anti-terronst legislation. 
The time has come for us, too, within the next period to formulate legislation 
capable of undermining and uprooting terrorism so our nation can be spared the 
evils terror brings. We are [aiming] for an anti-terror law that can provide a 
legislative substitute for the emergency laws. ' (Al Ahram, August 4-1 Oth 2005) 
'I promise to work towards implementing economic and social policies that ý'NAI 
increase job opportunities, improve living standards, guarantee decent 
conditions for the retired and allow the state to improve public education, health 
care, housing and transport. Together we will build a tomorrow where the 
middle class can strive for better living standards, where the disadvantaged have 
adequate social security provision and where the rights of women receive the 
attention they deserve. ' (Al Ahram, August 4-1 Oth 2005) 
A strong emphasis was placed by Mubarak on economic and political reforms, during 
his now 2005 Presidential campaign. However, it later became clear that Mubarak 
began to shift the focus of his campaign to primarily focusing on popular economic 
issues., such as poverty and unemployment. This was in comparison to his Presidential 
rivals, Ayman Nour of al Ghad and Nournan Gomma of the al Wafd party, both of 
which focused on political reforms connected to lifting of the state of emergency, 
removal of restrictions on political parties and the expansion of civil political 
freedoms (open Democracy, August 30th , 2005; VoaNews, 
August 17 th , 2005; The 
Economist, August 25 th , 2005). Mubarak pledged to carry out economic policies 
designed to promote industry, to tackle employment (proposed a programme to create 
4-5 million jobs for youth in the coming six years), and to encourage farm produce 
export and boost Egyptian fann competitiveness. Mubarak described fanners as the 
main pillar of the Egyptian society. noting that any plans for future development 
could not be implemented without the involvement of the agriculture sector and 
farmers. In addition, Nlubarak outlined his commitment to improving the salaries of 
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5.2 million civil servants in government and doubling the number of families 
receiving social security benefits from 650,000 to 1.3 million (English Peoples Dailý-. 
August 24th, 2005). Economic reforms became a cornerstone of Mubarak's 
presidential bid but his proposals came under criticism due to questions marks 
hanging over the feasibility of the economic policies which he had outlined. There 
appeared to be a feeling that popular economic rhetoric underlined Mubarak's 
speeches and pledges rather than a firin belief in being able to deliver on what he was 
promising. 
While economic growth for the fiscal year 2004-2005 soared to a record five percent 
and most other economic indicators were on the rise, the economic measures 
promised by Mubarak were criticised as they would require slashing subsidies, raising 
public debt and risk sending inflation skyrocketing. As a result Mubarak's economic 
promises were quickly dismissed as unrealistic by some of his election rivals. 'Why 
hasn't Mubarak created all these jobs during the 24 years he already spent in power? ' 
asked al Wafd party leader Nournan Gomma (Iran Daily, September 4th, 2005). 
Several analysts pointed out that the ultra-liberal policies pushed by Mubarak's son 
Gamal were hardly compatible with the campaign's social commitments. Ahmad 
Nagger an Egyptian economist stated, 'The job creation programme is simply not 
realistic. In 24 years, 29 1,000 jobs were created every year. How can we expect to see 
this figure double in only six years? ' (Iran Daily, September 4th, 2005). The WB also 
estimates that unemployment in Egypt is running at around 20 per cent, a figure that 
makes it difficult for Nazif s government to fulfil President Mubarak's election 
promise to create 4.5 million jobs in the next six years (Al Ahram, March 16-22d. 
2006). Nor was the \VB optimistic about the chances of achieving other economic 
tai-octs, pointnig, out that 'the deficit in the trade balance grew last year to more than 
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$7 billion, with imports increasing by 30 per cent annually. Balancing the budget and 
reducing public indebtedness were urgent requirements, while the budget deficit had 
skyrocketed from 0.6 per cent of GDP in 1996/1997 to nine per cent in 2005'2006, 
public debts now stood at more than 60 per cent of GDP' (Al Ahram, March, 16-22 nd I 
2006). 'What is clear at this point, ' says Nabil Abdel-Fattah of the Al-Ahram Centre 
for Political and Strategic Studies, 'is that the NDP has shown itself to be lacking both 
the imagination, and the will, to address the fundamental problems besetting Egypt's 
political and economic life. While it has referred to some of the chronic problems 
Egypt faces during its campaign it has failed to acknowledge that these very problems 
are a result of the failed policies of the past 24 years' (Al Ahram, August 25-31", 
2005). The campaign, however, failed to tackle what many argue is the chronic 
corruption plaguing Egypt's economic performance. In his campaign pledges, ' says al 
Tugummu MP Abul-Ezz Al-Hariri, 'the NDP candidate has not once referred to the 
corruption which has become a mode of governance. Nor is it clear how he can pledge 
to establish 1,000 factories over a six-year period when the government's 
understanding of economic refon-n seems not to extend beyond privatising the public 
sector' (Al Ahram, August 25-3 1 ", 2005). Therefore criticism, of Mubarak's 
economic pledges was, clearly apparent, with concern. of economic and social crisis 
stemming from the economic reforms he promised. Mubarak was further criticised 
\N, hen the new cabinet was introduced after the parliamentary elections in November 
2005. The composition of the new cabinet indicated the direction of the Egyptian 
government in economic reforri-is, which raised concerns about future socio-economic 
conditions in Egypt. 
In this new cabinet, post parliamentary elections 2005, the number of ministers with 
busincss connection rose to six*, this led the opposition press to charge that Prime 
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Minister Dr Nazif s cabinet looked more like the executive board of a pnvate 
company (Al Ahram, December 29'h -4 
Ih January. 2006). For example. prominent 
businessman Mohamed Mansour, the new transportation minister. is a former 
president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt. Ali El-Moselhi, who 
heads the new Social Solidarity Ministry, also comes from a pnvate sector 
background, but was most recently the head of the Egyptian postal service, where he 
implemented a wide-ranging modemisation project. 
In reply to the growing concem as a result of the increasing role of business men in 
the cabinet, Nazif argued that the inclusion of pragmatic and business-minded 
ministers had boosted the government's financial and economic success. He stated 
that the concept of businessmen becoming cabinet ministers should no longer be seen 
as a bad thing. 'Businessmen have the privilege of mixing administrative experience 
with a forward-looking and global mentality. ' To prove his argument, Nazif 
highlighted the rise in GDP from LE485 to LE537 billion ($93 billion), the vast 
increase in foreign exchange reserves, from $14.8 to $22 billion, the fall in external 
debt from $30 to $28.9 billion, and the drop in inflation from 16.7 per cent of GDP to 
3.1 per cent -- all of which he argued had taken place in one year (Al Ahram, 
February, 2-8 th, 2006). Despite this attempt to deal with the concems of the political 
opposition, it seems to ha\, e been in vain as the cabinet's key economic portfolios 
remained in the same hands indicating that the government will continue to pursue the 
same liberal economic policies as witnessed in Nazif s first term. These economic 
policies have yet to Nvin the confidence of the public. The cutting of subsidies and the 
pursuance of privatisation are two areas where Nazif s cabinet has faced its harshc.,, t 
criticism sincc Julv 1-004. Critics have argued that Nazif is merely following the 
or libcralising and globalisation of the E-. ptian orders of the IFI',, which are pushing fI () N 
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economy. To aid this process, critics have argued that ministers with a private sector 
have been drafted into the new cabinet. This pursuance of liberalisation and 
privatisation seems to indicate a lack of commitment of the cabinet and Mubarak to 
social development due to the ensuing consequences of unemployment, cutting of 
subsidies and inflation. Economically, the Egyptian people are unlikely to see a socio- 
economic improvement with the Egyptian government continuing with the same 
economic strategy as implemented in the past. The experience of the Egyptian people 
with liberal economic policies has not been good and it is unlikely that policies of this 
nature will bring a drastic change in their daily living. Therefore there is likely to be a 
continuation in past economic reform agenda by Mubarak, heralding no break away 
fTom past economic refon-n policies. 
As a result of the subsequent socio-economic crisis expected from the economic 
strategy outline by Mubarak in his 2005 presidential campaign, it is likely that the 
Egyptian government's political strategy will be detennined by the extent of the 
socio-economic crisis and challenges that it faces from political actors, such as the 
MB. Therefore, Mubarak's pledges of political reforrn and change carried little weight 
with the political opposition and the Egyptian people given that pledges of this nature 
havc been evident in the past, such as in his 1999 Presidential referendum. Mubarak's 
agenda in 1999 included economic as well as political pledges, such as promises of 
constitutional reform stimulating political party activity, bringing new and more 
youthftil elements into leadership positions, developing the electoral system, 
deregulating the media, supporting the rule of law, fighting corruption and enhancing 
the fteedorn of civil society institutions (Al Ahram, September 3 oth -6 th October, 1999; 
International Cnsis Group. September 3 Oth, 2003). In his address to university 
th 
. -\U izUSt, 1999. %lubarak stated that the NDP must saidents in Alcxandria on the 25 
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work 'to effect that change or reform that will enrich the process of popular 
participation in public life in a manner that will not prejudice the nation's higher 
interests' (Al Ahram, September 3 oth -6 th October, 1999). He also emphasised the idea 
that Egypt's revival does not depend on the government's efforts alone. Rather, 'it 
must be borne collectively by the institutions of goven-iment and the organisations of 
civil society, from the political parties to the syndicates, unions and community 
associations' (Al Ahram, September 3 oth -6 th October, 1999). Despite these pledges 
made, little progress in political reform was made by Mubarak since 1999, with the 
NDP continuing with its hegemony over society. Cosmetic changes were nitroduced 
which provided an image of reform but they did little to enhance political life in 
Egypt. The political reforms were piecemeal, which were introduced to deal with 
growing internal pressure and to create the context for the politics of succession rather 
than a real desire to facilitate refon-n in Egypt. The real political issues such as 
constitutional refonn, independence of the judiciary, separation of powers and 
empowerment of civil society did not enter the mindset of the Egyptian government. 
Given the hollow pledges made in 1999, the political pledges in 2005 could be seen as 
an on old story repeating itself, especially if one takes into consideration the 
composition of the new cabinet, liberal economic strategy, the role of the MB and the 
process of political succession, which is likely to be speeded up in the coming year. 
Therefore, the process of economic change is likely to be consistent with past policy 
and the political strategy will be dependent upon regime survival, in particular the 
succession process and the political weight of the MB. This can be seen from the 
process of political de-liberalisation, which has been witnessed in Egypt post elections 
2005. 
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Since Mubarak's re-election for a fifth six-year term in office September 2005. the 
goverriment has gone back on promises of political refon-n and introduced further 
restrictions. This political strategy can be understood in the context of the politics of 
succession and the political weight of the MB. For example, to contain the MB. the 
Egyptian government postponed local elections for 2 years, which Nxere scheduled to 
take place in spring 2006 (Al Ahram, February 16-22 nd 9 2006). This meant that, the 
Egyptian government blocked the possibility of the MB acquiring the 250 seats, 
required for it to contest the presidential elections in 2011 (The Mercury News, April 
29th 
, 2006; The Arabist, June, I 
gth 
, 2006). Also, in December 2005, opposition al 
Ghad party leader Ayman Nour was jailed for 5 years on forgery charges. Nour 
claimed the charges were false and the Egyptian state was punishing him for 
challenging Hosni Mubarak and criticising his son Gamal (Daily Times, December 
25 th 1 2005; www. arabnews, December, 25 
th 
9 2005). Thus, in the context of the 
political succession, the Egyptian state pre-empted any obstacles to the transition of 
power by the postponement of the local elections and the jailing of Ayman Nour. Also, 
in its policy of pre-empting obstacles, the Egyptian goveniment post election 2005, 
has directed its coercive arm towards weakening the judicial reform movement in 
Egypt, which is viewed by the state as being a possible problem to the succession 
process in Egypt. 
In February 2006 the Supreme Judicial Council stripped four Judges of their judicial 
inii-nunity, to allow State Security prosecutors to question them. The government has 
since charged the four - al-Bastaxvisi, Mahmoud Makki, his brother Ahmad Makki, 
and Mahmoud al-Khodain, president of the Alexandria Judges' Club - with 'defaming 
the state' (1khwanwcb, May 4 th. 2006). Two of the four pro-refonn judges, %lahmud 
Nlakki and Hisharn al-BastaNvisi have been summoned to a disciplinary board for 
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alleging that certain judges from within the judiciary helped rig last year's 
parliamentary polls that saw the ruling party retain a firm grip on power (BBC Nevvs, 
Apnl 18 th , 
20th and 24 
th 
, 2006, ). 
The judge's syndicate has become one of the most 
potent symbols of the drive for reform in Egypt over the last year and Dr Amr 
Hamzawy, from the Camegie Endowment for International Peace, said the regime's 
message was clear. 'It's a lesson to everyone who dares to cross the red lines, ' said the 
Washington-based analyst (Middle East Online, April 20th , 2006). Human Rights 
organizations have expressed grave concern about a police attack against peaceful 
demonstrators outside the Judges Club in the early hours of Monday May 1" 2006. An 
eyewitness told Human Rights Watch that a large number of men, apparently 
plainclothes police, attacked around 40 persons who had been holding a round-the- 
clock vigil in support of the two judges threatened with dismissal. They beat 15 
demonstrators and Judge Mahmud 'Abd al-Latif Hamza, who came out from the club 
(Ikhwanweb, May 4 th 2006-, The Daily Star, April 27 th 2006; Al Ahram April 27 th -3 
rd 
9 
May 2006). The Egyptian government detained 12 demonstrators for 15 days for 
investigation on charges of destroying public property. The oppressive attitude of the 
Egyptian government towards the refon-n judges shows the importance of state 
institutions to the government and its bid to secure the succession in Egypt (Middle 
East Online, April 20th 
, 
2006). The judiciary continues with its challenge to the 
Egyptian government and the judges are contributing to the demand for political 
change in Egypt. However, the Egyptian state continues to resist any demands for 
change. This resistance is proven through the extension of the state of emergenc,,,, la", 
by another 2 years and is indicative of the slide of Egypt into deeper authoritarianism. 
The Egyptian government justified this extension, through the terronst attacks on the 
d -1 holiday resort of Dahab in April 2006 (Ikhwanweb, Mav 2' , -006-, Al 
Jazeera, April 
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3 Oth, 2006; Reuters. April 30th: 2006). The state of emergency has failed to boost 
Egyptian secunty. as Egypt has experienced a number of terror attacks in the past. In 
fact the state of emergency has been used by the Egyptian government to restrict 
political activism in society which could weaken the state's powers and its structures. 
President Mubarak's economic and political reform agenda seems to have been 
derailed even before it actually began. The experience of the 1990s indicates political 
de-liberalisation at a time of economic reform and this seems to be the picture today, 
as the political weight of the MB increases and the politics of succession speeds up. 
Politically there has been a slide back to political de-liberalisation after the glimmer 
of hope leading up to the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2005 
(Ikhwanweb, May 12 th , 2006). Economically, Mubarak's economic pledges have been 
criticised for not being well thought out and being unfeasible given the severity of 
problems which already exist in Egypt. In addition the nature of the new cabinet does 
not inspire much confidence that it will be able to deliver on sOCio-economic 
commitments, such as decreasing the level of poverty and creating employment for 
the Egyptian people. Therefore the continuity in past economic and political strategy 
by Mubarak does not bode well for the future of economic and political change in 
Egypt. As a result, this raises the question of political succession, in particular 
whether one is expected to see a change and shift in economic and political strategy 
undcr Gamal Mubarak. 
8.3 Political Succession- Economic and Political Implications 
Post elections 2005, Gamal Mubarak and his close associates have moved into key 
political positions. Gamal Mubarak has risen in the hierarchy of the governing NDP 
and was named one of three NDP deputy secretaries general's, and 20 of his 
176 
associates took other high-ranking posts in the party. Ahmed Ezz, a steel magnate and 
close associate of Garnal, was also appointed to the NDP secretanat in the reshuffle. 
Gamal and his supporters displaced some, but not all, of the veteran NDP activists. 
Political observers saw in the move a gradual shift toward putting the NDP at the 
service of the president's son (allbusiness. com, January 23 rd , 2006: Egypt Today, 
March, 2006). As a result of these political developments post elections 2005, the 
succession process is proceeding at a fast pace. Thus, it is important to explore 
Gamal's level of continuity or discontinuity in economic and political reform from 
that seen under his father. 
A political succession, from father to son would effectively represent an intra regime 
political change. This would inevitably have no substantial beanngs upon the 
autocratic power structures which are embedded within the NDP and the state. It 
would not lead to a change in the political status in a profound manner but reinforce 
the present political situation, with a younger face at the apex of the political system. 
This political succession of Gamal is likely to result in a reshuffle in the political elite, 
bringing to the forefront likerninded individuals in terms of economic and political 
strategy. However, Gamal's rapid rise to influence in the NDP has not been without 
support from the political directives, within the NDP. Therefore, despite a reshuffle of 
the political elite inevitably Gamal would remain dependent upon them for political 
support (El Said, Interview, 2004; Nafa, Interview 2004; el Fattah, Interview, 2004). 
This dependency would constrain and restrict the political manoeuvring of Gamal to 
that xN'hich is approved by the political organs. Therefore, this dependency will restrict 
the ability of Gamal and his political elite to introduce a new political stratc(-, -,,, based 
upon wholesome political liberalisation. Despite the obvious setback of this 
depciidency for political refon-n. this dependency could give Gamal much needed 
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political support amongst the elite. However, this will depend upon to what extent 
Gamal is able to manage the various political organs effectively, neutralisino- their 
political threat and building constructive and positive relations with the various 
political organs. This skill of managing various political organs and incumbents is an 
extremely difficult task as the short tenure of Basher al. Assad in Syria clearby, w 
demonstrates (Zisser, 2000,2003; Gambill, 2000,2003-, Leverett, 2005). Basher al 
Assad has been unsuccessful in dealing with the various political organs, which has 
led to competition and conflict between the various political organs (Gambill, 2004). 
This has consequentially undermined his rule and brought the Baath regime near to 
collapse in Syria. Therefore when Gamal succeeds and if he is not able to handle the 
political organs shrewdly, then a similar situation to that in Syria could inevitably 
materialise. ) throwing Egypt into political crisis and tunnoil (El Said, Interview, 2004-, 
el Fattah, Interview, 2004). 
Therefore in terms of political strategy Gamal is likely to be pressured by the same 
forces in the political elite, to that experienced by his father. This will severely limit 
the scope of political refonns which will be introduced by Gamal and his political 
elite. There is no doubt that forces opposed to political reform will act as an obstacle 
to Gamal but there is also the question of to what extent Gamal and his liberal minded 
associates are driven by a desire to introduce bold political reforms and to take on the 
forces, which are opposed to political refon-n. At the present moment in time, pro- 
Gamal figures in the Egyptian cabinet are highly focused on pushing ahead a liberal 
economic strategy than introducing bold political reforms. Their record to date is 
indicative of speeding- up the process of economic liberalisation and privatisation than 
the process of political liberalisation. Therefore it seems that under Gamal, there will 
be a focus on econornic strategy than political strategy. As a result, no real drive 
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internally in the political elite to bring about political change. For example to 
demonstrate this point further, the rise of liberal politicians within Jordanian politics 
has been substantial under King Abdullah since 1999, resulting in a central discourse 
upon economic liberalisation-, with discussion on political reform being effectively 
sidelined. Politically there has been increasing centralisation of political power in the 
hands of King Abdullah, resulting in the liberal politicians being referred to as 'liberal 
authoritarians' (Ryan, June, 2005; Schwedler, 2002). The role of the security forces 
has increased under King Abdullah; leaving no doubt that even liberal minded 
politicians have their role which is determined by the power brokers in the Jordanian 
case the Monarchy. This has also been a discussion in Egypt that advocates of 
economic reforin do not necessarily drive or push for political refonn (El Said, 
Interview, 2004; Nafa, Interview, 2004). 
Therefore under Gamal what is expected is a greater emphasis upon economic 
strategy centering on economic liberalisation, privatisation and opening up Egypt to 
regional and international capital markets (Democracy Digest, July 23 rd , 2004). There 
is concern that the ones that will benefit excessively from the market reforms would 
be the capitalistic class with the Egyptian people being hurt by the destructive nature 
of market forces. This focus upon economic strategy would inevitably distract 
attention from crucial questions pertaining to political reform (El Said, Interview, 
2004, el Fattah, Interview, 2004). The economic strategy of Gamal could inevitably 
brino about social legitimacy if the economic reforms deliver and improve the ýtl 
economic situation of the Egyptian people. There has been talk of a revitalisation in 
the E(gyptian economy as a result of a5 per cent growth rate for the year 2004-2005 
but the question remains to what extent the growth has benefited the average Egyptian 
citizen (Cunningharn, 2005). There does not seem to be a change in the levels of 
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unemployment and poverty. If Mubarak's election economic pledges of creating 4 
million jobs in 6 years and raising living standards are going to be fulfilled bv the 
Egyptian state in the future, economists are predicting a worsening of the socio- 
economic situation in Egypt for the short term (Al Ahram, August 25-3 1 ". ý '200-5). If 
vast promises are made by Garnal and the results do not materialise a gap of trust 
would inevitable develop between the Egyptian people and Gamal. The previous 
Prime Minister Atif Obeid suffered from an immense lack of public trust for the 
failure of his government to deliver an improvement in the life of ordinary Egyptians. 
Promises would be made and economic success would be pronounced by Atif Obeid 
but the so called economic successes would not be experienced by the every day 
Egyptian. As a result a substantial trust deficit characterised Atif Obeid as Prime 
Minister dunng his time in office. Therefore the expected economic strategy by 
Gamal if and when he succeeds his father could have positive or negative 
consequences depending upon the manner in which economic reform is handled. The 
outcome of economic reform and how the benefits of economic reform are actually 
distributed to the people in society will have a decisive impact upon the public 
support base for the Gamal regime in the future. A wide public support base is crucial 
for Gamal in order to deal with potential problems, which stem from economic and 
political failure. A potential shift in the position of the NDP is a possible way of 
broadening appeal but this strategy is beset by a number of problems. 
8.4 Shifting of the National Democratic Party under Gamal Mubarak? 
The NDP occupies the centre ground in Egyptian politics, with the left and right 
spectrum within the political sphere occupied by various other political actors. There 
has been talk of a potential movement or shift in the political position of the NDP in 
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order to broaden its appeal amongst the Egyptian people (EI Said, friterview. 2004). 
The NDP exists in Egypt surrounded by various political polarities which have 
th characterised Egypt since the 1952 revolution (International Crisis Group, October 4, 
2005). The alternative polarities include the religious versus the secular, the neo 
liberal attitude towards the Egyptian economy versus the centralisation view toxN, ards 
the economy. These political polarities have occupied their political positions within 
the political spectrum for some time now and a potential shift in political position of 
the NDP could be difficult to engineer as it would necessitate building a new political 
coalition. This is unrealistic given that the present political coalition (i. e. old guard, 
military and security actors) would not want to exclude or adopt a political and 
economic position which could inevitable hinder their interests. In addition the 
attempt to build coalitions with the influential Islamist bloc would bring accusations 
of the NDP exploiting the use of religion for political purposes; the exact accusations 
the NDP directed towards the MB in the midst of the 2005 parliamentary elections. It 
seems that Gamal would remain dependent upon the political coalition of different 
interests, making it near to impossible to change the composition of the political 
coalition, in order to clear the path for a movement in the political position of the 
NDP (el Fattah, Interview, 2004, El Said, Interview, 2004). In addition opposition 
political parties would not view a potential movement of the NDP from the centre too 
favourably as would inevitable imply taking up their political ground, which would 
further harm their political role given the dominance of the NDP due to its close 
association and proximity with the state. Therefore in addition to potential opposition 
trom actors within the ruling coalition incvitable opposition would be from political 
parties which \VOLIld suffer as a result of the re-adjustment of the NDP to a different 
political position. Therefore relations Nvith political actors inside and outside the 
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political elite will have to be taken into consideration by Gamal. Relations with 
internal actors are important but also are relations with external actors. in particular 
the US. 
8.5 Egypt-US Relations 
Gamal would have to take into consideration numerous relationships such as that with 
the business community, political elite, security services, military and political 
opposition in order to ensure political stability. An important international 
relationship which would provide important support for Gamal would be one with 
Washington. This relationship has been important to Egypt under Hosni Mubarak and 
is likely to remain a central fixture of Egypt's foreign policy into the foreseeable 
future. Gamal is viewed to have had his presidential candidacy backed by Washington, 
which seems to be important in a time when US hegemony is stronger than ever 
within the Middle East and the US is pushing for change in the region; although the 
extent of political change desired by the US is debatable. As Egypt is an important 
strategic state to the US, this backing of Gamal by Washington carries further weight 
and importance, as the US would only support those that they could trust in the 
presidential hot seat within Egypt (Nafa, Interview, 2004-, El Said, Interview, 2004). 
The military as emphasised previously plays a fundamental role within Egyptian 
politics and this is comprehended by the US, therefore there is no doubt that the US 
would need the approval from the military in order to ensure the smooth transition of 
Gamal to the position of president in Egypt. The relationship inevitably will provide 
much needed support to Gamal but alternatively could backfire due to his close 
proximity to the US administration. His father on becoming president decided to 
pursue a populist foreign policy in order to build his own legitimacy, which included 
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the public distancing from the US in order to appease the strong anti US sentiments 
amongst the Egyptian masses (Al Awadi, 2004). This political manoeuvre could be an 
option for Gamal, who already is viewed publicly as being liberal minded and pro 
American. The war in Iraq, the US backing to Israeli military action in Lebanon and 
the threatening position of the US towards Syria and Iran has heightened the levels of 
anti Americanism in the Middle East; therefore a close relationship with the US could 
undermine the search for legitimacy by Gamal amongst the Egyptian people. 
However, despite the potential negative connotations of this relationship, the support 
this relationship provides gives Gamal the platform to drive his claim for presidency. 
The drive for presidency has not been comfortable for Gamal as he continues to face 
stiff resistance from political actors in Egypt, such as the MB. This has led to the 
Egyptian government trying to neutralise the influence and impact of the MB (see 
chapter 7). Given, the fact that the MB is a key political actor in Egypt, it is important 
to take into consideration the position of the Egyptian government towards the MB 
post elections 2005. In particular if there has been any change in the position of the 
Egyptian goverriment and the prospective position of Gamal Mubarak towards the 
MB. This is important as it will provide not only indications and implications for 
future Egyptian state and MB relations but also indications and implications for the 
future process of political reform in Egypt. 
8.6 Gamal Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood and Implications for the Future 
Process of Political Reform in Egypt. 
Ttian government and the NDP remains unchanged towards The position of the E(,,,, i 
Im-oviding the MB Nvith a legal platfomi in Egyptian politics. However, despite this 
rigid position of the NDP towards the legality of the MB, a statement made by Kama] 
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el Shazli, a leading member of the old guard within the NDP to the London based Al 
Hayat newspaper on the 30'h of October 2005 is reflective of a slight change in the 
Egyptian governments position towards the MB. He stated that the Aluslim 
Brotherhood had established a prominent presence on the political scene .... they have 
their supporters' (Al Ahram, November 10- 16 th , 2005). It was the first time a senior 
government official has publicly acknowledged the MBs influence and role in 
Egyptian politics. El Shazli continued to say 'We ha%, e ourselves developed as a 
ruling party and as a government and things have changed. The Brotherhood has a 
street presence and wants to engage in political work. We don't mind', (A] Ahram, 
November 10-16 th ý 2005). 
A clear sigm of a policy shift of the NDP towards the MB was seen during the 2005 
parliamentary elections campaign. The MB was allowed to use their traditional slogan 
'Islam is the Solution' in the constituencies in which they contested. In addition MB 
candidates were allowed to present themselves as 'Ikhwun' (Brotherhood) candidates 
which, was not allowed in the past. Also, this time the MB was allowed to actively 
engage in society without state intimidation and harassment, which indicated a shift in 
policy by the Egyptian state. However, despite, this change in policy the NDP does 
not sec a contradiction in recognising and acknowledging the MB's influence and 
political role in society but at the same time denying its legitimacy as a political party. 
In the same interview with Al Hayat, el Shazli suggested that 'if they want to engage 
in politics as the MB then they are free to do so. A political party though is not an 
option', (Al Ahram, November 10- 16 th, 2005). In reality the Egyptian government is 
not in actuality (Yi\ ing new ground to the MB, as it stops at the crucial question of 
legality which the MB has been seeking for the last 25 years in Egypt. CIN ý 
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The politics of succession is looming in Egypt and indications so far do not provide a 
positive picture regarding the position of Gamal Mubarak towards the MB. Gamal 
Mubarak has called on illegal parties not to be allowed to participate in formal politics. 
Although Gamal has not directly referred to the MB it was clear in an interview ý, vith 
Al Jazeera, that he was directing his comments towards the MB (Al Jazeera, Januarv 
25 th 12006). 
In May, 2006 there was strong rhetoric from the Egyptian government about barring 
individual candidates from the MB running in future elections in Egypt. Pro Gamalist 
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif described the MB members of parliament as a 'secret 
cell' threatening he 'will not allow them to forrn a parliamentary bloc in the future nor 
to assume any role in the political arena' (Al Mesryoon, May 3 Oth , 2006). In addition 
to Dr Nazif s statement, there has also been severe criticism by other government 
officials including Dr. Mufid Shihab, minister for Parliamentary Affairs; Dr Hatim Al 
Gabali, minister of health; Mr. Ahmed Darwish, minister of Administrative 
Development. These criticisms are in line with the Egyptian governments and Gamal 
Mubarak's firin stance against the MB post parliamentary elections 2005. Dr Nazif 
has gone further and suggested ways in which the government could reduce the 
representation of the MB in future parliaments. Dr Nazif has stated one proposal was 
to iiitroduce an electoral voting system which combines voting for individuals and 
voting for party lists, but this would require constitutional change. 'If we amended the 
constitution to allow that, then we could obtain better representation for the parties in 
parliament, cven if so far I don't know whether that would happen or not, ' he told the 
independent iic\\, spapcr -11 Mas)ýv A/ Youm in the interview (Arab Online, June I", 
'006). Dr Nazif was answerim, a question on hoxv the Egyptian govemment might put tý 
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into practice Nazif s wish to prevent the MB from forming a parliamentary bloc in the 
next parliament. 
However, some elements of the NDP's reformist wing seem to recognise that if they 
do not allow the oppositional parties enough room in society to maneuver, thev will 
be forced to legalise the MB. Even Gamals' political advisor Mohammed Kamal 
stated in an interview to the International Crisis Group; 
'In the future, definitely, the issue of the relation of religion with the state 'ývill 
have to be resolved. There is a definite need to integrate (the Brothers) into the 
political system. Personally, I am against legalising them as a political party. I 
think the solution is to enhance and strengthen the secular political parties in 
order to fill the vacuum in the political system that is being filled by the 
Islamists'. (Crisis Group Interview, October 4 th , 2005, p28). 
At the moment in time, there is no guarantee that a strong political alternative to the 
NDP will emerge in Egypt as a direct result of vested interests within the NDP who 
are resistant to the process of political change in Egypt. The Egyptian government, 
Gamal Mubarak and the NDP do not appear to have a positive position upon 
providing legal space for the MB and this will remain a stumbling block in the MB's 
quest for legitimacy. Gamals' position on the MB is something the Egyptian 
(, o\, emment will find difficult to uphold given the pressure that has been created 
w, ithin, Egyptian, British and US commentary upon the process of political reform and 
the chariging perceptions of the political opposition towards the MB in Egypt (Al 
Ahrani, December 15-2 1 ", 2005, Hamzawy and Brown, 2005; Al Jazeera, June 2 ý"d 1) 
2005). 
,, _ ptian hi response to the 
MB's growing political weight and its participation in Egy i 
political life through its involvement in the parliament and professional syndicates, 
the political opposition have changed their perceptions and attitudes towards the %1B. 
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Newcomers into the Egyptian political scene such as the 'Kefcývah 'movement and the 
al Ghad party have adopted rather clear positions in relation to the MB. Ayman Nour 
told the International Crisis Group, 'we respect them and the fact that they are a 
political current for nearly 80 years now. We are in favour of them being, legal' 
(International Crisis Group Inter-view, October 4 th , 2005, p25). The al Ghad party's 
recognition of the MB being a political actor within Egyptian society can be further 
proved from the meeting of Ayman Nour with the MB leadership in the run up to the 
2005 presidential elections. This was done in order to gain the support of the MB in 
relation to his candidacy in the presidential elections. George Ishak, from 'Kýfayuli' 
has commented; 
'I appreciate that they will be a political party; let them show themselves. I 
believe that if they were able to compete in an election, they would win 10 tO 15 
per cent. But for as long as they are forced to remain in hiding, people think 
there are three or four million of them; this is not true; there are 30,000 to 
40,000 of them no more' ( International Crisis Group, Interview, October 4th, 
2005, p25). 
The older parties in Egypt such as the al Nasseriyya and the al Tagammu parties are 
more ambivalent towards the MB, but nevertheless their position towards the MB has 
changed. The al Nusserýylv party favours involving the MB and the Islamic current 
in the political process and supports a legal party for the Islamists. This position Is not 
clear but at the same time it has not closed the door on the MB if certain conditions 
are rnct. On the other hand the al Tagamn7u party is split; Rifat al Sated from al 
Tagannnu is well known for his opposition to the Islamic trend within Egypt in 
general and in particular the MB. His opposition to Political Islam marks much of his 
academic and scholarly output. He devotes a weekly column in . 41-Ahall under the 
title 'A page from Egypt's history' to debunking the MB's role in Egýptian societv. 
Hc coined the term 'inuta'cishinin'. and cames a multitude of negative connotations 
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including the cynical use of religion to attain political power (Al Ahram, July 7-13 Ih. 
2005). However, this view of Rifat al Saeed is not consistent throughout the al 
Tagammu party, with other members being more receptive to the idea of MB and its 
quest for legitimacy. They have in fact advocated the MB's development into a 'Hizb 
al Madani (civil party) with an Islamic background (Kish, Interview, 2004). In 
relation to the al Wafd party the oldest liberal party in Egypt its position towards the 
MB has been of working and co-operating with the MB. For example, the former 
leader of the al Wafd party Nournan Gomma visited the MB prior to the presidential 
elections 2005 to seek the support of the MB, but has not been as direct in calling for 
the recognition of the MB as a legal political force. This is in direct contrast to his 
political rival Ayman Nour. 
The support for the MB's quest for legitimacy appears to have grown within the 
circles of the intelligentsia within Egypt. Dr Amr Choubaky, a leading analyst on the 
MB has stated; 
'It is possible to integrate them. But this requires, first a serious democratic 
process which integrates political activists generally, and then, on the Brothers 
side, they have to decide to choose between al-dawa (the religious movement) 
and al haraka al slyassa (the political movement)' (International Crisis Group, 
Interview, October 4 th 1 2005, p26). 
Al Choubaky is impressed by the new guard of MB members who have developed a 
discourse away from the traditional religiousness of the MB but believes that the MB 
needs to undergo further changes in its shape and character to allow the new guard to 
have a greater role in decision making and for the MB to form a programme for a civil 
political party (Choubaky, Interview, 2004). The same view has been presented by 
Mohammed El Said Said, deputy director of the Al Ahram Center for Political and 
Sti-atc,,,, Ic Studies, who has insisted that it was important for the MB to become a civil 
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party, instead of a religious movement in order to minimise the risk of sectarian 
violence in Egypt (El Said, Interview, 2004). The likelihood of the MB transforming 
itself comprehensively into a political movement is minimal due to the role of the old 
guard and the central role of religious missionary work at the core of its broader social 
activism at the grass root levels. The formation of a political organ is a more likek, 
option for the MB as it would allow them to continue with their religious work at the 
grass root level but also to present itself as a political movement detached from the 
spirit. This is a crucial debate in the MB between the old guard and new guard and 
will determine the path which the MB will proceed on into the future. 
Overall, it is evident that the MB has been able to win over opposition actors in its 
quest for legitimacy. This support will make it difficult for Gamal Mubarak to sustain 
its present position on the MB. The MB is showing its political weight through its 
influence and impact on the succession process (See chapter 7). This has been 
acknowledged by Gamal through his attempts to neutralise the MB new generation 
but has been unwilling to go the extra yard and contemplate a legal platform for the 
MB in Egypt. Gamal not solving the status of the MB in Egypt will make his life 
difficult as a result of the growing political stature of the MB and inevitably have 
negative implications for the future process of political refonn in Egypt. 
8.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the debates and pressures for economic and political refonn 
in contemporary Egypt. Pils was done by looking at the electoral promises that were 
made by Hosni Mubarak and analysin. (), progess which has been made to date in 
relation to his promises. Egypt is retracting into further authoritananism, at time of 
growing demand for economic and political reform. Economically, %lubarak's 
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economic pledges of raising living standards and creating employment have come 
under criticism due to the prospect of further economic liberalisation and privatisation 
under the new cabinet. In terms of the economic and political implications of a 
political succession, it is likely that the economic programme adopted in 1991 will 
continue to be pursued, with economic liberalisation and privatisation being pursued 
but still in a cautious manner. Politically, little change is expected as Gamal has been 
in the hierarchy of power since 2000 and no real political change has taken place. In 
particular there is not likely to be a drastic break from past political position towards 
the MB. As a result, no major change in relations between the Egyptian government 
and the MB is expected. The future of Egypt under Gamal is not going to mark a 
radical change from the economic and political agenda, which Egypt has experienced 
under his father in the past or at the present moment in time. 
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Chapter 9- Conclusion 
This research has explored the process of economic and political change in Egypt. 
with particular reference to the period, 1991-2006. This was done by examining the 
MB and the politics of succession in Egypt. The case of Egypt was located in the 
context of broader economic and political changes in the Middle East. In doing this, 
four important questions were addressed. These were as follows. First, what Nvas the 
extent that there had been a process of economic and political reform in Egypt? 
Second, to what extent has the process of economic and political change allowed for 
the emergence of a functioning civil society? Third to what extent has this allowed 
political actors such as the MB to challenge state power? And finally, to what extent 
might the role of the MB be symptomatic of a challenge to the legitimacy of the 
existing state dispensation? 
In order to address these research questions, I relied on the use of primary and 
secondary data. The primary data in the form of interviews provided access to leading 
academics, politicians and thinkers in Egypt. The interviewees were able to provide 
answers to my questions, which evolved around my research themes (i. e. Egyptian 
reforin, the MB, and the politics of succession). This was important, as it provided 
me with the thoughts and opinions of leading experts on my research themes, thus 
allowing me to make a new contribution to my research. The use of primary data was 
complemented by the use of secondary data. This provided another means through 
which to collect data in relation to my research themes. In particular the use of a range 
of newspapers (i. e. Egyptian, British and US), and the interpretation of these sources. 
allowed me to make an additional iiew conti-ibution to my research. Therefore the 
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primary and secondary data provided the basis on which to construct and begin the 
research. 
The thesis first explored economic and political reform in the context of the wider 
Middle East. This was done in Chapter 2, which in addition located the discussion in 
the context of regional and global developments such as US foreign policy post 
September II th , 2001 and the subsequent 'war on terror'. Chapter 2 demonstrated that 
the process of limited political liberalisation which was evident in the region in the 
1990s was reflective of a desire of power elites to survive in the context of internal 
socio-economic pressures. Thus, the process of limited political change was not 
enough alone to allow oppositional actors to challenge the power and hegemony of 
the state. This was due to the fact that oppositional actors were outmanoeuvred by 
states accustomed to survival and lacked a strong social support base in order to 
launch a challenge to state power. On the other hand, this process of limited political 
change driven by state survival and the need for legitimacy provided room for 
Islamist parties to enter the political system, and to have a role inside the political 
system. This role of Islamists inside the system and their presence outside of it 
through their existence in civil society via their involvement in trade unions, 
professional syndicates, student unions and teaching clubs allowed Islamists to 
position themselves with strength in order to launch a challenge to contest state power. 
The Islamists took advantage of internal poor socio-economic conditions to contest 
state power and their strength was boosted by regional crisis', such as the Palestinian- 
Israeli conflict, the Gulf War in 1991 and the Algerian military coup in the early 
1990s. Post 9/11 US foreign policy and the war on terror resulting in conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq allowed Islamists further to use regional ensis' to strengthen 
their positions and to launch further direct challenges to state power. In addition. the 
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Israeli bombardment of Lebanon in 2006, the Israeli incursions in the Gaza stnp and 
US pressures on Iran and Syria have added to the strength of Islamist parties, which 
continue to act as counter weights to state power in the region. This discussion in 
chapter 2 helped provide a comprehension into the processes of economic and 
political change at the state and regional level. Therefore the discussion provided a 
platform to examine the case of Egypt in chapters 3-8. 
Chapter 3 explored the process of economic and political reforin in Egypt since 1991, 
in particular its impact on the power and structure of the Egyptian state. The process 
of economic reform coincided with a process of political de-liberalisation. In response 
most political actors, in particular the political opposition suffocated and were 
paralysed as a result of state intrusion into political life. However, despite this 
political intrusion by the Egyptian governiment, the MB was able to escape political 
extinction and to grow and challenge the Egyptian government for a number of 
reasons such as its structure, social base, changing shape and character and its broad 
involvement in Egyptian society. Given the important role the MB came to play in 
challenging the Egyptian goventment and its power in the 1990s, chapters 4-6 
examined how the MB was able to become a key political actor in Egypt and to 
challenge its hegemony. This was done by examining the details of transformation of 
the MB from a religious movement into a central political actor in Egyptian politics. I 
explored how the MB emerged as a strong political force and how internal reforms to 
the way in which the MB organised itself contributed to its increasing strength and 
ptian political life. It also situated the internal political and power in Egy iIII 
organisational transfon-nations mside the MB alongside shifts in the spiritual and 
ideological discourse that the MB promoted. This is important as by understanding 
these shifts. the process of change in the NlB's shape and character and how it has 
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come to relate to the Egyptian state can be more readily understood. The thesis 
demonstrated this by examining the role of the MB in 2 key Egyptian institutions, the 
Egyptian parliament and professional syndicates. 
In particular, the MB used the professional syndicates to challenge the power and 
hegemony of the Egyptian state. At a time of heightened socio-economic crisis in the 
1990s, this was a dangerous situation for the Egyptian state as historically 
professional syndicates have played an important role in challenging state power and 
holding it to account. In response the Egyptian state intervened in order to paralyze 
the syndicates but importantly to weaken the growing influence and power of the MB. 
This was done initially by introducing Law 100 in 1993. However after the failure of 
this law to hinder the progress of the MB, it was amended by the Egyptian state in 
1995 but this also failed. In response the Egyptian state intervened to take control of 
many syndicate boards such as the Medical and Engineer syndicates. Despite this 
attempt to weaken the MB, the MB was able to continue with its challenge to the 
Egyptian state due to its large social support base and its wide presence in civil 
society. In fact, the ability of the MB to contest state power and to contribute to the 
process of political reform has been facilitated by its willingness to cross ideological 
barriers. It has tried to construct alliances (i. e. political and civilian) and to add 
diversity to its social base. This can be seen clearly post 2000 as the MB has exerted 
itself in trying to have an influence and impact on the process of political succession 
in Egypt. 
A detailed understanding of the MB was followed by examining the politics of 
succession in chapters 7 and 8. The politics of succession became important Since 
2000. It has been dorninated by the increasing role and power of Gamal Nlubarak in 
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Egyptian politics. The rise of Garnal and his acquaintances in the echelons of 
Egyptian politics raised many questions concerning the future of economic and 
political change in Egypt. Therefore it was important to demonstrate the discourse 
surrounding political succession, taking into consideration the actors involved and the 
forces driving the succession process in Egypt. In addition it was important to 
examine key political actors, such as the MB, to determine the extent of their 
influence and impact on the political succession process. For example, since 2000, the 
MB has been vocal in its criticism of the political succession process and its impact 
has been strengthened through its willingness to join forces with new social protest 
movements such as 'Kefayah' and the communist party. This alliance between the 
MB and other social forces heightened the concern of the Egyptian state. This concern 
was escalated when the MB began to take to the streets in order to galvanise public 
support in opposition to the succession process. In reaction to these developments the 
Egyptian state resorted to coercion in order to safeguard the succession process. 
However, the existence of the MB inside and outside the system resulted in the failure 
of coercion by the Egyptian government to weaken the MB in its agenda to undennine 
the succession process. As a result, the Egyptian government shifted its policy and 
began to pursue a strategy of trying to neutralise the MB to halt the MB's challenge to 
the succession process in Egypt. Therefore, the struggle between the Egyptian 
government and MB falls in to the context of the succession process, which is likely 
to have a key impact on reform process in Egypt. This examination of the politics of 
succession was important as it allowed an understanding into the forces involved and 
the power struggle unfolding in Egypt. In addition it provided a platform from N, ý'hlch 
to examine the ftiture process of economic and political change in Egypt, in particular 
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the level of continuity and discontinuity in the process of economic and political 
change emerging from a succession process. 
This research has allowed a number of important contributions to be made to 
scholarly work, through the examination of economic and political reform in Egypt, 
by relating it to the political weight of the MB and the politics of succession. First, it 
has allowed an understanding into the process of economic and political change in 
Egypt and its impact on the MB, which led it to challenge state power and its 
structures in the 1990s. Post 2000 the MB has continued to confront the Egyptian 
government, through its ability to have an influence and impact upon the political 
succession process in Egypt. Second, this focus on the MB, through examining its 
changing shape and character, has allowed an understanding into the transition of 
Islamism in Egypt and the wider Middle East. This is because the MB is a leading 
Islamic movement, with its internal changes and transformations having an impact on 
Islamist parties in the region, such as the IAF in Jordan, JDP in Morocco or even 
Hamas in the Palestinian Territories. Third, the focus on the politics of succession, has 
allowed an understanding into the level of continuity and discontinuity in the process 
of economic and political reform arising from a succession process in Egypt. The 
process of economic reform in Egypt continues to be market dominated, with the rise 
of Garnal Mubarak speeding up the process of economic liberalisation, in particular 
the linking of Egypt to wider markets. As a result in Egypt, there is a lot of emphasis 
on developing the stock and capital markets, in order to improve their competence. to 
attract regional and international investors. The process of economic reform remains 
market centric; howcver Gamal has extended this to include regional and global 
markets as well. On the other hand the process of political reform indicates continuit,., 
and discontinuity. This refcrs to shifts between the process of political liberalisation 
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and de-liberalisation. This will continue to be the basis of the Egyptian government 1ý s 
political strategy into the near future. both in order to balance the political weight of 
the MB and to manage the process of political succession. 
The overall argument in this thesis has been that Egypt in the 1990s underwent a 
process of economic and political change. This period of change coincided with 
heightened socio-economic crisis, which was worsened by economic reforins carried 
out by the Egyptian government under the influence of the IMF and WB. This led to 
the development of internal socio-economic pressures, which threatened the power 
and legitimacy of the Egyptian government. In order to survive and persist, the 
Egyptian government sustained a process of political de-liberalisation. This process 
was aimed at weakening the growing political power and influence of the MB. The 
state was mindful of the growing strength of the MB in civil society through its 
presence in student unions, teaching clubs, and professional syndicates. This existence 
of the MB inside and outside the system, allowed the MB to pressure the Egyptian 
government, which led to coercive action by the Egyptian government that was 
concerned about challenges to its power and legitimacy. 
This concern of the political weight of the MB, in combination with the growing 
socio-economic demands of the Egyptian people has posed survival dilemmas to the 
Egyptian government. This can be clearly seen in the context of the politics of 
succession, as the Egyptian govenu-nent has sought to manage this process carefully 
in order to deal Nvith the MB and rising socio-economic demands. Despite the careful 
management and planning by the Egyptian government, there has been wide spread 
opposition to the political succession process in Egypt, which was seen in the run up 
to and post elections in 200-5. This opposition has resulted in the Egý, ptian uovernment 
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further tightening its control over Egyptian society in order to safeguard the 
succession process. Given this political reality post elections 2005 , it is likely that the 
ftiture process of economic and political change in Egypt will be dictated b-.,! 3 main 
factors. These include the internal socio-economic demands, the political weight of 
the MB and the politics of succession. The latter no doubt is a key factor behind the 
recent economic and political developments in Egypt and the politics of succession is 
likely to be an important factor in determining the future relations not only between 
the Egyptian state and the MB, but by its very nature the future of political reform in 
Egypt itself 
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Appendices 
Interviews 
This appendix contains extracts relating to the MB's role in professional syndicates, 
from 4 interviews which I did with 4 leading experts on the MB. The information 
provi es based on noting taking during the interview process, which the 
interviewees were comfortable with. This information was used for chapter 6. which 
focused on the MB and its use of syndicates to challenge the Egyptian state's powers 
and its structures. The information (extracts) below supplements the intervievv 
material used in chapter 6. 
Interviewee Details 
Dr Amany Qandil- is a leading civil society and human rights activist in Egypt. She is 
well known for writing on professional syndicates in Egypt and the role of the MB in 
the syndicates. 
Dr Amr Choubaky- is a research at the Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic 
Studies in Cairo. He did his doctorate on the MB and writes frequently in the 
Egyptian press on the MB in Egypt. 
Abu Ella Madi- is a former senior member of the MB and was part of the new guard 
ývhich entered the syndicates in the 1980s. Now he is the leader of the Hizb al Wasat 
party. 
Dr Arnr Hamza\\, y, - is an academic and research at the Carnegie Endowment Centre 
for Interriational Peace. At the time of the interview he was a lecturer at the University 
of Cairo and is a leading expert on the MB in Egypt. 
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Appendix A- Interview with Dr Amany Qandil (extracts) Cairo, July 6 th 2004 
What role have syndicates played in the past? And how significant have they 
been in contesting state power? 
Qandil: Syndicates have played an important role in providing a sphere of 
mobilisation at times of socio-economic and political crisis in Egypt. One saw this in 
the 1960s and 1970s under Nasser and Sadat. 
Also the syndicates provide an avenue within which less influential and less 
prestigious sub groups of various professions may attempt to further their socio- 
economic and political causes. 
2. What was the relationship like between the state and syndicates under Nasser 
and Sadat? 
Qandil: Nasser had real concern over the role of the syndicates and applied a policy of 
co-optation and coercion. In the mid 1960s, Nasser launched a campaign against the 
syndicates in order to weaken and undermine them. Like wise Sadat had a similar 
policy to that of Nasser but preferred the carrot approach to that of the stick. 
3. Turning now to the 1980s, why did Mubarak relax state control over the 
syndicates? 
Qandil: Hosni Mubarak was new and required legitimacy. Therefore he removed 
restnctions on the activities of the syndicates. 
4. What was the relationship like between Mubarak and the MB in the early 
1980s? 
Qandil: Mubarak in his search for legitimacy fon-ned a close relationship with the MB. 
This aided his quest for religious legitimacy and appeal to the Egyptian public. 
5. Did Mubarak not foresee syndicates becoming a major source of activity for 
the MB? 
Qandil: Nlubarak was pragmatic and did not look into the future. He just wanted to 
survive and the MB provided legitimacy, therefore he sought it from the NIB. 
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How important 
political work? 
would the syndicates be in the 1980s to the MB and its 
Qandil: The syndicates would be a vehicle in the MB's work to extend its message 
and develop power to challenge the government. The involvement in syndicates 
represented a change in the MB and state relations. 
7. What factors accounted for the rise and consolidation of the MB in the 
syndicates during the 1908s? 
Qandil: A number of factors were responsible for the rise of the MB in the syndicates 
1) The new guard 2) corruption 3) political fighting 4) poor services 5) good 
structure and management. 
8. How important were the new guard in the early success of the MB in 
syndicates? 
Qandil: The new guard were crucial in the success of the MB. Their pragmatism and 
political mindset allowed the MB to take advantage of the situation that came across 
their way. 
9. How significant was the MB takeover of the medical (1984) and engineering 
syndicates (1987)? 
Qaiidil: The success in these 2 syndicates was important for the MB as they are 2 key 
syndicates. In addition these syndicates are known to be politically active. The 
success of the MB would lead such syndicates to evolve around Islamic politics 
iiistead of secular politics. 
10. In to the 1990s- what factors brought the Islamist takeover of the syndicates to 
the attention of the Egyptian government? in particular the mobilisation to 
challenge state power? 
Qandil: A number of key developments would lead to the state becoming concerned 
NN'ith the MB influence over the syndicates- 1) the 1991 gulf war, the MB would resist 
E gypt's support for the war through the syndicates success in the influential 
lawycrs syndicate 3) the 1992 Egyptian earthquake and the MB's relief efforts -ývhich 
xN'ould undermine the state and its use of syndicates in the relief efforts. 
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1. To what extent was the MB's victory in the lawyers syndicate responsible for 
confrontation with the state? 
Qandil: The MB's success in the lawyers syndicate awakened the state to the threat ad 
power of the MB. This was a major turning point in relations , N-Ith the MB, in 
particular under Mubarak. 
12. What was the response of the MB to the introduction of Law 100 in 1993? 
Qandil: Law 100 was in direct response to the power of the MB in the syndicates- In 
particular, due to the syndicates politicisation and mobilisation by the MB. The MB 
reacted by organising seminars and dialoguing with oppositional actors in order to 
over turn the legislation. Sustained pressure by the MB led to its amendment in 1995 
but had no impact on the independence of the syndicates. 
13. To what extent has such a law constrained the political work of the MB in 
syndicates? And has the MB found new avenues of political expression in 
Egypt? 
Qandil: The law has constricted the activities of the MB, although the MB has 
continued to exist and use the syndicates as political platforms. The MB has 
searched for new political space in civil society by joining hands in social 
movements to broaden its appeal in order to challenge the state. 
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Appendix- B- Intervie", with Dr Amr Choubaky (extracts) Cairo, May I", 
2004. 
1) What role have syndicates played in the past? And ho,,. N, significant have they 
been in contesting state power? 
Choubaky: Syndicates are key components of Egyptian civil society and act as a 
check and balance on state powers. They were highly active during the mid 1970s. 
especially at the time leading up to the peace agreement with Israel. 
The Physician and Journalist syndicates in the past have been extremely resistant to 
the state on a range of socio-economic and political issues. If mobilised they could 
represent a real challenge to the Egyptian states power and its institutions. 
2) What was the relationship like between the state and syndicates under Nasser 
and Sadat? 
Choubaky: Nasser wanted complete control and wanted to bring the syndicated under 
his control as well. Sadat allowed space for the syndicates but closed this space after 
they became powerful and began to contest state power and its legitimacy. 
3) Turning now to the 1980s, why did Mubarak relax state control over the 
syndicates? 
Choubaky: Hosni Mubarak needed legitimacy and began to undergo limited political 
liberalisation. In particular loosened controls over civil society and syndicates but not 
totally. 
4) What was the relationship like between Mubarak and the MB in the early 
1980s? 
Choubaky: Mubarak courted the MB and allowed the MB to participate in elections-, 
this boosted his religious outlook in Egyptian society and provided him NA"th 
legitimacy. 
5) Did Mubarak not foresee syndicates becoming a major source of activitý, for 
the MB" 
Choubaky: Mubarak assumed the NIB was too weak to challenge the state and 
bclieved that the NIB could be out nianoeuvred by the state. 
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6) How important 
political work? 
would the syndicates be in the 1980s to the MB and its 
Choubaky: The use of syndicates would become central to the political agenda of the 
MB and its development into a key political actor in Egypt. 
7) What factors accounted for the rise and consolidation of the MB in the 
syndicates during the 1908s? 
Choubaky: The professional class had become dissatisfied With the performance of 
the syndicate's boards in dealing with the economic, social and political concerns. 
This provided impetus for the success of the MB. The MB would address all such 
issues head on and this would lead to growing support in the syndicates. In particular 
the MB had strong support in the medical and engineering syndicates due to their 
work and due to the involvement of the Student Islamic movement in these syndicates. 
8) How important were the new guard in the early success of the MB in 
syndicates? 
Choubaky: The new guard have been central in the change of the MB and were key 
behind the involvement of the MB in the syndicates and its success. Their blend of 
religion and politics was central in the rise of the MB. 
9) How significant was the MB takeover of the medical (1984) and engineering 
syndicates (1987)? 
Choubaky: This success indicated the pragmatism of the MB and flexibility of the 
iiew guard. Also their success represented the take over of 2 key political syndicates 
ai-id would have implications for relations with the state. 
10) In to the 1990s- what factors brought the Islamist takeover of the syndicates to 
the attention of the Egyptian goverriment?, in particular the mobilisation to 
challcrige state power/ 
Choubaky: The success in the lawyers syndicate, the gulf war and the 1992 
earthquake inct-cased the profile and power of the MB and heightened the concern of 
the role of the MB in the syndicates. Therefore it would only be a matter of time 
before the state took action to weaken the MB and the syndicates. 
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I) To what extent was the MB's victory in the lawyers syndicate responsible for 
confrontation with the state? 
Choubaky: The take over of the lawyers syndicate meant another powerful syndicate 
was under the control of the MB. This ffightened the state and as a result it began to 
take drastic measures to deal with the challenge of the MB. 
12) What was the response of the MB to the introduction of Law 100 in 1993? 
Choubaky: The 1993 legislation was directed to the MB and its growing power. The 
MB in response organised demonstrations and petitions to overturn the legislation. 
This represented a souring in relations with the state and changing fortunes of the MB 
in the 1990s. 
13) To what extent has such a law constrained the political work of the MB in 
syndicates? And has the MB found new avenues of political expression in 
Egypt? 
Choubaky: The MB has continued to use syndicates despite Law 100 to challenge 
the state. In addition the new guard has been instrumental in building relations 
with opposing forces in the syndicates to create pressure on the state to stop its 
interference in the syndicates. 
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Appendix- C- Interview with Abu Ella Madi (extracts) Cairo, May 20th 2004 
1) What role have syndicates played in the past? And hoNA, significant have they 
been in contesting state power? 
Ella Madi: The syndicates played an important role prior to the 1952 revolution in 
Egypt. They acted as an accounting mechanism on the abuse of power by the 
monarchy and government. After 1952, the role of syndicates was subordinated to the 
power of the state. This existed till the 1970s but Sadat closed the political space he 
allowed to syndicates after the signing of the peace agreement with Israel. This Nvas 
because syndicates were central in challenging and contesting state power through 
their mobilisation capabilities. 
2) What was the relationship like between the state and syndicates under Nasser 
and Sadat? 
Ella Madi: Civil society was manipulated and controlled by Nasser and Sadat. 
Different styles between the two, however their policy towards the syndicates did not 
change- a policy to weaken and subordinate the syndicates to the power of the state. 
3) Turning now to the 1980s, why did Mubarak relax state control over the 
syndicates? 
Ella Madi: Hosni Mubarak needed legitimacy and support; therefore he adopted a 
policy of allowing limited political space to exist in society, which meant more space 
for syndicates and its activities. 
4) What was the relationship like between Mubarak and the MB in the early 
1980s? 
Ella Madi: The MB was happy to co-operate with Mubarak and Mubarak benefited 
througli the MB's religious credentials in society. 
5) Did Mubarak not foresee syndicates becoming a major source of activity for 
the MB? 
Ella Madi: It Nvas quite clear that Mubarak in his quest for legitimacy did not foresee 
syndicates becoming a major sphere of MB activity and source of mobilisation. which 
would allow the N4B to contest state power in Egypt. 
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6) How important would the syndicates be in the 1980s to the MB and its 
Political work? 
Ella Madi: The MB would use syndicates in order to create new space in order to 
develop support amongst the professional class to challenge the state on a range of 
socio-economic issues. 
7) What factors accounted for the rise and consolidation of the MB in the 
syndicates during the 1908s? 
Ella Madi: The syndicates were in a poor state and there was much discontent 
amongst the professional class. The MB would use this to build support. Also the 
MB's Islamic appeal and good management skills helped in their rise and 
consolidation. The MB had good experience in dealing with financial issues based on 
experience from university campuses. This allowed the MB to provide much needed 
social services to the members of the syndicates. 
8) How important were the new guard in the early success of the MB in 
syndicates? 
Ella Madi: The new guard allowed the MB to shift and change. Also they allowed the 
MB to rise in the syndicates through pragmatism and continuous flexibility. 
9) How significant was the MB takeover of the medical (1984) and engineering 
syndicates (1987)? 
Ella Madi: The medical and engineering syndicates are important in Egypt. They both 
have a large size and are political. Therefore the MB had access to a large base, which 
was already political, which was good for the new guard and their quest to challenge 
the state. 
10) In to the 1990s- what factors brought the Islamist takeover of the syndicates to 
the attention of the Egyptian government?, in particular the mobilisation to 
challenge state power/ 
Ella Madi: The success in the lawyers syndicate, the 1991 gulf . var and the 1992 
earthquake Nvere key events that would raise the profile and image of the MB. The 
MB began to co-ordinate the activities of other sNrndicates in response to the states 
support in the gulf war. The take over of the lawyers syndicate due to internal political 
crisis alloxvcd the MB to further politicise the syndicates. A number of seminars and 
conferenecs \N, cre held in the sýiidicates addressing socio-economic issues. The 199-1 
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earthquake saw the MB respond quickly, assisted by its large tanzim and resources. 
which embarrassed the state, which was slow to respond. 
I) To what extent was the MB's victory in the lawyers syndicate responsible for 
confrontation with the state? 
Ella Madi: The state was worried with the success of the MB in the la, ývyers syndicate 
and would invest time in undermining the rise of the MB in all syndicates in Egypt. 
12) What was the response of the MB to the introduction of Law 100 in 1993? 
Ella Madi: The MB reacted by attempting to create pressure on the state by petitions, 
seminars, meetings and demonstrations. But failed to overturn the legislation, 
however indicated the desperate nature of the state to weaken the MB in the 
syndicates. 
13) To what extent has such a law constrained the political work of the MB in 
syndicates? And has the MB found new avenues of political expression in 
Egypt? 
Ella Madi: The MB has continued to exist in the syndicates and to use them. No 
doubt flexibility and pragmatism of the new guard has allowed the MB to search 
for new political space to challenge the state via its involvement in protest 
movements and alternative political spaces. 
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Appendix D- Interview with Dr Amr Hainzaw. v (extracts) Cairo, June 1", 2004 
1) What role have syndicates played in the past? And how significant have tliey 
been in contesting state power? 
Hamzawy: Syndicates have played an important role in Egypt and continue to do so. 
They are vehicles through which the state power can be challenged through an 
educated and professional class. 
2) What was the relationship like between the state and syndicates under Nasser 
and Sadat? 
Hamzawy: The syndicates were dealt with harshly by Nasser and Sadat. For example 
Sadat turned against the lawyers syndicate after it criticised the peace agreement with 
Israel in 1979. Conflict developed between the syndicates and the state. 
3) Turning now to the 1980s, why did Mubarak relax state control over the 
syndicates? 
Hamzawy: Hosni Mubarak allowed limited political reforms for the purpose of 
political legitimacy, which he needed as he was an unknown political quantity in the 
early 1980s. 
4) What was the relationship like between Mubarak and the MB in the early 
1980s? 
Hamzawy: The Egyptian govenu-nent allowed space for the MB, in order to acquire 
much needed religious legitimacy in society. Mubarak used the MB for this purpose 
but this relationship would change later. 
5) Did Mubarak not foresee syndicates becoming a major source of activity for 
the MB? 
Hamza\\, y: Mubarak believed that the syndicates had been weakened and could be 
controlled but failed to take into consideration the change in the MB, in particular its 
ideas and discourse. 
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6) How important 
political work? 
would the syndicates be in the 1980s to the NIB and its 
Harnzawy: The MB use of the syndicates was part of a comprehensive policv to 
appeal to all sectors in society to challenge the state. 
7) What factors accounted for the rise and consolidation of the MB in the 
syndicates during the 1908s? 
Hamzawy: A number of factors led to the rise of the MB in the syndicates and their 
growing popularity- 1) corruption 2) mismanagement 3) political bickering 4) poor 
services. The MB addressed these issues and by providing much needed services 
renewed the legacy of social Islam and social justice. 
8) How important were the new guard in the early success of the MB in 
syndicates? 
Hamzawy: The new guard such as Abu Futuh and Essam. El Eynan were central 
behind the rise of the MB and push new pragmatic ideas into the MB to encourage 
change, which led to its domination over the syndicates in Egypt. 
9) How significant was the MB takeover of the medical (1984) and engineering 
syndicates (1987)? 
Hamzawy: The new guard's success in the medical and engineering syndicates was 
the I" step in the rise of the MB and its political challenge to the state. The new guard 
would push its blend of religion and politics in the syndicates. The state would 
become concerned with this success of the MB. 
10) In to the 1990s- what factors brought the Islamist takeover of the syndicates to 
the attention of the Egyptian government?, in particular the mobilisation to 
challenge state power/ 
Hamzax\, v: The 1991 gulf xar 1992 earthquake and lawyers syndicate victory put the 
MB on a course of collision with the state. These events not only allowed tile MB to 
use the syndicates to further politicise them to challenge the state but also raised the 
profile of tile MB not only in EgNjit but the wider Middle East. This was a major 
concern for the state, NN, hich felt weakened and needed to take action to restore its 
strength in Egýpt. 
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11) To what extent was the MB's victory in the lawyers syndicate responsible for 
confrontation with the state? 
Harnzawy: The MB showed its power with the success in the 1992 lawyers syndicate, 
this raised the concern of the state. As a result it reacted by taking action to stop the 
rise of the MB and a possible threat to its power in Egypt. 
12) What was the response of the MB to the introduction of Law 100 in 1993" 
Hamzawy: The MB organised seminars and talks to create pressure on the state. This 
failed as the syndicates were placed under judicial supervision, such as the engineers 
syndicate. The new guard refused to comply and there was conflict with the security 
forces. This reflected the broader spirit in the new guard, which emphasised the fact 
that the MB should not be deterred by the state from influencing syndicate politics in 
general. 
13) To what extent has such a law constrained the political work of the MB in 
syndicates? And has the MB found new avenues of political expression in 
Egypt? 
Hamzawy: Law 100 represented the states coercion not only towards the MB but 
to civil society in general. The MB was weakened but responded quickly like it 
has done in the past. This indicates the resilient nature of the MB and it continues 
to challenge the state through different means in civil society. 
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